Essays On Financial Crises by Villalvazo Martin, Sergio
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 
2021 
Essays On Financial Crises 
Sergio Villalvazo Martin 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Villalvazo Martin, Sergio, "Essays On Financial Crises" (2021). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 
4093. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4093 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4093 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Essays On Financial Crises 
Abstract 
This dissertation studies financial crises of the Sudden Stop type where large reversals in the current 
account are triggered by a deflation mechanism that tightens the borrowing capacity of individuals, and 
amplifies the effects of negative shocks. These episodes are characterized by large drops in consumption 
and domestic asset prices. The first chapter argues that inequality in wealth and leverage across 
households plays an important role in determining the aggregate effects of a crisis. Next, the second 
chapter studies the role that foreign direct investment flows have on the different frequency of crises 
observed in advanced and emerging economies. Finally, the third chapter develops a new algorithm that 
allows solving dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with occasionally-binding 












Asset-pricing, Debt-deflation, Financial crises, Household leverage, Inequality, Sudden Stops 
Subject Categories 
Economics 
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4093 
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 




Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Co-Supervisor of Dissertation 
Enrique G. Mendoza 
Presidential Professor of Economics 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
r-r�J-V� 
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde 




Co-Supervisor of Dissertation 
Professor and Chair of Economics 
Walter H. and Leonore C. Annenberg Professor in the 
Social Sciences and Professor of Economics and Finance 
Alessandro Davis 
Assistant Professor of Economics 







I am immensely grateful to my advisors, Enrique G. Mendoza and Frank Schorfheide, 
and my dissertation committee, Alessandro Dovis and Dirk Krueger, for their ex-
ceptional supervision and constant support. I also want to thank Hal Cole, Frank 
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL CRISES
Sergio Villalvazo Mart́ın
Enrique G. Mendoza and Frank Schorfheide
This dissertation studies financial crises of the Sudden Stop type where large re-
versals in the current account are triggered by a deflation mechanism that tightens
the borrowing capacity of individuals, and amplifies the effects of negative shocks.
These episodes are characterized by large drops in consumption and domestic asset
prices. The first chapter argues that inequality in wealth and leverage across house-
holds plays an important role in determining the aggregate effects of a crisis. Next,
the second chapter studies the role that foreign direct investment flows have on the
different frequency of crises observed in advanced and emerging economies. Finally,
the third chapter develops a new algorithm that allows solving dynamic stochastic
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Chapter 1
Inequality and Asset Prices during
Sudden Stops
by Sergio Villalvazo Mart́ın
1.1 Introduction
In the last 30 years, 58 financial crises have occurred in both emerging and developed
economies of the Sudden Stop type, each characterized by episodes of a large reversal
in the current account deficit.1 The occurrence of these crises has led to a vast liter-
ature that studies Sudden Stops using models with financial frictions but assuming a
representative-agent framework. In the paper in this chapter, we argue that inequal-
ity in wealth and leverage across households plays an important role in determining
the aggregate effects of a financial crisis.2 Specifically, an economy’s aggregate ex-
University of Pennsylvania.
1See Bianchi and Mendoza (2020) for a recent survey and review of the stylized facts of Sudden
Stops.
2Figure 1.10 shows descriptive evidence that emerging economies are more unequal than advanced
economies, and that Sudden Stop episodes are more severe in more unequal economies.
1
posure to tighter financial conditions depends on the share of financially vulnerable
households defined as those that end up constrained when the crisis happens. Sud-
den Stops are characterized by large declines in asset prices, which affect households
differently depending on their balance sheet. For example, micro-data evidence from
Mexico (an open economy commonly used to study Sudden Stops) shows that during
the 2009 crisis, households with high leverage decreased their expenditures by 6.2%
while non-leveraged households increased their expenditures by 5.4%. Moreover, the
value of asset holdings of wealthy households with low leverage increased 64.6% while
wealthy households with high leverage fire-sold and decreased the most their assets
during the crisis. Hence, studying only aggregate dynamics misses the fact that fi-
nancial crises do not affect all households in the same way and that inequality has
aggregate implications.
This paper addresses this issue by examining the cross-sectional dimension of the
debt-deflation mechanism introduced by Fisher (1933). This mechanism works as fol-
lows. After a negative3 aggregate shock that tightens the financial conditions of the
economy, financially constrained agents sell part of their collateralizable assets, which
puts downward pressure on asset prices. As asset prices drop, (possibly more) finan-
cially constrained agents have to sell a larger asset position, which causes feedback
that puts additional downward pressure on asset prices, and this, in turn, further
tightens aggregate financial conditions. This paper posits that the cross-sectional
dimension of the debt-deflation mechanism matters for macro dynamics of Sudden
Stops via two opposing effects: First, a crisis-dampening effect that weakens the debt-
deflation mechanism because unconstrained wealthy households can buy the depressed
3Commonly studied negative shocks in small open economy models are an increase in the inter-
national interest rate, a decrease in total factor productivity, a drop in the terms of trade, or an
ad-hoc tightening of the financial conditions of the economy. In this paper, the financial tightening
shock will be a hike in the international interest rate.
2
assets fire-sold by financially constrained households. Second, a crisis-amplifying ef-
fect that strengthens the debt-deflation mechanism because of financially vulnerable
households that become credit-constrained as asset prices fall. As aggregate financial
conditions tighten, such households also have to sell assets, increasing the downward
pressure on asset prices. Because these two cross-sectional effects constitute oppos-
ing forces, the role of the cross-section and inequality during crises is quantitatively
ambiguous. Hence, this paper conducts a quantitative investigation of the degree to
which the severity of Sudden Stops crises is affected by inequality in an economy.
To shed light on the empirical relevance of these issues, we examine a panel house-
hold survey for Mexico that provides evidence of the dampening and amplifying cross-
sectional effects. Moreover, we test – and reject – the individual complete-market hy-
pothesis. These results support our decision to use a heterogeneous-agent framework
to study financial crises and cross-sectional dynamics in households’ consumption and
portfolio choice
Then, the paper conducts a quantitative analysis of the effect of wealth inequality
on Sudden Stops. To this end, we propose a small-open-economy, asset-pricing Bew-
ley model with debt and assets, an endogenous occasionally-binding loan-to-value
(LtV) collateral constraint, and aggregate risk. At the individual level, markets
are incomplete, and households face both idiosyncratic labor and dividend income
risk. The combination of the dividend risk with an imperfect debt market (the LtV
constraint) generates an asset-wealth trade-off : more asset holdings relax the collat-
eral constraint and allow for better consumption smoothing (reducing consumption
volatility) but also, more asset holdings increase the divided risk exposure which
leads to higher income volatility of the household (increasing consumption volatility),
incentivizing additional precautionary savings. This trade-off makes high-dividend
asset-rich households deleverage faster than low-dividend households, producing an
3
empirically plausible leverage ratio distribution with wealthy unconstrained house-
holds that face non-degenerate portfolio choices.
In a version of the model calibrated to an emerging economy (Mexico), the quanti-
tative analysis shows that the dampening effect dominates and asset prices drop less in
heterogeneous-agents economies. In contrast to the representative-agent framework,
the model produces an empirically plausible leverage ratio distribution and gener-
ates persistent current account reversals with larger drops in consumption driven by
the most leveraged households, consistent with the data. Moreover, calibrating the
model to an advanced economy where the dividend risk is one-half of the bench-
mark emerging-markets model, the average net foreign debt position is twice as large,
consumption drops 0.8 percentage points less, and asset prices drop 0.4 percentage
points less. Hence, the model predicts that in economies with lower dividend return
volatility, income inequality is lower, the economy supports larger debt positions and
Sudden Stop crises are less severe, as observed in the data.
The analysis also shows that a constant 50% tax on dividend returns designed to
lower income inequality generates more frequent but less severe crises. In particular,
the probability of a Sudden Stop increases from 2.3% to 2.5%, and the current account
relative to GDP reversal is 0.9 percentage point smaller. The intuition for this result
comes from an equilibrium effect on asset prices. Under a redistributive dividend tax,
two things happen. First, households have a less potent precautionary savings motive
because they are effectively less exposed to dividend risk. Consequently, they demand
fewer bonds (or more debt if the bond holdings are negative) and less domestic assets.
Hence, the domestic asset’s equilibrium price drops to clear the market. On average,
the asset price is 54% smaller because of the dividend tax. Since the smaller asset’s
price tightens the debt limit for every household (the pecuniary externality), the long-
run share of financially constrained households increases from 3.4% to 8.2%. This
4
effect increases the economy’s exposure to changes in the international interest rate
and generates more frequent crises. Nonetheless, the second effect of the redistributive
dividend tax generates less severe crises in terms of the current account reversal, and
aggregate consumption drops 1 percentage point less. Since the financially vulnerable
households have effectively less debt because of the smaller asset price that tightens
the debt limit, their international bond adjustment is smaller and, together with the
redistributive government transfers, the drop in every household’s consumption, but
especially the high leveraged, is smaller.
After reviewing the literature in Section 1.2, in Section 1.3 we describe the empiri-
cal evidence that supports the cross-sectional effects of the debt-deflation mechanism.
The proposed model is described in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 describes the cross-
sectional effects through the lens of the model. Section 1.6 presents the quantitative
analysis and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to three strands in the economics literature. In the first strand,
Sudden Stop crises with financial frictions have been studied using representative-
agent models. For instance, Mendoza (2010) studies Sudden Stops in a standard
representative firm-agent real business cycle model augmented with a debt-deflation
mechanism. He introduces a loan-to-value collateral constraint that generates a pe-
cuniary externality, reflecting that agents do not internalize how their decisions today
affect the equilibrium Tobin’s Q price of capital that tightens or loosens the debt ca-
pacity. In a related paper, Mendoza and K. A. Smith (2006) study the debt-deflation
mechanism in a small open economy with a representative agent that trades domes-
tic equity with a foreign investor. In their model, the combination of a collateral
5
constraint and equity trading costs can produce realistic Sudden Stops. Our paper
complements both studies, yet it differs fundamentally from them because we study
the cross-sectional dimension of the debt-deflation mechanism. To this end, we intro-
duce market incompleteness at the individual level and study how the distribution of
households along bonds, assets, and individual productivities affects the asset’s price,
portfolio choices, and consumption dynamics during crises.
A second strand of the literature focuses on asset prices in closed economies with
individual incomplete markets. Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) study asset prices and
particularly the equity premium puzzle (see Mehra and Prescott, 1985) in a closed
economy with two assets (bonds and stocks), adjustment costs, and individual labor
income risk. The authors conclude that the difference in relative adjustment costs
between assets and the need to trade assets for consumption smoothing – introduced
by the individual market incompleteness – can generate a spread between the return
on bonds and stocks. Heaton and Lucas (1996), who study an economy with two types
of agents, income risk, adjustment costs, short-sales constraints, and debt constraints,
find that the adjustment costs can generate higher equity premiums. Studying the
excess volatility in asset prices that a loan-to-value constraint causes, Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999) explain price volatility in a model with limited heterogeneity. In their
environment there are only two representative agents: a household and a trader, and
when the trader is constrained, the multiplier in the collateral constraint is active
for the whole population of traders. This translates into higher volatility in asset
prices. More recently, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007) show that in a life-
cycle model, the effects of idiosyncratic labor risk are quantitatively significant if the
idiosyncratic risk becomes more volatile during economic contractions. They further
demonstrate that idiosyncratic risk inhibits inter-generational risk sharing, imposing
a disproportionate share of aggregate risk on the wealthy middle-aged cohorts who
6
demand an equity premium for their exposure to this risk. In their setting, the
young cohorts do not hold equity to avoid the counter-cyclical volatility risk. Our
paper differs from these because we model a small-open-economy with a continuum of
agents. This allows analyzing the distributional effects of an endogenous occasionally-
binding constraint that introduces a pecuniary externality. Moreover, we show that
in our setting, the equity premium can be decomposed into a constraint effect, a
risk effect, a trading cost effect that is expected to be close to zero, and a short-
sales effect. In fact, the trading cost effect will only be non-zero because of the
combination of the collateral constraint and the trading cost function. Hence, most
of the risk compensation proceeds from the LtV constraint and individual risk.
A third strand studies the macroeconomy accounting for individual heterogene-
ity, a line of inquiry begun with the pioneering work of Krusell and A. A. Smith
(1997), who developed quantitative tools to analyze economies in which the market
clearing price is a function of the distribution of agents (and not only of the mean
aggregate state) with individual incomplete markets and aggregate risk. Mendoza,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) examine how global imbalances can be precipitated
by the integration of economies that have different financial markets development.
They study the transition path after an unexpected integration of economies and
analyze the global balance sheet and equilibrium interest rates. In a related paper,
Kaplan and Violante (2014) study households with access to two types of assets that
differ in their liquidity. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) study the transition path in
a closed economy that experienced an unexpected tightening in the exogenous debt
limit. Finally, in a recent working paper, Huo and Ŕıos-Rull (2016) examine the effect
of asset prices in a closed economy without aggregate risk and study the transition
after an unexpected shock in the financial conditions. In contrast, we study the gen-
eral equilibrium in a small open economy with aggregate risk and individual labor
7
and dividend productivities. This setup, augmented with an individual loan-to-value
collateral constraint, allows us to analyze the cross-sectional dimension of the debt-
deflation mechanism and the pecuniary externality that it generates. Finally, in a
series of recent empirical papers that study the relationship between income inequal-
ity and crises, Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Morelli and Atkinson (2015) study the
predictive power of rising income inequality on financial crises without finding conclu-
sive evidence. One exception is Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015), who propose
a model to study the effect of changes in the top income distribution on household
leverage and crises. Lastly, Guntin, Ottonello, and Perez (2020) use micro-data to
asses individual consumption changes in episodes of large aggregate consumption ad-
justments. The authors argue that consistent with the permanent income hypothesis,
households with high income and liquid assets adjust their consumption severely dur-
ing such episodes. The present paper complements but differs fundamentally from
these papers because it studies a model with ex-ante homogeneous agents with ex-
post heterogeneity and uses this heterogeneous agent framework to study Sudden
Stops and the cross-sectional dynamics in the consumption and portfolio choice of
households. Moreover, we document the importance of leverage and not only the
liquidity of assets. In particular, we find that during a Sudden Stop, households with
high leverage adjust the most their consumption.
1.3 The Cross-Sectional Effects in the Data
This section first describes the data used to show that the cross-sectional effects of
the debt-deflation mechanism are empirically relevant. Then, sorting the households
according to their net wealth and leverage ratio, we obtain the changes in their
individual asset values and consumption during the 2009 Sudden Stop crisis. The
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results show that the households in the top decile of wealth and top decile of leverage
ratio fire-sold the most their assets while the low-leveraged households increased their
asset holdings.
1.3.1 Description of the data
We use data from The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) for the three available
waves: 2002, 2005, and 2009. The MxFLS is a longitudinal household survey that
collected information from a representative sample of approximately 8,400 households
in 150 localities throughout Mexico. The survey covers information on expenditures,
income, assets, and liabilities.4 The MxFLS is representative at the national, urban-
rural, and regional level.5 The sample selection criterion we used corresponds to the
households that answered the survey in all three waves. The resulting sub-sample
corresponds to 78% of the households in 2005.
Table 1.1 shows the mean net wealth, the portfolio decomposition, and the leverage
ratio in 2005 by deciles of the net wealth distribution. The leverage ratio is defined as
the household’s total debt over the sum of the household’s assets. As the second and
third rows show, Mexican households’ wealth is mostly in physical assets (real estate
and other durable goods). Although the proportion of debt decreases as households
have higher net wealth, as we can see from the last two rows of the Table, there are
leveraged and non-leveraged households in each of the deciles. The next section will
analyze the asset and consumption dynamics for households grouped by their level of
leverage ratio and net wealth.
4To the best of our knowledge, this survey is the only publicly available data source that covers
information about the households’ stock of assets and liabilities.












































































































































































































































































































































1.3.2 Stylized Facts: Differentiated Individual Effects
Mexico, as almost any other open economy, experienced a severe Sudden Stop crisis
in 2009. Aggregate data shows a current account reversal of 1.5 percentage points
relative to GDP, a 7% drop in per capita consumption, and house prices 4% below
the pre-crisis trend in 2010 (for an overview of the aggregate time series see Appendix
1.A.1). Moreover, the MxFLS survey shows that from 2005 to 2009, the sum of the
households’ gross asset values dropped 1%. At the household level, however, the crisis
had different effects depending on the composition of their balance sheets.
Supporting evidence of the cross-sectional effects:
The dampening cross-sectional effect comes from the unconstrained wealthy house-
holds that can buy the depressed assets fire-sold by the financially constrained house-
holds during a crisis. Table 1.2 shows the median change in the real estate owned
by households sorted out according to their net wealth and leverage ratio in 2009.6
Wealthy households correspond to the top decile of net wealth, and the financially
constrained households correspond to the top decile of the leverage ratio. As shown
in the Table, the real estate held by wealthy unconstrained households (top right
cell) increased by 59.4% while the rest of households experienced drops in their asset
holdings. Hence, this evidence supports the dampening effects coming from the cross-
sectional dimension: wealthy unconstrained agents take advantage of the depressed
prices and increase their asset positions.
Assuming that there were no creation or destruction of real estate, then it must
be the case that since the assets held by the unconstrained wealthy agents increased,
they were necessarily buying assets from someone else. Hence, other households were
selling their assets. Since the amplifying effect comes from the households that are
6The survey data corresponds to the value of real estate. To obtain the quantity change, we
deflated the value change with the aggregate house price index.
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close to becoming financially constrained, and once the mechanism is triggered, they
end up financially constrained and strengthen the downward pressure on asset prices.
The magnitude of the numbers in the Table suggests that the wealthy financially
constrained – the households in deciles X according to the net wealth and to the
leverage ratio – fire-sold the most their assets putting downward pressure on their
prices. Furthermore, wealthy financially vulnerable – the households in decile X
according to the net wealth and decile IX according to the leverage ratio – also ended
up fire-selling their assets as the financial conditions tightened. Hence, this evidence
supports the amplifying effects coming from the cross-sectional dimension: financially
vulnerable agents end up constrained and decrease their asset positions, increasing
downward pressure on asset prices.
Table 1.2: Median % Real Estate Change 2005-09
Net Wealth
Leverage Ratio I-IX X
(Non-Wealthy) (Wealthy)
I-VIII (Low-LR) -1.1 59.4
IX (High-LR) -1.9 -15.0
X (Very High-LR) -1.4 -36.5
Notes: Ordered by deciles in 2009. Source: MxFLS.
Additionally, in Table 1.3 we show the median change in the consumption of the
households according to their leverage ratio in 2005. During the crisis, households that
in 2005 were highly leveraged (bottom row) decreased by 6.2% their consumption.
These households were the most affected by the crisis since right before the crisis
happened, they were the most exposed to changes in the financial conditions of the
economy. In contrast to the declines in consumption of the high leveraged households,
the ones in the first decile that mostly have no debt and are net savers, increased their
consumption by 5.4%. Households that were moderately leveraged – deciles II to IX
12
– increased their consumption by less than the non-leveraged households supporting
a potential snowball effect: as the financial conditions tightened because financially
constrained agents fire-sold their assets, financially vulnerable households ended up
constrained. Moreover, these dynamics are different during normal years. In the first
column of the Table, we can see that households that end with low leverage ratios
are the ones most exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. While the moderately leveraged
households, who have debt capacity but are not financially constrained, increased
their consumption.
Table 1.3: Median % Consumption Change
Normal Times Crisis Times




Notes: Ordered by deciles in 2005. Source: MxFLS.
1.3.3 Stylized Facts: Heterogeneous Consumption Dynamics
In this section, we give evidence that the households have heterogeneous consumption
dynamics and that the modeling choice of a heterogeneous agent framework is sup-
ported by the data. Following Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017), we perform a test of the
complete-market hypothesis for Mexico. Under complete markets, changes in individ-
ual consumption depend only on aggregate fluctuations common to all individuals.
To perform the test, we estimate the following regression






where cit is the household i consumption in Ct is the aggregate consumption in year
t and yit is the household i income in year t. We reject at 1% significance level
the joint test of β = 1 and δ = 0. The point estimates with standard errors in
parenthesis are β = 0.73 (0.22) and δ = 0.05 (0.006). Which are similar to the
evidence from Thailand presented in Townsend (1995). Moreover, as we can see
in Figure 1.1 changes in consumption vary across households both in normal and
crises years. However, during the crisis, there is a larger negative mass and a more
concentrated distribution.
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Notes: The distributions are truncated at the top and bottom 1%. Source: MxFLS.
Additionally, Table 1.4 and Figure 1.2 show how the leverage ratio distribution
of households changed before and during the crisis. We can see that the mass of
financially constrained and the mass of indebted households increased when there
was high aggregate liquidity (2002 to 2005). The complement of these changes is that
the mass of savers decreased during the same period. This suggests that the economy
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moved to a more exposed aggregate state since more households had positive leverage,
and more households were becoming financially constrained. As the crisis unfolds and
aggregate liquidity is reduced, households, both financially constrained and indebted,
deleveraged, and more became net savers.
Table 1.4: Distribution of Households in %
2002 2005 2009
Savers (leverage ratio ≤ 0 ) 37.9 24.6 46.5
Indebted not constrained (leverage ratio ∈ (0, 0.144)) 45.7 57.2 37.5
Indebted constrained (leverage ratio ≥ 0.144]) 16.4 18.2 16.0
Notes: Truncated at a leverage ratio of 14.4%. Source: MxFLS.











-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8
- Leverage Ratio (solid gray: 2005, red: 2002, blue: 2009)
Notes: The leverage ratio corresponds to the total debts over the total assets of the household.
Positive values of the negative leverage ratio correspond to households with net savings and
negative values correspond to households with net debts. The distribution is truncated at the
mean leverage ratio of 0.14. Source: MxFLS.
Finally, we complement the evidence from the MxFLS with the Income and Ex-
penditure Household Survey (ENIGH). This survey is cross-sectional and is done
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every two years. In Figure 1.3 we show the Gini coefficient for consumption, and
we can see that during the crisis, consumption inequality decreased more than the
pre-crisis trend. This evidence is in line with the higher concentration documented
in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.3: Consumption Gini Coefficient
Notes: A larger Gini coefficient means more inequality. Source: ENIGH.
Having documented stylized facts about households’ cross-section, we describe the




The model proposed here is a Bewley model of a small open economy with inter-
national bonds, domestic equity, and an endogenous occasionally binding constraint.
Time is discrete and infinite t = 0, ...,∞. The economy is populated by a unit mea-
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sure of households. There are two financial assets: a one-period risk-free international
bond that the households can trade with the rest of the world and a risky domestic
asset (land) that is only tradable between the households and is subject to a trading
cost.7 Borrowing is subject to a loan-to-value (LtV) collateral constraint by which the
households’ international debt cannot exceed a fraction of the market value of their
assets, i.e., the domestic asset is collateralizable.8 Regarding the financial market’s
structure in the economy, markets are incomplete at the aggregate and individual lev-
els. With respect to the aggregate risk, the economy is subject to an aggregate shock
that determines the international interest rate. Concerning the individual risk, the
households face non-insurable idiosyncratic labor income risk and dividend income
risk. The latter risk means that households buy ex-ante identical shares of the risky
domestic asset but get ex-post heterogeneity in the return. Evidence of a similar
individual return on wealth is documented by Fagereng et al. (2020) and related in-
dividual capital income risk has been used by Angeletos (2007), Mendoza, Quadrini,
and Rios-Rull (2009), Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011) and Hubmer, Krusell, and
Smith Jr (2020). The combination of the dividend risk with an imperfect debt mar-
ket (the LtV constraint) generates an asset-wealth trade-off : more asset holdings
7The assumption of only domestic trading could be relaxed to allow foreign ownership up to a
certain percentage of the shares in the economy. With an exogenous stochastic foreign demand for
domestic shares, asset prices could become more volatile.
8The micro-foundations of the collateral constraint are similar to the ones presented by Bianchi
and Mendoza (2018) extended for an economy with non-insurable idiosyncratic risk. Specifically,
the LtV constraint is derived from an incentive compatibility constraint resulting from a limited
enforcement problem. In an economy where debt contracts are signed with creditors in a competitive
environment and households can always switch to another creditor at any point in time. At the
beginning of the period credit and asset markets open, production happens and households choose




t+1 with price qt. Then, markets close, and households decide to divert the
resources from the credit and default. Local competitive financial intermediaries monitor costlessly
who diverts resources and seize a fraction κ of the household asset holdings, which are qta
i
t+1.
After defaulting, the household regains access to credit markets instantaneously and repurchases
the assets that investors sell in open markets at a price qt. In this environment, a household that
borrows −R−1t bit+1 and engages in diversion activities gains −R−1t bit+1 and loses κqtait+1. Hence,
households repay if and only −R−1t bit+1 ≤ κqtait+1.
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relax the collateral constraint and allow for better consumption smoothing (reducing
consumption volatility) but also, more asset holdings increase the divided risk expo-
sure which leads to higher income volatility of the household (increasing consumption
volatility), incentivizing additional precautionary savings. This asset-wealth trade-off
will be studied in Section 1.5.1.
1.4.2 Households









where cit is consumption of household i, β ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor
and the utility function, u(·), has a common constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
form. Households have access to the international bond market and the domestic asset
market. However, since debt markets are imperfect, only secured-debt is available:
household assets serve as collateral. At the beginning of the period, each household
holds bit risk-free international bonds, a
i
t shares of the risky domestic asset that has an
endogenous price qt and pays a dividend d
i
t. The household receives labor endowment
income wit and uses funds to buy consumption goods c
i
t, bonds to carry for the next
period at an exogenous price equal to the inverse of the gross international rate Rt






(ait+1−ait)2. This cost reflects that trading the domestic asset requires
a higher level of financial knowledge relative to the bond market and that physical





















Households face a loan-to-value constraint that limits their ability to leverage
foreign debt on domestic asset holdings. Next period debt (negative bonds) can not




t+1 ≥ −κqtait+1. (1.4)
In addition, there is a short-sales constraint on the asset ait+1 ≥ 0.9 Note that the
portfolio choice problem is well defined given the combination of the trading costs in
the asset market and the loan-to-value debt constraint.
Lastly, the income of the households is composed of an idiosyncratic and an aggre-
gate part like in Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2015). The individual wage takes the form
wit = ε
i,w









to the idiosyncratic risk components which will be specified in the next section, and
{w, d} correspond to the aggregate, exogenous, and constant components.10
1.4.3 Exogenous stochastic processes
The economy is exposed to only one aggregate shock. The process for the international
interest rate is Rt = ε
R
t R̄ and log(ε
R






t ∼ N (0, σ2R).
Regarding the individual shocks, the individual wage takes the form wit = ε
i,w
t w and






t ∼ N (0, σ2w), and the individual dividend takes
the form dit = ε
i,d
t d and log(ε
i,d






t ∼ N (0, σ2d). Note
9The short-sales constraint is needed to ensure that the state space of asset holdings is compact
and that the LtV constraint is not irrelevant. If unlimited short selling of assets were possible,
households could always undo the effect of Equation 1.4.
10The structure of the income endowments is similar to an economy in which households supply
1 unit of labor inellastically, and production is done with a competitive constant returns to scale
production function that only demands aggregate labor, and pays competitive wages w to each
household. Additionally, households have an “Ak” production function that uses their individual
assets to produce and households obtain dividends d from such production. In the end, households
supply effective units of labor and assets so returns are multiplied by the idiosyncratic shocks.
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that the idiosyncratic labor and dividend risk that the households face do not have












εi,wt w di = w.
1.4.4 Closing the domestic asset market
The domestic asset is in positive fix net supply equal to K̄ and in equilibrium it must
be equal to the total asset holdings (demand) of the households. Hence, market-
clearing in the asset market requires:
1∫
0
ait di = K̄ for every t.
1.4.5 Recursive Formulation
To characterize the problem of the agents and the equilibrium in recursive form we
start by defining the states of the economy. Households are heterogeneous in their
current holding of bonds, assets, idiosyncratic labor and dividend productivity. The
individual states are: (b, a, εw, εd). We need to keep track of both the individual
bonds and assets given the asset trading costs and the imperfect debt market. Let
Ω(b, a, εw, εd) be the endogenous distribution of households according to their bonds,
assets and individual productivities. Regarding aggregate states, to forecast asset
prices, the households need to know the distribution of wealth. Hence, the aggregate
states correspond to the endogenous distribution Ω, and the exogenous shock to the
international interest rate εR. Letting the superscript ′ correspond to the variables in
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the next period, the recursive problem of a household becomes:
v(b, a, εw, εd,︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ind. states




u(c) + βE[v(b′, a′, εw′ , εd′ ,Ω′, εR′)]
s.t.
c+R(εR)−1b′ + q(Ω, εR)(a′ + Φ(a′, a)) = εww + a(q(Ω, εR) + εdd) + b, with mult. λ





Ω′ = HΩ(Ω, εR), (1.5)
where HΩ(·) corresponds to the aggregate law of motion of the distribution of
households.
Definition of a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Let the individual bond and asset holdings be elements (b, a) ∈ [
¯
b, b̄]× [0, ā] ≡ S and





} ≡ EI .
LetM be the set of probability measures of the set S × EI and the aggregate shocks
be elements εR ∈ {εR1 , ..., εRNR} ≡ E
A. Finally, let the function π(ε′|ε) be the exogenous
Markov transition probability of next period shocks take the realization ε′ conditional
on the shocks in the current period being ε, where ε = (εw, εd, εR) ∈ EI × EA. Now
we can define a recursive competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium in this economy is given by a value
function v : S×EI×M×EA → R, policy functions for the household c : S×EI×M×
EA → R, b′ : S × EI ×M×EA → R and a′ : S × EI ×M×EA → R, domestic asset
pricing function q :M×EA → R, and an aggregate law of motion HΩ :M×EA →M
such that:
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1. Given the asset pricing function and the aggregate law of motion, the value
function v satisfies the household’s Bellman Equation 1.5 and c, a′, b′ are the
associated policy functions,





a′(b, a, εw, εd,Ω, εR) dΩ = K̄,
3. For all Ω ∈M and εR ∈ EA, the aggregate resource constraint is satisfied:∫
S×EI
c(b, a, εw, εd,Ω, εR) dΩ +R(εR)−1
∫
S×EI











4. The aggregate law of motion is generated by the exogenous Markov process π
and the policy functions b′ and a′ as described below:
Let (εw, εd) = εI and εR = εA and define the transition function QΩ,εA : S×EI×
B(S)× B(EI)→ [0, 1], where B(·) is the corresponding Borel set, by
QΩ,εA(b, a, ε
I ,S ,E I) =
∑
εI′∈E I ,εA′∈EA
π(εI′, εA′|εI , εA), if (b′(b, a, εI ,Ω, εA), a′(b, a, εI ,Ω, εA)) ∈ S
0, otherwise.
Then, for any S ∈ B(S) and any E I ∈ B(EI) the aggregate law of motion is
given by




I ,S ,E I) dΩ.
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1.5 The Cross-Sectional Effects in the Model
In this section, we study the cross-sectional effects on the credit and equity channel
of the economy.
1.5.1 Market Incompleteness and Risk Exposure
The households are exposed to two sources of non-insurable idiosyncratic risk that
have different equilibrium implications. Note that the standard Bewley non-insurable
persistent labor income risk εw, together with the constant aggregate labor income
endowment assumption implies a fixed labor risk exposure. This means that the
exposure to the labor earnings risk is independent of the households’ decisions. In
contrast, the idiosyncratic persistent dividend productivity, εd, allows the households
to change future risk exposure by changing the next period holdings of the asset.
This varying dividend risk exposure, combined with the loan-to-value collateral
constraint, generates an asset-wealth trade-off. To see this, first, note that when
households are in an adverse state, they can smooth consumption in two ways: by
lowering their bond holdings b′ (if these are already negative, this means borrow
more) or by reducing their asset holdings a′. Given the financial frictions in the debt
market (see Equation 1.4), to have credit capacity and hence borrow, the household
needs first to save and accumulate assets. Note that although the current dividend
return is given since the current asset holdings are fixed in the current period (they
are an individual state variable), the household chooses how much future exposure
to have by choosing the next period asset holdings a′. Because the flow income of
the household is given by FI(a, εw, εd) = εww + aεdd, with independent idiosyncratic
risks its variance is V[FI(a, εw, εd)] = w2σ2εw +a2d2σ2εd which is a convex function with
respect to the asset holdings. This translates into more income volatility for asset-rich
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households. This property of the flow income generates the following trade-off from
getting more assets:
1. Households get higher debt capacity that allows higher smoothing and reduces
consumption volatility since R(·)−1b′(·) ≥ −κq(·)a′(·), incentivizing lower pre-
cautionary savings.
2. Households get higher future income risk that increases consumption volatility,
incentivizing higher precautionary savings.
In equilibrium, indebted asset-poor households increase their debts as they in-
crease their assets, and for households with high dividend returns, when they become
asset-rich, they start deleveraging (precautionary saving motives kick in) and some
end up being savers due to the increasing income risk.11 This behavior generates
unconstrained wealthy households which endogenously have a diversified portfolio:
asset-rich households end up holding both positive international bonds and domestic
assets.
Similar trade-offs have been studied in the literature but through different mech-
anisms. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) find that an individual investment
shock (similar to an individual dividend shock) makes agents lower their debt positions
as they increase their net wealth. The outcome for asset-rich households is the same
but for different reasons. Because we introduce the shock with persistence (theirs
is an iid shock) the households with a negative dividend shock want to lower their
bond position (or increase debts if negative) as the asset position increases. Moreover,
in our paper, introducing the LtV constraint and the individual non-trivial portfolio
choice problem makes asset-poor households increase their debts as they increase their
assets. In another study, Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011) show that idiosyncratic
11See the top row of Figure 1.5 in the graphical analysis of the policy functions done for the
calibrated stationary model in Section 1.6.2.
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capital returns determine the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution in
a Bewley economy. Their theoretical result is in line with the asset-wealth trade-off
described above since asset-rich households that get a positive dividend shock will in-
crease their net wealth by two sources: by buying more assets and by increasing their
bond position (or decreasing their debt if the bond position is negative). Hence the
share of wealthy households and the wealth inequality increase. However, again, the
combination of the dividend risk with the LtV constraint allows the model to generate
an empirical plausible distribution of constrained households, financially vulnerable
households that hold debt, and households with positive bond positions (savers).
1.5.2 Financial Premia
In this section, we study the effects that the households’ balance sheet heterogeneity
introduces. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional dimension of the debt-deflation
mechanism in terms of the external financing premium and equity premium at the
individual and aggregate levels. For simplicity, we omit the state variables and re-
introduce the superscript i to identify household-specific variables. Let λi, µi and
ψi be the multipliers on the budget constraint, the collateral constraint, and the
short-sales constraint, respectively, and let µ̃i = µ
i
λi




Similar to the analysis done by Mendoza and K. A. Smith (2006) but for an
economy with heterogeneous agents, from the first-order conditions of household i’s
problem we obtain an Euler Equation for individual bonds:
λiR−1 − µiR−1 = βE[λi′] ⇒









Let the individual expected effective interest rate be the inverse of the individual
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. Then, from the above
Euler Equation we get an individual expected external financing premium on debt:




This individual premium reflects the fact that when the constraint binds (µ̃i > 0),
the household would want to borrow more than what the collateral constraint allows.
Also, note that it is increasing on µ̃i. This means that as the constraint tightens, the
household would be willing to pay an interest rate higher than R for more debt.
Similarly, from the first-order conditions of household i’s problem we obtain the
Euler Equation for individual assets:
q(λi(1 + Φi1)− κµi)− ψi = βE[λi′(q′ + di′ − q′Φi′2 )],
where Φij corresponds to the partial derivative with respect to argument j. Let














As in Mendoza and K. A. Smith (2006), in Equation 1.7 we see a direct positive
effect in the individual equity premium coming from the collateral constraint: as µ̃i
increases, the individual equity premium increases by an additive term that multiplies
R(1 − κ) and by a multiplicative factor (1/(1 − µ̃i)) that affects the whole premia.
Also, there is a positive risk effect coming from the covariance term that will become
more negative due to the precautionary savings.12 Lastly, there is an ambiguous effect
12This risk effect also includes the next period’s marginal trading cost effect that is expected to
26
coming from the marginal trading costs. This last effect is expected to be negative for
financially constrained households since when µ̃i > 0, the household will sell assets
to smooth consumption and ai′ < ai ⇒ Φi1 < 0. When the constraint binds, a larger
equity premium reflects that buying an extra unit of the asset provides an additional
benefit since this additional unit also relaxes the constraint. However, this additional
benefit is imperfect since κ fraction of the assets is pledgeable as collateral.
The aggregate expected equity rate of return, E [Rq], can be obtained by first
integrating the individual expected asset returns over all the households:
1∫
0















































































≡ E [Rq] .
Then, we use the expected returns derived in Equation 1.7 to obtain a decom-
position of the aggregate expected equity premium. Assuming that fraction Ī of
households are credit constrained and without loss of generality sorting constrained
increase the precautionary motives. The intuition for this is the following. Note that the household
that next period gets a high divided return will buy more shares, hence ai′′ > ai′ ⇒ Φi′2 < 0⇒ d̃i,′ >
di′, effectively the individual dividend risk increases due to the trading costs.
27
households from 0 to Ī we obtain the following result:


































This expression shows that the aggregate excess returns can be decomposed into
four effects. First, a positive direct effect coming from the measure of constrained
households and from how “strong” the constraint binds. Second, the risk effect com-
ing from the covariance between the individual stochastic discount factor and the
individual return on the equity (note that the integral becomes a weighted average
of the covariances with larger weights on constrained households since µ̃i > 0 ⇒
1/(1 − µ̃i) > 1). Since constrained households are expected to have more negative
covariances due to the increased individual consumption volatility and the precau-
tionary savings behavior, we expect a positive risk effect. Third, the trading cost




Φi1 di = 0 we can expect the aggregate effect to be close to zero and decreasing
with respect to φ. This trading cost effect comes from the interaction of the collateral
constraint and the trading cost function since if there are no constrained households,
this term becomes zero. Fourth, a short-sales effect that decreases the equity pre-
mium since households with a binding short-sales constraint increase the marginal
gain of additional asset holdings and has no effect on the marginal benefit of saving
in assets.
Finally, the debt-deflation cross-sectional effects in the risk premium are:
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1. Dampening effect: having more unconstrained wealthy households reduces the
equity premium by having a smaller risk effect since they are better able to
smooth consumption.
2. Amplifying effect: having more financially vulnerable households increases the
equity premium due to a larger constraint effect (larger Ī) and by having a larger
risk effect since these constrained households have more consumption volatility.
Note that the precautionary behavior introduced by the asset-wealth trade-off,
under empirically suitable high persistence of the dividend risk, generates uncon-
strained households. Hence, in the stationary equilibrium the measure of financially
constrained households is Ī < 1. Intuitively, when households get a high individual
dividend return, they accumulate more assets. Since the individual risk is sufficiently
persistent, this gives households enough time to become asset-rich and the dividend
risk exposure is high enough such that the precautionary savings motive makes house-
holds deleverage and become unconstrained. In the next section, we use the model as
a measurement device to quantitatively study the cross-sectional effects of a Sudden
Stop episode.
1.6 Quantitative Analysis
This section presents the quantitative results of the model. Due to the computational
intensity of the solution method, we calibrate the parameters using the stationary
model without aggregate risk.13 To calibrate the model, we use data for Mexico.
Table 1.5 shows the calibrated parameters.
13Since the economy has an endogenous occasionally-binding constraint, the household’s policy
functions are expected to be highly nonlinear, and a global solutions method is needed. We use
the FiPIt algorithm proposed by Mendoza and Villalvazo (2020) to solve the household’s problem
combined with the stochastic-simulation approach by L. Maliar, S. Maliar, and Valli (2010) and




Parameter Value Source or Target
Calibrated outside of the model
ν Risk aversion 2 Common in the literature
R̄ Interest rate 1.03 Mean interest rate Mexico 1990-2017
κ Debt fraction of collateral 0.14 Mean leverage ratio in 2005
K̄ Net asset supply 1 Normalization
Calibrated by simulation
β Discount factor 0.90 Mean NFA/GDP ratio of -40%
φ Trading cost 3.5 Mean transaction cost of 5%
Individual labor income risk
w Average wage 0.072 See Section 1.6.1
ρw Autocorrelation 0.91
σw Std. dev. 20%
Individual dividend income risk
d Average dividend yield 0.036 See Section 1.6.1
ρd Autocorrelation 0.94
σd Std. dev. 83%
Aggregate interest rate risk
R Interest rate value {1.01, 1.05} See Section 1.6.1
ρR Autocorrelation 0.90
Regarding the set of parameters that are calibrated outside of the model, we
set the household’s risk aversion ν = 2 which is a value common in the literature.
The average international interest rate equal to 3% which is Mexico’s interest rate
average between 1990 to 2017. The collateral debt fraction κ equal to 0.14 which is
the average leverage ratio in 2005. Lastly, the net asset supply is normalized at 1.
Then, we calibrate by simulation the discount factor β = 0.90 to match the average
net foreign asset position relative to GDP for Mexico equal to 40% and the trading
cost parameter φ equal to 3.5 to obtain an average transaction cost of 5% which is
consistent with the estimates from Aiyagari and Gertler (1999).
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To estimate the exogenous earning process we apply the methodology described
in Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016) using Mexican data.14 First, we estimate a
Mincer log-earnings equation with time fixed effects
log(Y ia,t) = β
′X ia,t +Dt + y
i
a,t , (1.9)
where each observation corresponds to an individual i, with quarterly age a and in
quarter t. Y ia,t corresponds to the annual income of the person, the vector of controls
X ia,t includes a cubic polynomial on age, dummy variables for the education level and
a dummy variable that identifies if the worker is in the informal sector. Finally, Dt
corresponds to the time fixed effects dummy variables. After running the regression,
we obtain the residuals yia,t and assume the income risk follows a stationary process
with a persistent and transitory component. The stationarity assumption allows us











ηi,wa ∼ (0, σ2w), zi0 ∼ (0, σ2z0), ε
i
a ∼ (0, σ2ε ). (1.10)





, σ2ε ). These
14There is a vast literature on the estimation of the labor income risk (see Meghir and Pistaferri,
2004, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2004, Guvenen, 2007, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante,
2010).
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σ2ε =V[yia−1]− ρ−1COV[yia, yia−1]
σ2w =V[yia−1]− COV[yia, yia−2]− σ2ε
σ2z0 =V[y
i
0]− σ2ε . (1.11)
We use data from the National Survey of Employment and Occupation (ENOE) to do
an over-identified GMM estimation with an identity weighting matrix.15 The ENOE
survey is a quarterly household rotating panel with a representative sample of 120,000
households that started in 2005-I. Every household is interviewed for 5 consequently
quarters and each quarter 20% of the sample is replaced. As the standard practice in
the literature, our sample selection criteria are individuals with ages between 20 and
60, males, and with positive earnings. Table 1.6 shows the estimated parameters and
compares them with the literature’s estimation done for the US.
We find that the estimated persistence of the income risk process is smaller, and
the variance is larger for Mexico compared to the US. A reason for this difference
could come from the informal market structure that is common in emerging economies
(Leyva and Urrutia, 2020). The Mexican labor market is characterized by having a
high informality rate in which more than 50% of informal employment. Since the
informal sector is relatively more flexible than the formal sector, it could create a
less permanent effect of idiosyncratic shocks. Moreover, Gomes, Iachan, and Santos
(2020) find that informality is associated with more volatile earnings. Finally, the
combination of a large informal sector and the lack of unemployment insurance could
15Note that to just-identify the parameters we only need data for ages (a, a− 1, a− 2). Since we


























































































































































































































































also cause a higher income risk.16 To explore this reason, in the second column, we
show the results from the estimation done with a subsample of only formal employ-
ment. As expected, the difference narrows, although the change is small. Given that
we do not explore specific heterogeneity in the labor markets in the model, we sill use
as a benchmark the results from the first column that include all the employment.
Lastly, the discrete labor income risk process is approximated using a symmetric 2-
state Markov chain using a simple persistence rule following Mendoza (2010). The
discretized risk takes the values εw ∈ {εwL = 0.80, εwH = 1.20} and the probability
that the next period realization of the shock is the same as the current period is
Pr[εw
′
= εwj |εw = εwj ] = 0.95 for j ∈ {L,H}.
The dividend income risk plays a key role in the decision rules of the house-
holds and drives the asset-wealth trade-off discussed in Section 1.5.1. However, a
proper estimation of this process is infeasible due to the lack of available data in most
economies.17 Due to the restrictions of the available data for Mexico, we take the
following calibration strategy. We jointly calibrate the three parameters that charac-
terize the dividend income risk (d̄, ρd, σd) to match the leverage ratio distribution of
households in 2005. Specifically, we focus on three distribution statistics: the measure
of savers that have financial assets (negative leverage ratio), indebted households that
have positive debts but are not close to their debt limit, and financially constrained
households. The calibrated parameters are (d = 0.036, ρd = 0.94, σd = 0.83) and
similarly to the labor risk, the discrete dividend risk process is approximated us-
ing a symmetric 2-state Markov chain using a simple persistence rule. Hence, the
16Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2015) study the consequences on the labor market of implement-
ing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and find that an
unemployment benefit could increase the formality rate.
17One exemption is the work by Fagereng et al. (2020) which estimate the wealth risk using
administrative data from Norway and find that there is high heterogeneity in the wealth returns and
that these differences are highly persistent.
34
discretized risk takes the values εd ∈ {εdL = 0.17, εdH = 1.83} and the probability
that the next period realization of the shock is the same as the current period is
Pr[εd
′
= εdj |εd = εdj ] = 0.97 for j ∈ {L,H}. These estimates imply that the effec-
tive dividend yield (εdd) the households will face can take the following two values:
{0.6%, 6.6%}. The matched distribution is shown in Table 1.7. Lastly, the aggregate
wage level, w, is set set equal to 2dK̄ such that the average household has a total flow
income that correspond to two-thirds labor income and one-third dividend income.
Table 1.7: Leverage Ratio Distribution of Households in %
Data in 2005 Stationary Model
Savers: leverage ratio ≤ 0 24.6 25.1
Indebted not constrained: leverage ratio ∈ (0, 0.14) 57.2 57.0
Financially constrained: leverage ratio ≥ 0.14] 18.2 17.9
Notes: Financially constrained households correspond to the households with leverage ratio above
the mean leverage ratio equal to 0.144 in 2005. Source: MxFLS.
The last exogenous process that needs to be calibrated corresponds to the inter-
national interest rate. This process will also follow symmetric 2-state Markov chain
with values R ∈ {1.01, 1.05} and persistence ρR = 0.90. These values are common in
the literature of small open economies and have been used in studies of the Mexican
economy (see Bianchi, 2016).
1.6.2 Stationary Model
In this section, we analyze the stationary equilibrium for an economy in which the
interest rate is constant at its steady state value of 3% – i.e., a Bewley economy
without aggregate risk. The stationary model does a good job capturing the wealth
and consumption inequality, as seen in Table 1.8. This is the result of the asset-wealth
trade-off described in Section 1.5.1.
Moreover, in Table 1.9 we show the average net wealth, assets, and debts by
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Table 1.8: Non-targeted Inequality Measure
Model Data
Wealth Gini 0.678 0.733
Consumption Gini 0.305 0.497
Notes: Source: MxFLS.
deciles relative to the median level of each variable for simulated data and observed
data in 2005. As we can see in the top and medium rows, the net wealth and assets
distributions generated by the model are very close to the ones obtained from the
MxFLS in 2005. Regarding the total debt, the only decile that is significantly different
is the bottom decile. One possible reason for this difference is that we do not allow
the households to default in the model and cannot hold more debt than the collateral
limit. Where in the real data, households in the bottom decile have negative net
wealth. However, for the rest of the deciles, the model does a good job of capturing
the inequality in terms of the net wealth, total assets, and debt.
Table 1.9: Variables relative to the median, ordered by net wealth
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Net Wealth relative to median
Data -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1 1.6 2.2 3.2 4.9 22.1
Model 0 0.1 0.4 0.7 1 1.5 2.2 3.3 5.8 16.5
Assets relative to median
Data 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1 1.6 2.2 3.1 4.8 21.3
Model 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1 1.5 2.2 3.4 5.9 17
Debt relative to median
Data 4.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 1 1.8 1 1.6 2.4 5.2
Model 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 1 1.5 2.3 3.5 6.2 9.5
Notes: Deciles ordered by the net wealth.
Regarding the aggregate equity premium, in Table 1.10 we show its level and
decomposition. As expected, the risk component contributes the most to the equity
premium, about 60%. The other 40% corresponds to the constraint effect. Note that
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the calibration was done to capture the measure of constrained households in 2005
equal to 18% (see Table 1.7). Hence, even if only these households have an active
debt constraint, there is an important contribution to the equity premium.
Table 1.10: Decomposition of the Equity Premium
Model Data
Equity Premium 4.9% 6.5%
Constraint Effect 39.1% -
Risk Effect 59.7% -
Trading Cost Effect 2.7% -
Short-Sales Effect -1.5% -
Notes: Data from Damodaran (2013) corre-
sponds to Mexico in 2005.
Finally, notice that the debt-deflation mechanism affects a household’s consump-
tion when two things happen. First, the household must be highly leveraged, so
when the collateral constraint tightens, they are close to (or at) the binding region
and they need to adjust their asset holdings; and second, the household must have a
large debt-to-expenditure ratio so when they have to deleverage, there is a significant
impact on their consumption. As a model validation exercise, the following figures
show how well the model replicates the distribution of households with respect to
the joint leverage ratio and debt-to-expenditure ratio. In overall terms, the model
does a good job replicating the joint distribution, with a slight underestimation of the
measure of households in the top quintile of leverage ratio and debt-to-expenditure
ratio.
Regarding the policy functions, in the upper row of Figure 1.5 the solid lines
correspond to the bond policy for the high (low) dividend shock in blue (red) and
the average labor income shock as a function of the current asset holdings for three
different values of the current bond holding b#. Additionally, the dashed lines rep-
resent the corresponding debt limits, and the black dashed lines correspond to the
37
Figure 1.4: Joint leverage ratio and debt-to-expenditure ratio distribution
(a) LR q=I (b) LR q=II (c) LR q=III
(d) LR q=IV (e) LR q=V
Notes: Solid lines correspond to the simulated distribution of the stationary model. Dashed lines
correspond to the distribution for Mexican households in 2005.
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bottom 1% and top 99% percentiles of bond and asset holdings obtained from the
model’s simulated time series. The figure, shows that for low dividend shocks (red
lines) a household lowers their bond holdings (or gets more debt) as they increase
their asset holdings. This effect is stronger for constrained households, as shown in
panels c) and e). As described in Section 1.5.1, the asset-wealth trade-off generates
the convex form of the bond policy for high dividend shocks (blue lines). For asset-
poor households, as they increase their assets, they also lower their bond holdings (or
get more debt if the holdings are negative) and there is a certain level for which the
dividend risk exposure overcomes the benefit from more debt capacity that makes the
households increase their bond holdings. Regarding the lower row of the figure, we
can see the asset policy function that is highly linear and behaves as expected: for
high-dividend shocks the households accumulate more assets, and for low-dividend
shocks the households de-accumulate assets.
Moreover, in Figure 1.6 we show similar bond and asset policies but now as a
function of the current bond holdings. In the left column, we can see the standard
bond policies under a binding debt limit. Panel a) shows the policy for a high-asset
holder. Here we can see that the debt limit is not binding for the states within the 1
and 99th percentiles. However, as we move to lower asset holdings, in Panel c) and e),
we can see that the LtV becomes binding when households accumulate enough debt.
With respect to the cross-sectional fire-sales in the model, in the right column we
can see that households accumulate less assets as they increase their debt holdings.
However, this relation is highly strengthened (households incur in fire-sales) when the
debt limit becomes binding. This can be seen using panels c) and d) and also panels
e) and f). There are strong declines in the asset holdings (panels d) and f)) in the
states where the bond holdings reach the debt limit (panels c) and e)).
Additionally, in Figure 1.7 we show the difference between the bond policy func-
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Figure 1.5: Stationary bond and asset policies as a function of current asset holdings
(a) p99 Current Bond Holding








(b) p99 Current Bond Holding







(c) p50 Current Bond Holding








(d) p50 Current Bond Holding







(e) p01 Current Bond Holding








(f) p01 Current Bond Holding







Notes: For a current bond holding b# and mean labor shock ε̄w, the left (right) column corresponds to the bond
(asset) policies, the solid blue (red) line corresponds to the policy function with the high (low) dividend shock and
the dashed blue (red) line corresponds to the debt limit with the high (low) dividend shock. Black dashed lines
correspond to the bottom 1% and top 99% percentiles of bond and asset holdings obtained from the model’s
simulated time series. Black dotted lines correspond to the 45-degree line. The missing values across the state space
correspond to the infeasible individual states that would imply a negative consumption.
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Figure 1.6: Stationary bond and asset policies as a function of current bond holdings
(a) p99 Current Asset Holding



















(c) p50 Current Asset Holding








(d) p50 Current Asset Holding







(e) p01 Current Asset Holding








(f) p01 Current Asset Holding






Notes: For a current bond holding b# and mean labor shock ε̄w, the left (right) column corresponds to the bond
(asset) policies, the solid blue (red) line corresponds to the policy function with the high (low) dividend shock and
the dashed blue (red) line corresponds to the debt limit with the high (low) dividend shock. Black dashed lines
correspond to the bottom 1% and top 99% percentiles of bond and asset holdings obtained from the model’s
simulated time series. Black dotted lines correspond to the 45-degree line. The missing values across the state space
correspond to the infeasible individual states that would imply a negative consumption.
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tions and the dividend shocks in panel a) and labor income shocks in panel b). We
can see a positive and increasing difference in the next period bond holdings between
the high and low dividend productivities as we move to higher current asset holdings
(Figure 1.7.a). This means that when the idiosyncratic dividend realization is high,
the household optimally chooses also larger bond holding for the next period. More-
over, this difference is kept almost constant (only increases close to the debt limit)
across the current bond holdings. In contrast, in Figure 1.7.b we can see that the
difference in the bond policy function between the high and low idiosyncratic labor
productivity realization is positive but close to zero and constant throughout all the
feasible state space. Similarly, in Figure 1.8 we show the difference between the asset
policy functions and the dividend shocks in panel a) and labor income shocks in panel
b). We can see a positive and increasing difference in the next period asset holdings
between the high and low dividend productivities as we move to higher current asset
holdings (Figure 1.8.a). However, for high enough asset values, this positive difference
becomes relatively constant. Moreover, this difference is kept almost constant (only
increases close to the debt limit) across the current bond holdings. Finally, similarly
to the bond policy function, in Figure 1.8.b we can see that the asset holding differ-
ence between the high and low idiosyncratic labor productivity realization is positive
but close to zero and constant throughout all the feasible state-space.
In summary, we used the stationary model to show the cross-sectional behavior of
households. We can see that households with high-dividend shocks will accumulate
more assets and, while they are still asset-poor, they de-accumulate bonds. Once they
become asset-rich, because of the asset-wealth trade-off, they start accumulating more
bonds (Figure 1.5). This behavior generates wealthy unconstrained households that
drive the dampening cross-sectional effect. Moreover, we also show that households
de-accumulate assets as they increase their debts, and that this relation strengthens
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Figure 1.7: Effect of Non-insurable Individual Shocks in the Bond Policy
(a) Difference in Dividend Shock (b) Difference in Labor Shock
Notes: ε̄w and ε̄d correspond to the mean shock values. The missing values across the state space
correspond to the infeasible individual states that would imply a negative consumption.
Figure 1.8: Effect of Non-insurable Individual Shocks in the Asset Policy
(a) Difference in Dividend Shock (b) Difference in Labor Shock
Notes: ε̄w and ε̄d correspond to the mean shock values. The missing values across the state space
correspond to the infeasible individual states that would imply a negative consumption.
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(households incur in fire-sales) when the debt limit is reached, driving the strength
of the amplifying effect (Figure 1.6). Note that the representative-agent model would
miss both effects. First, since there are no individual shocks, every household will
behave in the same way. Hence, they either want to sell or want to buy more assets.
Second, in that model, the average debt constraint multiplier will be the same as
the individual debt multiplier, while in the heterogeneous-agents model, although
fewer households could be constrained, they could have a stronger multiplier given
the individual states. Finally, we used the stationary solution for simplicity and to
avoid the extra aggregate states that would be needed in the aggregate risk model.
1.6.3 Aggregate Risk Model
To solve the aggregate risk model, we adapt the non-trivial market clearing algorithm
proposed by Krusell and A. A. Smith (1997) to a small-open-economy framework.




the current interest rate R− 1 to forecast the next period’s net foreign asset position
B′ and the domestic asset price q. This algorithm is computationally intensive since
the market clearing asset price depends on the whole distribution of asset holdings
and not only on the aggregate holdings (which are constant). For this reason, to
obtain a simulated time series, each period, we use the aggregate law of motions to
forecast the next period’s aggregate net foreign asset position and the next period’s
asset’s price. With these forecasts, we then solve a fixed-point problem for every
period, which gives as solution the equilibrium market clearing price.18 The solution
18See Appendix 1.A.2 for a description of the solution algorithm.
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of the aggregate law of motions are:
B′ = − 0.005 + 0.870 B + 0.054 (R− 1), R2 = 0.99
q = 0.517 + 0.126 B − 0.301 (R− 1), R2 = 0.92 (1.12)
Simulation and Event Study of Sudden Stops
Using the solution to the aggregate law of motions, we simulate a panel of 1,000 house-
holds for 6,000 periods and drop the first 1,000 periods. Table 1.11 reports long-run
moments of the main macro aggregates from the model with heterogeneous-agents
and a representative-agent version without idiosyncratic risk and a lower leverage
limit, κ that matches the same average leverage ratio of 0.11. Regarding the mean
of the variables, the current account as a percentage of GDP is zero for both models.
Average consumption is 8 percent higher, and the asset price is 40 percent higher in
the heterogeneous-agents model. Since households do not need to self-insure against
idiosyncratic shocks in the representative-agent model, there are less precautionary
savings and less demand for the domestic asset. This equilibrium effect lowers the
average asset price and tightens the aggregate financial conditions, lowering average
consumption. Regarding the standard deviations, although the current account is 2.5
times more volatile and the asset price is 3.9 times more volatile in the representative-
agent economy, consumption volatility is 17% larger in the heterogeneous-agents econ-
omy. This result comes from the larger consumption adjustments that high leveraged
households have to do when they get hit by a negative shock. The heterogeneous-
agents model shows high and positive first-order autocorrelations, which are in line
with the data (see Mendoza, 2010). Lastly, regarding crisis episodes, we identify
Sudden Stops as the periods in which the current account is 2 standard deviations
above its historical mean, which is a common practice in empirical work (see Calvo,
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Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006). The last row of the table reports the probability of
Sudden Stop events. In the heterogeneous-agents economy, a less volatile current ac-
count compared to the representative-agent economy, lowers the threshold to identify
Sudden Stops and increases its frequency.
Table 1.11: Business Cycle Statistics
Heterogeneous-agents Representative-agent
Mean
CA/GDP % 0.00 0.00
Consumption 0.12 0.11
Asset Price (q) 0.52 0.36
Standard deviation (in percent)
CA/GDP % 0.89 2.01
Consumption 2.50 2.14




Asset Price (q) 0.83 -0.60
Prob. of Sudden Stops 2.3% 1.4%
Notes: Sudden Stop episodes are defined as the periods where the current account as a
percentage of GDP is 2 standard deviations above its mean.
To construct the event study of the simulated Sudden Stops, we average across all
the identified crisis periods. Figure 1.9 shows the percent deviations from the steady
state where the crisis period corresponds to t = 0. The average of the simulated crisis
episodes in the heterogeneous-agents economy corresponds to the solid lines and the
average of the data for Mexico around 1995 and 2009 Sudden Stops corresponds to
the dashed line.
Figure 1.9.a shows that the Sudden Stops occur when there is an interest rate
increase. This is expected since the interest rate is the only source of aggregate un-
certainty in this economy. However, note that not all the interest rate increases cause
46
Figure 1.9: Event Study of a Sudden Stop
(a) Interest Rate















































Notes: Solid lines correspond to the simulated data using the heterogeneous-agent model
calibrated to Mexico, dotted lines correspond to the average of the Mexican data around the 1995
and 2009 Sudden Stops. Panels a), b) and e) correspond to the level difference to the long-run
mean. Panels c) and d) correspond to percentage point deviations from the long-run average.
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a crisis. Specifically, the long-run probability of a Sudden Stop in the simulated
economy is 2.3%. In 1.9.b we can see that a crisis episode is preceded by periods
with current account below the long-run average. Then, when the crisis happens
(t = 0) there is a sharp reversal in the current account which means that interna-
tional capital stops flowing into the economy. Consistent with the data, the crisis is
persistent and takes more than 3 years for the international capital to flow back into
the economy. Regarding the asset price drop, in 1.9.c we can see that the simulated
price is 1.7% below the steady state which is below the asset price index for Mexico
and in 1.9.d we can see that the model is able to generate a large and persistent
aggregate consumption drop. Finally, 1.9.e shows that the model is able to capture a
decline in consumption inequality during the crisis measured with the Gini coefficient,
consistent with the data.
Regarding the differentiated individual effects during a Sudden Stop, in Tables
1.12 and 1.13 we show the dynamics of the asset holdings and consumption according
to the leverage ratio and wealth of the households in a similar way as the results
presented in Section 1.3.2. We can see that the model does a good job capturing the
dampening effect coming from the wealthy unconstrained households that buy assets
during a crisis and relieve the downward pressure on the price. In particular, these
households increased by 3.8% their asset holdings during the crises. Moreover, in
line with the empirical evidence on the amplifying effect, the financially constrained
wealthy households are the ones that fire-sale the most their assets during the crisis
and decreased their asset holdings by 9.8%. Although in the model, the households
in decile IX of the leverage ratio do not sell their assets, we can see that they increase
in a smaller amount than the low-leveraged households. Hence, the model is able
to capture both cross-sectional effects. In Table 1.13, we see that, in line with the
empirical evidence, households with larger leverage ratios decrease the most their
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consumption. Hence, the model captures the heterogeneous consumption dynamics
coming from the different leverage ratio levels and that crisis do no affect every
household in the same way.
Table 1.12: Median % Asset Holdings Change in a Crisis
Net Wealth
Leverage Ratio I-IX X
(Non-Wealthy) (Wealthy)
I-VIII (Low-LR) -0.1 3.8
IX (High-LR) 1.7 2.3
X (Very High-LR) 0.8 -9.8
Notes: Ordered in the period of the crisis.
Table 1.13: Median % Consumption Change




Notes: Ordered in the period previous to the crisis.
Lastly in Table 1.14, we show percent deviations from the steady state of the cur-
rent account as a percentage of the GDP, consumption and the asset price for Mexico
and different simulated economies. Columns (1) and (2) show the observed deviations
in 1995 and 2009 for Mexico, respectively. In column (3) we show the heterogeneous-
agents model calibrated to an emerging economy (Mexico). We can see that in the
benchmark calibration, the asset price drop is smaller than the consumption drop,
consistent with the data. Finally, in column (4) we show the representative-agent
version of the model in which there is no idiosyncratic risk, and the leverage ratio
limit, κ, is reduced to match the average leverage obtained in the heterogeneous-agent
economy. Comparing columns (3) and (4) we can see that in the heterogeneous-agents
economy the dampening effect dominates and asset prices drop less. However, there
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is a larger adjustment in aggregate consumption mainly driven by the most leveraged
households (see Table 1.13).
Table 1.14: Comparison of Dynamics during Sudden Stops
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mexico Mexico Het. Agents Rep. Agent
1995 2009 Benchmark EE Match Mean Lev. Ratio
CA / GDP p.p. 2.6 0.4 2.8 0.3
Consumption -8.3% -5.3% -3.4% -1.3%
Asset Price (q) -3.7% -1.8% -1.7% -3.0%
Notes: Sudden Stop episodes are defined as the periods where the current account as a
percentage of GDP is 2 standard deviations above its mean.
Effect of a Lower Variance in the Dividend Risk
In this section, we compare the severity of Sudden Stops in economies with different
degrees of inequality. Figure 1.10 shows descriptive evidence that crises are more
severe in more unequal economies. The figure shows a scatter plot with the percentage
change in consumption and in GDP during Sudden Stops for different economies
(advanced in triangle and emerging in circle) against their income Gini index. This
evidence suggests that emerging economies are more unequal and that there is a
negative correlation between both variables.
To quantitatively asses the effects of lower income inequality, we calibrate the
model to an advanced economy where the dividend risk is one-half of the benchmark
emerging-markets model. In Figures 1.11 and 1.12 we show the event study analysis
for the same history of individual and aggregate shocks for the two calibrations: the
emerging economy from the previous section in solid lines and the advanced economy
with the same calibration but with half variance in the dividend risk in dashed lines.
The results during the crises, summarized in Table 1.15, show that in the version of
the model calibrated to an advanced economy (dashed lines), the average net foreign
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Figure 1.10: Severity of Sudden Stops and Inequality
Notes: Triangle (circle) markers correspond to advanced (emerging) economies. Dates of Sudden
Stop episodes come from Bianchi and Mendoza (2020). Gini index measures income inequality,
larger numbers mean larger inequality (income instead of wealth is used due to the availability in a
larger sample of countries). ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: The World Bank.
debt position is twice as large, consumption drops 0.8 percentage points less and asset
prices drop 0.4 percentage points less. Hence, the model predicts that in economies
with less dividend return inequality, the economy supports larger debt positions and
Sudden Stop crises are less severe, as observed in the data,
Table 1.15: Sudden Stop Deviations: Different Heterogeneous Economies
(1) (2) (3)
Het. Agents Het. Agents Het. Agents
Benchmark EE Adv Eco. (σd/2) EE with div. tax
CA / GDP p.p. 2.8 1.4 1.9
Consumption -3.4% -2.6% -2.4%
Asset Price (q) -1.7% -1.3% -1.7%
Notes: Sudden Stop episodes are defined as the periods where the current account
as a percentage of GDP is 2 standard deviations above its mean.
Effect of a Dividend Income Tax
According to the OECD (2018), Mexico is one of the countries with the lowest tax
rates. The marginal effective tax rate in Mexico for bank deposits and dividends is
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Figure 1.11: Event Study of a Sudden Stop in Simulated Economies
(a) Interest Rate














































Notes: Solid lines correspond to the simulated data using the heterogeneous-agent model
calibrated to an emerging economy (Mexico) and dashed lines to the heterogeneous-agent model
calibrated to an advanced economy which has one half the variance in the dividend risk. Panels a),
b) and e) correspond to the level difference to the long-run mean. Panels c) and d) correspond to
percentage point deviations from the long-run average.
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Figure 1.12: Net Foreign Asset Position Event Study of a Sudden Stop in Simulated
Economies
(a) Emering Economy












Notes: Solid blue horizontal lines correspond to the long-run averages.
around zero (negative for low-income households) while the OECD average rate is
close to 30%. In this section, we use the proposed model to study the effect of a re-
distributive dividend income tax. Specifically, the government taxes the household’s
dividend returns at a constant (across periods and households) rate τ d = 50% and
redistributes the tax revenue through lump-sum transfers Tt.
19 The government fol-
























t(1− τ d)) + bit + Tt . (1.13)
The economy with a redistributive dividend income tax experiences more frequent
but less severe crises. In particular, the probability of a Sudden Stop increases from
2.3% to 2.5% and the current account reversal is 0.9 percentage points smaller (see
column (3) of Table 1.15). The intuition for this result is the following. In an
economy with a positive redistributive dividend tax, households have a less potent
19Although the 50% rate is larger than the OECD average, we take it as a comparison benchmark
to the previous section where we reduced the dividend variance by 50%.
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precautionary savings motive since they are effectively less exposed to the dividend
risk. Hence, they demand fewer bonds (or more debt if the bond holdings are negative)
and less domestic assets. Given the lower aggregate demand for the domestic asset,
its equilibrium price drops to clear the market. On average, the asset price is 54%
smaller because of the dividend tax. Because the smaller asset price tightens the
debt limit for every household (the pecuniary externality), the long-run share of
financially constrained households increases from 3.4% to 8.2%. This effect increases
the economy’s exposure to movements in the international interest rate and generates
more frequent crises.
Although the crises are more frequent, the domestic absorption change is less
severe. In particular, aggregate consumption drops 1 percentage point less in the
economy with the dividend tax. Because the financially vulnerable households have
effectively less debt given the smaller asset price that tightened the debt limit, their
bond adjustment is smaller, and together with the government transfers, the drop in
consumption is less severe.
In Figure 1.13 we show graphically how the behavior of the households change
given the introduction of the dividend tax in the stationary equilibrium. Specifically,
the figure shows the economy’s stationary bond policy functions with a dividend tax
rate equal to 50% in red and with a rate equal to 0% in blue. The bond policies
are represented for a current bond holding equal to the 1% most indebted house-
hold. We can see two effects coming from the asset-wealth trade-off. First, given that
with a positive dividend tax there is a redistribution, the households effectively face
a lower dividend risk. This effect, lowers the excess exposure channel for asset-rich
households, lowering their next period bond holdings (increasing their debt positions).
Hence, for high values of the current asset holding, the bond policy in the economy
with the dividend tax (red) is below the bond policy in the economy without dividend
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tax (blue). Second, since there is an aggregate decrease in the risk exposure, the pre-
cautionary savings motive for every household is less potent. Hence, the equilibrium
asset price is lower due to the lower precautionary demand of the asset. This asset
price effect tightens the debt constraint for every household. Hence, the financially
vulnerable households (the constrained or close to becoming constrained households)
effectively borrow less. Lastly, in Tables 1.16 and 1.17 we compute the dynamics of
the asset holdings and consumption during crises. We can see how the fire-sale effect
is stronger in the economy with a positive redistribution tax compared to Tables 1.12
and 1.13. However, given the redistribution, financially constrained households have
to adjust by much less their consumption.
Figure 1.13: Stationary Bond Policies without and with a Dividend Income Tax








Table 1.16: Median % Asset Holdings Change in a Crisis with Dividend Tax
Net Wealth
Leverage Ratio I-IX X
(Non-Wealthy) (Wealthy)
I-VIII (Low-LR) -0.3 3.1
IX (High-LR) 1.8 -0.8
X (Very High-LR) 1.2 -7.6
Notes: Ordered in the period of the crisis.
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Table 1.17: Median % Consumption Change with Dividend Tax




Notes: Ordered in the period previous to the crisis.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper studies the cross-sectional dimension of the debt-deflation mechanism that
triggers endogenous financial crises of the Sudden Stop type. This dimension is rele-
vant for the macroeconomy for two reasons. First, there is a dampening effect on the
deflation of asset prices coming from the unconstrained wealthy households who buy
depressed assets, relieving the downward pressure on asset prices. Second, there is an
amplifying effect on the asset price deflation coming from the financially vulnerable
households who fire-sale assets, generating a stronger downward pressure on asset
prices. Because these two cross-sectional effects move asset prices in opposite direc-
tions, the cross-section and inequality role during crises is quantitatively ambiguous.
Hence, this paper examines how the frequency and severity of Sudden Stops crises
are affected by inequality in an economy.
Using panel data for Mexican households, we document micro-data evidence that
supports both effects. Specifically, the 2009 crisis had different effects on the house-
holds depending on the composition of their balance sheets. The real estate holdings
of low-leveraged wealthy households increased 59.4% during the crisis while wealthy
households with high-leverage fire-sold and decreased the most their assets during the
crisis. Additionally, in terms of the consumption dynamics, high-leverage households
decreased their expenditures 6.2% while non-leveraged households increased 5.4%
during the crisis. These heterogeneous asset and consumption dynamics during the
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crisis highlight the importance of the opposing forces that are missed when the finan-
cial crises are studied under a representative-agent framework. For this reason, we
proposed a model to quantify a Sudden Stop’s effect on asset prices and consumption,
accounting for the household’s heterogeneity in their balance sheet.
Using the proposed asset-pricing Bewley model of a small-open-economy, we find
that in a version of the model calibrated to an emerging economy (Mexico), the model
can explain Sudden Stops’ key stylized facts and generate persistent current account
crises. Regarding the cross-sectional forces, the dampening effect dominates and asset
prices drop less during Sudden Stop episodes in heterogeneous-agents economies. In
contrast to the representative-agent framework, the model produces an empirically
plausible leverage ratio distribution and generates persistent current account reversals
with larger drops in consumption driven by the most leveraged households. Moreover,
calibrating the model to an advanced economy where the dividend risk is one-half of
the benchmark emerging-markets model, the average net foreign debt position is
twice as large, consumption drops 0.8 percentage points less, and asset prices drop
0.4 percentage points less. Hence, the model predicts that in economies with less
dividend return inequality, larger debt positions are supported, and Sudden Stop
crises are less severe, as observed in the data. Additionally, an economy with a
redistributive dividend income tax experiences more frequent but less severe crises.
This result comes from an equilibrium effect that lowers the asset price, tightening
the financial conditions. Hence, increasing the share of constrained households that
effectively hold less debt and adjust their consumption less.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 The 2009 Mexican Sudden Stop at the Aggregate Level
A Sudden Stop is a fast and large outflow of international capital (Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Talvi, 2006). Hence these types of episodes are characterized by large Current
Account (CA) movements.20 In this Appendix, we use aggregate data to show the
Sudden Stop that the Mexican economy experienced in 2009.
In Figure 1.14 we can see that the current account deficit reversed around 1.5
percentage points of GDP. Also, GDP and consumption declined, there was a drop in
the consumer confidence and a decline in consumption credit while firm and housing
credit was not affected.
On the prices side, in Figure 1.15 we see that there was a large decline in the stock
market, house prices decelerated and remained constant for about 4 years since the
crisis burst, the J.P. Morgan EMBI+ spread that measures the Mexican sovereign
bonds risk increased about 2 percentage points and there has a large depreciation of
the Mexican peso against the dollar.
The aggregate dynamics shown in this Appendix are not particular to Mexico.
20Some Sudden Stop episodes have even registered CA reversals. Meaning that the economy
transits from having a negative CA (foreign capital entering the economy) to positive CA surpluses
(capital leaving the economy).
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Figure 1.14: Quantities and Consumption determinants
(a) CA/GDP %
(b) Consumption and GDP Index
(2007=100)
(c) Consumer Confidence Index
(2007=100) (d) Credit Index (2007=100)
Notes: The grey area corresponds to the crisis. Source: INEGI, World Bank, Banxico.
See Bianchi and Mendoza (2020) for a recent survey of Sudden Stop episodes both
among advanced and emerging economies.
1.A.2 Solution Algorithm
In this Appendix we describe the solution method. Building from Krusell and A. A.
Smith (1997), we adapt their non-trivial market clearing algorithm to a small-open-
economy framework. In particular, instead of solving problem 1.5, we solve:
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Figure 1.15: Asset Prices
(a) House Price Index (2007=100)
(b) Stock Market Value Index
(2007=100)
(c) J.P. Morgan EMBI Spread for Mex-
ico in %
(d) Mexican Peso Exchange Rate for
USD
Notes: The grey area corresponds to the crisis. Source: Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, Moodys
Analitics, INEGI, World Bank.
ṽ(b, a, εw, εd, B, εR, q) = max
{c,b′,a′≥0}
u(c) + βE[v(b′, a′, εw′ , εd′ , B′, εR′)] s.t.
c+R(εR)−1b′ + q(a′ + Φ(a′, a)) = εww + a(q + εdd) + b,
















Where we replaced the full household distribution Ω with the aggregate bond
position B =
∫
b dΩ, and market clearing in the asset holdings is achieved using a
fixed-point iteration on q such that K̄ =
∫
a′(·) dΩ. Then, the solution algorithm
follows the simulation method described in Krusell and A. A. Smith (1997).
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Chapter 2
FDI Flows and Sudden Stops in
Small Open Economies
by Sergio Villalvazo Mart́ın
2.1 Motivation
Most of the Sudden Stops (SS) literature has focused on emerging economies neglect-
ing that from 1990 to 2016 there have been 16 SS episodes in advanced economies.1
Although, for the past almost three decades advanced economies have been experienc-
ing episodes of capital outflows that have been associated only to emerging and fragile
economies, the probability of experiencing a SS in an advanced economy is 20 per-
cent smaller than in an emerging economy.2 Is there any difference other than income
levels driving these probabilities? This paper contributes to closing the literature
University of Pennsylvania.
1See Figure 2.1 and J. Bianchi and Mendoza (2020) for a recent survey. The terms emerging and
upper-middle income will be used interchangeably, as well as the terms advanced and high income.
The income threshold is taken from the World Bank classification.
2Specifically, using the panel database constructed in this paper, the probability in an advanced
economy is 2.3 percent while for an emerging economy is 2.9 percent.
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gap by studying and contrasting SS episodes in advanced and emerging economies,
focusing on the role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through the lens of a small
open economy framework.
Figure 2.1: Number of Sudden Stops by year and by classification of economies.
This paper explores the complementarities between FDI and Portfolio Investment
(PI). The mechanism through which both accounts interact is the following. As FDI
enters an economy, the borrowing capacity of the economy increases because the
amount of available collateral increases through two channels. First, the direct effect
in emerging economies is that a fraction of the foreign stock of capital is subject to ex-
propriation risk and thus can be used as collateral to increase the borrowing capacity
of the economy, and second, the indirect effect is that FDI flows affect the domestic
price of capital and thus change the market value of all the available collateral in
the economy (both domestic and foreign capital stocks).3 Both channels move the
borrowing capacity of the economy in the same direction: less (more) foreign capital
tightness (loosens) the borrowing constraint. This spillover effect from FDI to the
borrowing constraint amplifies the negative shocks that hit an economy that is close
3Discussion and evidence of the fact that expropriation risk is only present in emerging economies
will be presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.4.
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to its debt limit. The above mechanism, together with a price deflation mechanism
similar to the one introduced by Mendoza (2010), will generate endogenous Sudden
Stop crises.
A Sudden Stop is defined as a large, fast, and unlikely outflow of capital in the
Financial Account (FA) of the Balance of Payments Identity (similar definitions have
been used by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006, Mendoza, 2010, among others). At
the aggregate FA level, every country that experiences a SS is similar since they all
register a large capital outflow. However, after decomposing the FA into its main com-
ponents there are significant differences between emerging and advanced economies
(see Figures 2.2 and 2.3 for a small sub-sample of economies from both groups). Ad-
vanced economies have net flows of FDI as a percentage of GDP that fluctuate around
zero (some years positive and some years negative) while emerging economies tend
to have only negative net flows (inflows of capital). This paper will focus on this
difference between advanced and emerging economies and will explore the effects of
FDI movements during crises.
A sizable literature, starting more than 25 years ago with Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1995), has documented how international
financial markets are a transmission mechanism of business cycles among economies.
A strand of this literature, closely related to this paper, has studied business cycles
in small open economies (see Heathcote and Perri, 2002 and Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi,
and Uribe, 2010). However, the main focus of our paper is considerably narrower.
We will measure the effect of the different characteristics of international capital
flows, between emerging and advanced economies, on the dynamics and probability
of a balance of payments crisis. In particular, this paper will study the differences
between FDI and PI flows. Regarding the former, Albuquerque, Loayza, and Servén
(2005) study how an increase in FDI is related to global factors and higher integration
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in capital markets. In that paper, the authors argue that FDI may look similar to
equity flows, although, the former does not depend on the existence of developed
stock markets. For this reason, it seems more appropriate to use FDI given that
capital liberalization has occurred in different stages of development for each country.
They find that global factors have become more relevant and that these factors can
explain better the dynamics of FDI since some local factor risks can be hedged due
to the increase in financial liberalization. In line with the authors findings about
the importance of global factors, our analysis will includes the international interest
rate level and volatility as exogenous global factors. However, regarding local factors,
this paper documents the importance of the expropriation risk for FDI and its effect
during crises.
The two main components of the FA are Portfolio Investment and Direct Invest-
ment (FDI), which differ in maturity and volatility. As noted by Albuquerque (2003),
FDI is a less volatile long-term position given natural constraints to rapidly withdraw
illiquid investments. On the other hand, Portfolio Investments have shorter matu-
rity, since technological advances provide additional flexibility for the investments to
leave an economy faster. Hence, from the perspective of international investors, the
current opportunity cost of an investment (i.e. the international interest rate) is not
the only moment affecting investment decisions, but also the current state of interna-
tional volatility and its effect on future returns. C. M. Reinhart and V. R. Reinhart
(2001) document that when volatility in the US interest rate is high, net FDI flows
to emerging economies are 23 percent smaller. Therefore, introducing an element of
time-varying volatility in the international risk provides a deeper understanding of
the dynamics behind the different capital flows and the effect of having different FDI
flows.
In terms of structural modeling, some characteristics of the FDI on which this
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paper focuses on have been previously documented in the literature. In Albuquerque
(2003), the author argues that FDI is less volatile than other financial flows and
that non-FDI flows are shorter-term investments facing less physical constraints to
movement, and thus making it easier to flee a jurisdiction. The author proposes a
model with enforcement constraints in which FDI is partly inalienable to the extent
that it comprises intangible assets, and portfolio flows are subject to expropriation
due to the lack international enforcement mechanisms. The author finds that more
financially constraint economies should borrow more relatively through FDI. The
model in our paper differs from his since we model portfolio flows to be subject to
a loan-to-value constraint and we study the mechanism through which the risk of
expropriation of FDI in emerging economies affects the debt capacity of the economy.
Hence, in our paper, the risk of expropiation is one of the key elements that explain
the difference between advanced and emerging economies. According to the World
Bank (2017), 5 percent of foreign investment is expropriated in emerging economies
and this risk is a major concern for multinationals when they choose where, when,
and how much to invest. The World Bank, through the Global Investment Compet-
itiveness group, surveyed executives of multinational corporations with investments
in developing countries. They find that over 90 percent of all investors say that legal
protections are critically important in the decision process of investing abroad. These
guarantees include laws that protect against expropriation, breaches of contracts and
arbitrary government conducts.
Regarding local factors, this paper contributes to the literature on emerging
economies expropriation risk that has been studied by Thomas and Worrall (1994),
Antras, Desai, and Foley (2009), Hajzler (2012), among others, by analyzing the ef-
fects of the risk of FDI expropriation on Sudden Stop crises. In particular, we study
the complementarities between FDI and Portfolio flows, the relations between FDI
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and the debt capacity of the domestic economy, and the different exposure to crises
between advanced and emerging economies. Lastly, our paper quantifies the effect
of this risk in a small open economy model with financial frictions in which Sudden
Stops arise endogenously.
Another closely related strand of the literature focuses on the real effect of time-
varying volatility of the international interest rate. Justiniano and Primiceri (2008)
estimate a large-scale DSGE model that allows time variation in the volatility of
the structural innovations and conclude that volatility has decreased dramatically in
the postwar era having a large effect on investment. Following this line of research,
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) document how changes in the volatility of the
interest rate can have an effect on output, consumption, investment and hours worked
even when the interest rate level does not change. The present paper contributes to
this growing literature by introducing time-varying volatility to a small open economy
model with an endogenous occasionally-binding constraint and quantifies the effect
of time-varying volatility on the dynamics of the Balance of Payment accounts and
GDP during a Sudden Stop.
All the previous works have studied real business cycles long-run moments. How-
ever, the focus of this paper is on the dynamics of Sudden Stops. Hence, our model
will build on Mendoza (2010) work which introduces the debt-deflation mechanism to
study SS episodes (Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé, 2017 provide a textbook treatment of
open economy models with collateral constraints). We follow this set-up to analyze
the FDI channel during Sudden Stop crises. In particular, this paper studies the dif-
ferent characteristics of the capital flows between advanced and emerging economies
and its effect on the dynamics of the economies during crises.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the panel
database constructed and shows empirical evidence on the importance of the FDI
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channel. In Section 2.3, we propose a small open economy model with financial
frictions that incorporates both types of international capital flows: Portfolio Invest-
ment and Direct Investment subject to expropriation risk, and allows for time-varying
volatility in the international interest rate. Then, Section 2.4 presents the quantita-
tive results from running simulations with calibrated parameters for each type of
economy. We quantify how much of the differences in the probability of a Sudden
Stop observed in the data can be accounted by the FDI channel and also perform
an impulse response exercise to quantify the effects of temporary and permanent in-
creases in the volatility of the interest rate and the expropriation risk. Finally, Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
The first point this paper aims to make is that Sudden Stop crises happen also
in advanced economies. To accomplish this, we construct a panel database of 31
advanced and 75 emerging economies from 1990 to 2016. The economies were selected
according to the classification of the World Bank of high income economies (advanced)
and upper-middle income economies (emerging).4 Following Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Talvi (2006), we identify a SS episode as a large outflow of capital from an economy.
Specifically, a change in the Financial Account as a percentage of GDP 2 standard
deviations above the historical mean in a year will be considered a SS episode. Figure
2.1 shows the number of crises per year for both groups of economies. There have
been 16 crises in advanced and 50 crises in emerging. This evidence suggests that
SS are not a phenomenon exclusive of emerging economies although they are more
probable than in advanced economies. Moreover, the distribution of capital outflows
4See the Appendix for the list of countries in each group.
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in emerging economies shows fatter tails. The average Kurtosis coefficient for an
emerging economy is 2.0 while for advanced economies is 0.9. This evidence suggests
that there is a fundamental difference between both groups of economies regarding
how net international flows enter and leave the economies. Figure 2.1 also highlights
the importance of global factors since SS crises do not happen in isolation; there
seems to be a clustering of episodes during the mid 90’s, early 2000’s, and during the
great recession years. Given this evidence, we state the following Fact 1.
Fact 1: The probability of a SS in advanced economies is 20 percent
smaller than in emerging and the distribution of outflows in emerging
economies shows fatter tails.
2.2.1 Differences in the FDI flows and the capital stock
Although at the aggregate level of the Financial Account a crisis seems similar be-
tween economies (see Figure 2.4.b), a decomposition of the FA suggests fundamental
differences between both groups of economies. The mean net FDI to GDP flow for
emerging economies is -3.9 percent (negative sign corresponds to inflows) while for
advanced economies is -0.3 percent, and the mean inflow FDI to GDP flow for both
emerging and advanced economies is -5.1 percent.5 These percentages suggest that
net FDI and inflow FDI are similar in emerging economies while very different in
advanced. Moreover, the net FDI account in the former is mainly an inflow account:
capital is only flowing into the economy. While for advanced economies, similar
magnitudes of inflows and outflows of capital are registered such that the net FDI
is around zero and even positive in some years. Hence, emerging economies only
have inflows of capital while advanced economies attract capital and invest abroad
5To obtain the moments we averaged each country across time and then took the mean across
countries.
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approximately in the same magnitudes possibly due to diversification motives.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the decomposition of the Financial Account for a sub-
sample of 4 economies for each group. Emerging economies (Figure 2.2) consistently
have negative FDI flows. This means that capital from abroad is flowing into the
economy. As a global resource constraint would imply, this capital is coming from
another economy, which most likely is an advanced economy. Figure 2.3 gives evi-
dence that advanced economies have both positive and negative large flows of FDI.
Hence, let Fact 2 be:
Fact 2: The mean net FDI as a percentage of GDP flow for emerging
economies is -3.9 percent and for advanced is -0.3 percent.
Figure 2.2: Financial Account in Emerging Economies
(a) Mexico (b) South Africa
(c) Thailand (d) Turkey
Notes: Financial Account in a sample of emerging economies. Source: World Bank WDI and IMF.
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Figure 2.3: Financial Account in Advanced Economies
(a) Canada (b) Finland
(c) Germany (d) United States
Notes: Financial Account in a sample of advanced economies. Source: World Bank WDI and IMF.
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Lastly, estimates of the total stock of capital in each group of economies also show
significant differences. Advanced economies have a stock of capital to GDP ratio 15
percent larger than emerging economies.6 Given this evidence, we state Fact 3.
Fact 3: The mean capital to GDP ratio in advanced economies is 2.4
and in emerging economies is 2.1.
Facts 2 and 3 can be rationalized as follows: under a national aggregate production
function with diminishing marginal returns to capital and no domestic investment,
emerging economies that have smaller stocks of domestic capital relative to advanced
economies will have a greater rate of return on capital and will attract a larger amount
of international capital inflows.
These differences can be seen not only at a business cycle level among the whole
sample but also during Sudden Stop episodes. Figure 2.4 shows median GDP, FA,
FDI, and Portfolio plus Other Investments during crisis episodes for both classifica-
tions of economies. The graphs are centered around period 0 that corresponds to
the period identified as a SS. Even when the method to identify a crisis does not
include directly a drop in the GDP, Figure 2.4.a shows a drop in the cycle compo-
nent of the GDP for both groups. In this sense, SS’s are accompanied by declines
in the production that are 1.5 percentage points more severe in emerging economies.
We can see in Figure 2.4.b that at the aggregate level, the FA as a percentage of
GDP follows a similar movement in both economies although, before the SS, emerg-
ing economies have a more negative position, of around 4 percentage points more
than advanced economies. However, after decomposing into FDI and PI (that also
includes Other Investments) we can see a clear difference between groups. On the
Portfolio side (Figure 2.4.c), although both groups show similar movements, before
6Capital stock estimated are obtained from the IMF Investment and Capital Stock Dataset, see
International Monetary Fund (2015).
76
the SS, advanced economies have a more negative position and the contraction during
the crisis is larger. Figure 2.4.d shows two clear differences between both groups of
economies: the FDI flows previous to a SS account for almost half of the FA deficit
in emerging economies (4 percent) while for advanced economies the flows are close
to zero, and emerging economies suffer a large correction in FDI the year of the SS
(1.5 percentage points) while advanced economies can smooth it out.
This second difference might suggest that multinational corporations seem to be-
have different if they have invested in emerging or in advanced economies. Whenever
there is a crisis in an emerging economy, international investors will move their FDI
investments out of such economy while if the crisis happens in an advanced economy
they are more resilient to move their investments. However, Figure 2.4.e suggests
that this is not the case.
Figure 2.4.e shows the inflow FDI event study analysis for both groups of economies.
The graph suggests that multinational corporations react in the same way in both
groups of economies. Whenever the crisis hits the domestic economy, FDI invest-
ments are pulled out of the economy (independently if it is advanced or emerging).
Hence, the difference between groups comes from domestic investors and relies on the
fact that advanced economies have outflow FDI investments of the same magnitude
as the inflows they receive and these outflows react and move in opposite ways to
the inflows such that the net FDI account is around zero, even when the crisis hits
the advanced economy. In this sense, outflow FDI investments serve as buffer sav-
ings in advanced economies that let them smooth their Financial Account account
whenever the economy enters a Sudden Stop episode and possible prevents them from
experiencing more severe crises more frequently.
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Figure 2.4: Event Study of a Sudden Stop
(a) GDP cycle (b) Financial Account as a % of GDP
(c) Portfolio and Other as a % of GDP (d) FDI as a % of GDP
(e) Inflow FDI as a % of GDP
Notes: Solid (dashed) lines correspond to advanced (emerging) economy.
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2.2.2 Importance of the international volatility
The Financial Account records transactions that involve financial assets and liabilities
that take place between residents and non-residents. Its two main components, FDI
and Portfolio Investment, are different in nature. According to the International
Monetary Fund (2013):
“Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment associated
with a resident in one economy having control or a significant degree of
influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another
economy.”
and,
“Portfolio investment is defined as cross-border transactions and posi-
tions involving debt or equity securities, other than those included in direct
investment or reserve assets.”
Hence, these accounts involve international transactions of different things. Port-
folio investments are the exchanges of financial securities while Direct investments
are the exchanges of control (ownership) of enterprises. From the perspective of an
international investor (noted earlier by Albuquerque, 2003), FDI is a less volatile
longer-term investment while Portfolio could be short-term. Given the different pos-
sible maturities of each investment, not only the current interest rate is relevant but
also its volatility. Moreover, C. M. Reinhart and V. R. Reinhart (2001) find that
when volatility in the US interest rate is high net FDI flows to emerging economies
are 23 percent smaller.
Following the literature on high frequency data we construct a proxy of the volatil-
ity of the US interest rate using its realized volatility. Using average monthly se-
ries (intra-period information) we estimate the standard deviation for a year (period
79
length of analysis) and use it as a proxy for international volatility. Figure 2.5 shows
the 3-Month Treasury Bill real rate for the US and its realized volatility.7
Having documented the importance of the FDI flows and the state of the inter-
national volatility to study Sudden Stop episodes, the next section will describe the
proposed model that incorporates both elements.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Environment
This paper proposes a standard real business cycle of a small open economy model
(RBC-SOE) with an endogenous occasionally-binding constraint, a fixed domestic
stock of capital, and foreign investment subject to expropriation risk. The model
builds from Mendoza (2010) with two new elements: an FDI channel and time-varying
volatility in the international interest rate.
The economy is inhabited by an infinitely lived household with preferences defined
















The GHH type utility function proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huff-
man (1988) is commonly used in RBC-SOE models since the wealth effects on the
labor supply are eliminated and a closed form expression for the labor supply can be
obtained.
The representative household has access to a non-state-contingent bond, bt+1, that
7The nominal rate was converted to a real rate using the past 12 months inflation.
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Figure 2.5: US real interest rate and realized volatility
(a) US Real Rate Average %
(b) US Real Rate Realized Volatility
(c) US Real Rate Box Plot
Notes: The gray area corresponds to high volatility periods. Source: FRED.
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pays one unit in the next period with price equal to the inverse international interest
rate factor, qt = (1 + rt)
−1. The household will choose sequences of consumption,
supply of labor and bond positions to maximize her lifetime expected utility subject
to the following period budget constraint:
ct + qtbt+1 = wtLt + rk,tk̄ + bt + Tt. (2.2)
The agent income comes from the labor income, wtLt, plus the capital income
from the fixed domestic stock of capital owned by the agent, rk,tk̄, plus any bond
position coming from the previous period, bt, plus any transfers from the government,
Tt. On the expenditure side, the agent will buy consumption (numeraire good with
normalized price equal to 1) goods, ct, plus the next period bond position, bt+1,
multiplied by its price, qt. However, next period bond position is subject to a collateral
constraint:
qtbt+1 ≥ −κqk,tk̄ − κf,tqk,tkf,t+1. (2.3)
The household will not be able to issue more debt (negative bond positions) than a
constant fraction κ of the market value (the capital, both locally and foreign owned,
has price qk,t) of the fixed domestic capital stock, k̄, plus a stochastic fraction κf,t of
the market value of the next period foreign stock of capital in the economy, kf,t+1.
8
The market value is the price of the capital multiplied by the corresponding stock
of capital (i.e. for the domestic capital, the market value is qk,tk̄). The fraction
κf,t corresponds to the exogenous probability that the government expropriates the
foreign capital.
The consumption good is produced by a single firm with a constant-returns-to-
8Following Mendoza (2010) and Mendoza and Villalvazo (2020), in the competitive equi-
librium the price of capital will be obtained from Tobin’s Q investment optimality condition:
qk,t = ∂Ĩt/∂Kt+1 .
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scale production function, that uses labor and capital as production inputs, and is





Total capital demanded by the firm, Kt, is composed of the exogenously fixed domestic
stock, k̄, and an endogenous foreign stock (FDI), kf,t, which are additive perfect
substitutes: Kt = k̄ + kf,t. The firm, which is owned by the household and has zero
profits, chooses every period how much capital to rent at the competitive rate, rk,t,
and how much labor to demand for a competitive wage, wt. Both input prices are
taken as given by the firm. The TFP shock, εt, follows a first-order Markov process.
The international interest rate, rt, follows a stochastic process with time-varying
volatility, σt, that follows a regime-switching process. The stochastic process’s will
be specified at the end of this section.
There is also an international investor that chooses sequences of foreign capital to
invest in the economy and rent to the domestic firm (note that the rental rate will be
such that the foreign capital market will clear), kf,t for t = 1, ...,∞, as to maximize
the expected present discounted value of profits paid to their global shareholders (a
similar setup was introduced in Mendoza and Smith, 2006) with the addition that
the international investor takes into account the expropriation risk. The objective
function of this investor is:
∞∑
t=0
E0 [Mt (rk,tkf,t(1− κf,t)− (kf,t+1 − (1− δ)(1− κf,t)kf,t + Φ(kf,t+1, kf,t)))] ,
(2.4)
given kf,0 and where Mt is the stochastic discount factor used by the financial insti-
tution (we will assume Mt = qt =
1
1+rt





corresponds to a standard quadratic adjustment cost function incurred by the inter-
national investor to move capital globally.
Lastly, the government will play a simple but crucial role of expropriating foreign
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capital and transferring these resources to the agent in a lump-sum transfer Tt every
period.
As noted above, the exogenous stochastic shocks of the model are four: the TFP
shock εt, the international interest rate rt, the international interest rate volatility σt,
and the expropriation risk κf,t. The TFP shock will follow a standard independent
AR1 process. The interest rate will follow an AR1 process with time-varying volatility:
rt = (1− ρσr)r̄ + ρσrrt−1 + σtεr,t , εr ∼ N(0, 1).
The volatility, σt, will follow a regime-switching process between low and high peri-
ods of volatility. Finally, the probability of expropriation will also follow a regime-
switching process between low and high probability of expropriation periods (inde-
pendent of all the other processes).
2.3.2 Recursive competitive equilibrium
The individual state variables are today’s bond position b, the foreign owned capital
stock in the economy kf , and the exogenous state vector of shocks composed by
TFP shock, the international interest rate and its volatility and the probability of
expropriation: s = (ε, r, σ, κf ), and the aggregate state variable is today’s aggregate




v(b, s;K) = max
c,L,b′
u(c, L) + βE[v(b′, s′;K ′)|σ(s)] s.t.
c+ q(s)b′ = w(s;K)L+ rk(s;K)k̄ + b+ T (s;K) , Budget Constraint,
q(s)b′ ≥ −κqk(s;K)k̄ − κf (s)qk(s;K)k′f (s;K) , Debt Constraint,
K ′ = HK(s;K) , Rational Expectations of the household.
Let λ(b, s;K) ≥ 0 be the multiplier on the budget constraint and µ(b, s;K) ≥ 0












βE[vb′(b′, s′;K ′)|σ(s)] =λ(b, s;K)q(s)− µ(b, s;K)q(s)
0 =µ(b, s;K)(q(s)b′ + κ(qk(s;K)k̄) + κf (s)(qk(s;K)k
′
f (s;K))).
We can see from the last first order condition how the introduction of expropriation









w(s;K) =(1− α) exp(ε(s))AKαL−α.
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Foreign Investor’s problem:
vf (kf , s;K) = max
k′f>0
rk(s;K)kf (1− κf (s))− I +
1
1 + r(s)
E[vf (k′f , s′;K ′)|σ(s)] s.t.
I = k′f − (1− δ)kf (1− κf (s)) + Φ(k′f , kf )
K ′ = HK(s;K)
⇒ F.O.C.:
1 + Φ1(·) =
1
1 + r(s)
E[rk(s′;K ′)(1− κf (s′)) + (1− δ)(1− κf (s′)) + Φ2(·′)|σ(s)].






and Φn(·) corresponds to the first derivative of the
adjustment cost function with respect to the n argument.
From the first order condition we can see how the introduction of the expropriation
risk distorts the optimal decision of the international investor. In the current period,
the investor takes into account that if there is a positive probability of being in a
state with positive κf in the future, the expected return on the investments will be
lower. Hence, optimality is achieved with a lower level of foreign capital (less FDI
enters the economy).
Finally, the Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is given by the allocation functions
{c(b, s;K), L(b, s;K), b′(b, s;K), k′f (kf , s;K), T (s;K)}, the price functions {w(s;K),
rk(s;K), qk(s;K), q(s)} and the functions {v(b, s;K), vf (kf , s;K), HK(s;K)} such
that:
1. Given the prices, the functions {c(b, s;K), L(b, s;K), b′(b, s;K)} solve the
household’s problem.
2. Given the prices, the firm maximizes profits.
3. Given the prices, the function k′f (kf , s;K) solves the Foreign Investor’s problem.
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4. The price of the bonds satisfies q(s) = (1 + r(s))−1 and the price of the capital
satisfies Tobin’s Q optimality condition qk(s;K) = ∂I(K
′, K)/∂K ′
5. The capital market clearing condition is satisfied:
K = k̄ + kf
6. The representative agent’s condition is satisfied:
K ′ = HK(s;K) = k̄ + k
′
f (K − k̄, s;K)
7. The government’s budget is balanced:
T (s;K) = κf (s)kf [rk(s,K) + 1− δ].
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we report the results obtained after solving the model calibrated to an
emerging and an advanced economy.
2.4.1 Calibration
The parameters of the utility function and the capital depreciation rate were taken
from the literature with studies that used data from the Mexican economy. In partic-
ular, the risk aversion coefficient, ν, equal to 2 and the labor parameter that deter-
mines the wage elasticity of labor supply, ω, equal to 1.85 were taken from Mendoza
(2010). The annual depreciation rate, δ, equal to 8.8 percent and was taken from
Garcıa-Verdú (2005).
Regarding the parameters that were calibrated to match specific moments of the
data, the discount factor, β, equal to 0.956 was calibrated to match the probability
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of a Sudden Stop of 2.9 percent in emerging economies.9 The fix domestic capital
stock, k̄, for an emerging (advanced) economy was set to 1.90 (3.14) to match the
average FDI to GDP percentage of -3.9 (-0.3) percent. The share of capital, α, was
set to 0.23 to match the average capital to GDP ratio for an emerging economy of 2.1.
The debt fraction of domestic collateral, κ, was set to 0.22 to match Mexico’s Debt
to GDP ratio of -35 percent. Lastly, the adjustment cost coefficient, φ, equals 8.5 to
match the median ratio of Portfolio flows standard deviation to FDI flows standard
deviation of 1.85 in emerging economies.
With respect to the exogenous process, the 3-Month Treasury Bill for the US was
used as a proxy for the international interest rate and was converted to a real rate
using the past 12 months inflation. Intra-period data (monthly) was used to construct
period (yearly) realized volatility. The volatility process is assumed to follow a two-
state regime-switching process. To identify the different volatility periods we divided
the sample from 1953 to 1984 and from 1985 to 2016, the latter period is also known
as the Great Moderation era. Then, high volatility periods were identified to start the
first year in which the volatility was 2 standard deviations above the historical mean,
for each sub-sample, and lasted all the subsequent years for which the volatility was a
quarter of a standard deviation above the mean. The resulting high volatility episodes
are from 1980 to 1984 which is known as the period of highly active monetary policies
made by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker to control inflation and from 2008
to 2011 which were the years of the Great Recession.10 The low volatility episodes
are from 1953 to 1979 and from 1985 to 2007 (see Figure 2.5). Finally, the volatility
process calibration is set to capture the average duration of low volatility periods of 25
9The data used to calibrate the emerging economy model consists of averages from the sample
of emerging economies data and for some parameters data only for Mexico was used.
10F. Bianchi (2012) finds that the appointment of Volcker marked a change in the conduct of
monetary policy.
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years and of high volatility periods of 4 years.11 The resulting transition probabilities
are Fll = 0.94 and Fhh = 0.60. The value for the low volatility is set to the average of
both low volatility periods: σl = 0.44 percent. Then, given the long-run probabilities
implied by the duration of each period, high volatility is set to σh = 1.20 percent to
match the full-sample 1953-2016 average volatility of 0.55 percent.
For the interest rate process, the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) discretization algo-
rithm was used with 5 grid points, mean interest rate of 0.7 percent, and autocorre-
lation coefficient 0.479 for the high volatility process and 0.799 for the low volatility
process. The autocorrelation coefficients were estimated using the periods identified
in Section 2.2.2. Regarding the TFP shock, the autoregressive coefficient and stan-
dard deviation were set to commonly used values for small open economies of 0.54
and 2.58 percent respectively (see J. Bianchi, 2011).
Finally, the debt fraction of foreign collateral κf is assumed to follow a two-state
regime-switching process. The parameter κf will take the value of 0 for low-risk
periods and 0.05 for high-risk periods following the evidence documented in World
Bank (2017). The transition matrix calibration is set to capture the length of a
full presidential term in Mexico of 6 years for high-risk periods, and for the low-risk
periods, the duration is calibrated such that when there is no expropriation risk the
average capital to GDP ratio is equal to the advanced economies average of 2.4. Table
2.1 shows the calibrated parameters.
2.4.2 Quantitative results
This paper explores the role of FDI during Sudden Stop episodes. In particular,
the analyzed mechanism has two effects: the direct effect that comes from having a
11The sample used starts at the beginning of a full observed period of low volatility and ends at







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































positive probability of expropriation and hence increasing the debt capacity of the
economy, and the indirect effect that comes from movements in the FDI account
during a crisis that affects the price of capital and hence the market value of all the
collateral.
To account for the role of FDI, we compare the results obtained from an emerging
economy following the calibration proposed in Section 2.4.1 with the results obtained
from the calibration of an advanced economy. To discipline the quantitative results,
the advanced economy calibration will defer only in two ways from the emerging
economy calibration. First, as noted in Section 2.3, the advanced economy will have
a larger stock of domestic capital (this is a proxy to having outflow FDI and hence
reduce the net FDI position), and second, following the World Bank (2017), the
advanced economy will not be exposed to any expropriation risk. To additionally
motivate that advanced economies have no expropriation risk we use the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database.12 In particular, we will use the variable that
corresponds to Investment Profile (inv) to document any correlation evidence between
expropriation risk and FDI in both groups of economies. The inv variable takes values
from 0 (very high risk) to 12 (very low risk). Column (1) of Table 2.3 shows the results
from a descriptive panel regression model that includes as explanatory variables the
lag US interest rate level, the lag US interest rate volatility, the interaction of the
inv variable with both a dummy variable for advanced economies and a dummy
variable for emerging economies and country Fixed Effects. From the coefficients of
the interaction of the investment profile variable we get two results. First, focusing
on the effect of investment risk in advanced economies (-inv * Dummy Adv), the
regression coefficient is not statistically different from zero suggesting that in fact,
12The ICRG database is a well-known source for political and economic risk measures and has
been used by Herrera, Ordoñez, and Trebesch (2020) among others.
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the expropriation risk is only present in emerging economies. Second, the coefficient
for the emerging economies (-inv * Dummy Eme) is highly significant and negative
meaning that more risk decreases the FDI flows into the economy (since the regression
is done with -inv, higher numbers mean more risk). Hence, as expected, expropriation
risk increases the cost of FDI, disincentives multinationals to invest in the domestic
economy, and is only present in emerging economies.
After solving both models, we simulated 200,000 periods and dropped the first
10,000 points.13 Table 2.2 shows the moments of the simulated data for both classifi-
cations of economies. To discipline the results we match Fact 2 and Fact 3 described
in Section 2.2 and will use the structural model to quantify the role of the FDI channel
in the probability of a Sudden Stop (Fact 1).
Concerning the business cycle moments, the middle section of Table 2.2 shows that
the calibrated models are consistent with advanced economies having larger GDP per
capita than emerging economies and having more debt-to-income ratios. The model
suggests that advanced economies are 11 percent larger than emerging and have 46
percent more debt relative to their GDP than emerging economies. Also, in line
with the evidence presented in Section 2.2, the capital outflows distribution for the
advanced economy model has thinner tails and a Kurtosis coefficient 1 unit below the
coefficient in the emerging economy model.
Finally, with respect to the probability of a Sudden Stop (Fact 1), the model
suggests that an emerging economy that increases the outflow FDI and eliminates
the expropriation risk would reduce the probability of a Sudden Stop to 1.3 percent.
Figure 2.6 shows the simulated dynamics of the variables of interest during a
13We use the FiPIt algorithm proposed by Mendoza and Villalvazo (2020). Note that a global
solution method is required due to the time-varying volatility in the interest rate and the high non-
linearities that models with occasionally-binding constraints are characterized to show in the policy
functions.
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Table 2.2: Simulated Statistics
Emerging Eco. Advanced Eco.
Matched Business Cycles Moments
Mean FDI / GDP % -3.9% -0.3% Fact 2
Mean Capital / GDP 2.1 2.4 Fact 3
Business Cycle Moments
Mean GDP (index EE = 100) 100 111
Mean Debt / GDP % 35% 51%
Kurtosis of capital outflows 4.7 3.6 Fact 1
Sudden Stops
Long-run prob. of SS (matched for EE) 2.9% 1.3% Fact 1
Sudden Stop. With respect to the price of the capital (Tobin’s Q), the drop in the
emerging economy model is about 8 percent and this drop is 6 percentage points larger
than in the advanced economy model. Regarding the Financial Account, advanced
economies have smaller deficits in the FA, while emerging economies show a larger
contraction in the FA consistent with the data presented in Figure 2.4. This difference
is due mainly to the FDI channel since both groups show similar dynamics in the
Portfolio flows. Also in line with the data, advanced economies have a larger deficit in
the Portfolio flows and register a larger contraction during the Sudden Stop. Finally,
there is a large contraction in FDI flows in the emerging economy and no movement
in advanced economies also consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2.2.
Finally, in Column (2) of Table 2.3, we compare the results obtained from a de-
scriptive regression using the simulated data from the model with the results obtained
from the panel database in Column (1). Since the expropriation risk is only present in
the emerging economy model, instead of having the investment risk interaction with
a dummy variable for each economy group, we use the time series of the probability
of expropriation κf to measure the effect of expropriation risk in emerging economies.
We can see that the results from the simulated data obtained from the model are
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Figure 2.6: Simulated Event Study of a Sudden Stop
(a) Tobin’s Q (b) FA as a percentage of GDP
(c) PI as a percentage of GDP (d) FDI as a percentage of GDP
Notes: Solid (dashed) lines correspond to advanced (emerging) economy model.
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consistent qualitatively with the results from the panel database.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Regression
Dependent variable: -FDI / GDPi,t %
Real Data (1) Simulated Data (2)
r meanUS,t−1 −0.452∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.003)
r volUS,t−1 0.580 −1.041∗∗∗
(0.751) (0.010)
-inv * Dummy Adv 0.430 −
(0.264)
-inv * Dummy Eme −0.524∗∗ −
(0.249)
κf i,t − −2.718∗∗∗
(0.018)
Country FE Y ES Y ES
Observations 1,923 389,997
R2 0.199 0.629
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
In terms of the signs of the coefficients, the model does a successful job. With
simulated data, the regression coefficients with respect to the interest rate level and
volatility are negative. An interpretation of this is that as the international interest
rate increases, the opportunity cost of FDI investment increases and capital that had
previously enter the economy will be reallocated and invested at the international rate.
Concerning the volatility coefficient, in line with the results from C. M. Reinhart and
V. R. Reinhart (2001), with simulated data the regression coefficient suggests that
as the volatility increases FDI decreases while the coefficient using real data is not
statistically significant. Finally, the coefficient for investment risk (κf in the simulated
data) in the emerging economies is highly significant and negative for both real data
and simulated data. Suggesting that as investment risk increases, net FDI flows into
the domestic economy decrease.
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2.4.3 Impulse response analysis
As documented in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011), changes in volatility affect real
term variables. This paper extends their analysis to study how changes in volatility
can cause Sudden Stops and quantifies the effect on the Financial Account flows and
the GDP. Figure 2.7 corresponds to a permanent increase in the US interest rate
volatility from a high interest rate and mean productivity state. The model suggests
that a permanent increase would generate a permanent contraction in the FA/GDP
ratio close to 0.5 percent in an emerging and to 0.25 percent in an advanced economy,
and a permanent decrease of 1.1 percent in the GDP of emerging and of 0.5 percent in
advanced economies. However, in the short run, the outflows of capital are 0.5 percent
higher in advanced economies. With respect to a temporary shock, Figure 2.8 shows
that a temporary increase of 1 period in the volatility of the US interest rate would
generate a Sudden Stop in both types of economies and a contraction in the FA/GDP
ratio of close to 2 and 1.5 percent in advanced and emerging economies, respectively.
However, this increase in volatility would generate a decrease of only 0.03 percent in
emerging economies while a decrease of about 0.005 percent in advanced economies.
Hence, the model suggests that in terms of the GDP effect from a temporary increase
in the international volatility, advanced economies are more resilient.
To account for the importance of providing certainty to international investors
and multinationals, we perform an impulse response analysis after a shock to the
probability of expropriation. Figure 2.9 corresponds to a permanent increase in the
probability of expropriation from a mean interest rate and mean productivity state.
This shock generates a permanent contraction in the FA/GDP ratio of 1.5 percent
and a permanent decrease of 3.5 percent in the emerging economy’s GDP. However,
in the short run, the FA/GDP ratio shows a large contraction of 3 percent. With
respect to a temporary shock, Figure 2.10 shows that a temporary increase of 1 period
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Figure 2.7: Impulse response analysis after a permanent increase in the international
interest rate volatility
(a) σr





(b) GDP (longer series)







(c) FA as a percentage of GDP






(d) FDI as a percentage of GDP





Notes: Solid (dashed) lines correspond to advanced (emerging) economy model.
in the risk of expropriation would cause a large Sudden Stop with a contraction in
the FA/GDP ratio of 3 percent. Moreover, this increase in expropriation risk would
generate a temporary decrease close to 0.09 percent in GDP.
2.4.4 Anecdotal evidence: episodes of expropriation
To give the previous results some historical context, in this section we present anec-
dotal evidence of temporary and permanent episodes of increases in the risk of ex-
propriation. For the case of a temporary shock, in Mexico in 1982, 3 months before
leaving the office, President Jose Lopez Portillo nationalized the banks. However, by
1984 almost all assets were re-privatized and by 1990 only 18 out of the 58 originally
nationalized banks remained (Haber, 2005 and Gruben, McComb, et al., 1997). Fig-
ure 2.11.a shows how after the nationalization, FDI/GDP ratio dropped 0.8 percent
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response analysis after a temporary increase in the international
interest rate volatility
(a) σr





(b) GDP (longer series)






(c) FA as a percentage of GDP





(d) FDI as a percentage of GDP





Notes: Solid (dashed) lines correspond to advanced (emerging) economy model.
and the GDP decreased 4.2 percent in 1983. The drop in FDI is similar to the drop
obtained by the model as Figure 2.10.d shows. However, it is important to note
that the movement in the GDP is larger than the results of the previous section be-
cause, among other things, this episode was of an actual privatization and not only
an increase in the risk of privatization.
With respect to a permanent shock, in Venezuela in 1998, after Hugo Chavez
was elected president the risk of expropriation increased and it was until 2003 when
the oil industry was re-nationalized (Weisbrot, Ray, Sandoval, et al., 2009). Figure
2.11.b shows how from 1997 to 2001 the FDI/GDP ratio decreased 1 percent. In
this case, the results obtained from the model for a permanent shock in the risk of
expropriation (Figure 2.9.b and 2.9.d) are in line with the anecdotal evidence from
Venezuela when only the risk of expropriation increased (the GDP decreased by 5
98
Figure 2.9: Impulse response analysis after a permanent increase in the risk of expro-
priation
(a) κf





(b) GDP (longer series)






(c) FA as a percentage of GDP





(d) FDI as a percentage of GDP






Notes: Dashed lines correspond to emerging economy model.
percent from 1997 to 2001). However, in 2002 and 2003 large expropriations (the oil
industry was nationalized) happened in Venezuela and after 2003, the GDP increased
dramatically, possibly due to a large increase in oil prices that went from $30 to $100
dollars per barrel and also to a lack of credibility in the Venezuelan national accounts.
2.5 Conclusions
Balance of payment crises, characterized by Sudden Stops, are not a phenomenon
exclusive to emerging economies. However, the underlying factors are not necessarily
the same; these countries have opened their economies to foreign capital in distinct
ways. These differences motivate the study of the components of capital flows in both
types of economies to better understand why the probability of having a Sudden Stop
in an emerging economy is 20 percent larger than in advanced economies.
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Figure 2.10: Impulse response analysis after a temporary increase in the risk of ex-
propriation
(a) κf





(b) GDP (longer series)







(c) FA as a percentage of GDP





(d) FDI as a percentage of GDP







Notes: Dashed lines correspond to emerging economy model.
Figure 2.11: Episodes of Expropriations
(a) Mexico, FDI/GDP% and GDP per capita
(Index 1982=100)
(b) Venezuela, FDI/GDP% and GDP per
capita (Index 1997=100)
Source: World Bank WDI.
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Decomposing the Financial Account uncovers important differences between ad-
vanced and emerging economies in their FDI account. First, advanced economies
have on average zero net FDI flows as a percentage of GDP, and second, advanced
economies have sufficient FDI outflows that act as a buffer saving during Sudden
Stops. To quantify the effect of the FDI channel on the probability of a SS, we pro-
pose a standard real business cycle of a small open economy model with an endogenous
occasionally-binding constraint, a fixed domestic stock of capital and foreign invest-
ment subject to expropriation risk, that generates Sudden Stop crises endogenously.
We calibrate the model using data for a large sample of advanced and emerging
economies and find that the FDI channel has a large impact on the probability of a
Sudden Stop. In particular, the model’s results suggest that on average an emerging
economy that increases their capital to GDP ratio and eliminates the expropriation
risk would reduce the probability of a Sudden Stop from 2.9 to 1.3 percent and would
increase its debt-to-income ratio from 35 percent to 51 percent.
Also, the impulse response analysis suggests that a temporary (permanent) in-
crease in the international interest volatility would lead to a short-run (long-run)
decrease of 0.03 (1.1) percent in the GDP in emerging economies. Moreover, in
advanced economies, although the movements in the Financial Account are 0.5 per-
centage points larger than in emerging economies, the effect in the GDP is a third of
the magnitude of emerging economies. Regarding the expropriation risk, a temporary
(permanent) increase in the expropriation risk would lead to a short-run (long-run)
decline of 0.09 (3.5) in the GDP for an emerging economy.
On the policy side, in addition to encouraging a stronger rule of law that would
bring certainty to foreign investors (i.e. reduce the risk of expropriation), emerging
economies should promote policies that encourage outflow FDI to diversify the capital
flows and become more resilient to volatility shocks. This would reduce the probability
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and the severity of a Sudden Stop crisis while increasing the debt capacity of the
economy.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Description of the data
The panel database consists of 31 high income economies and 75 upper-middle income
economies according to the World Bank’s classification. Data on the Financial Ac-
count components comes from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, GDP comes
from the World Bank National Accounts database, capital stocks come from the IMF
Investment and Capital Stock Dataset, debt stocks come from the Joint External
Debt Hub, and the US interest rate comes from the FRED. The list of countries and
Sudden Stop episodes are:
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Table 2.4: List of Countries
Albania Upper-Middle Income Jordan Upper-Middle Income
Algeria Upper-Middle Income Kazakhstan Upper-Middle Income
Angola Upper-Middle Income Korea, Republic of Upper-Middle Income
Antigua and Barbuda Upper-Middle Income Kuwait High Income
Argentina Upper-Middle Income Latvia Upper-Middle Income
Australia High Income Lebanon Upper-Middle Income
Austria High Income Libya Upper-Middle Income
Azerbaijan, Republic of Upper-Middle Income Lithuania Upper-Middle Income
Bahamas, The High Income China, P.R.: Macao High Income
Bahrain, Kingdom of Upper-Middle Income Macedonia, FYR Upper-Middle Income
Barbados Upper-Middle Income Malaysia Upper-Middle Income
Belarus Upper-Middle Income Maldives Upper-Middle Income
Belgium High Income Malta Upper-Middle Income
Belize Upper-Middle Income Marshall Islands, Republic of Upper-Middle Income
Bermuda High Income Mauritius Upper-Middle Income
Bosnia and Herzegovina Upper-Middle Income Mexico Upper-Middle Income
Botswana Upper-Middle Income Montenegro Upper-Middle Income
Brazil Upper-Middle Income Namibia Upper-Middle Income
Brunei Darussalam High Income Netherlands High Income
Bulgaria Upper-Middle Income New Zealand High Income
Canada High Income Norway High Income
Chile Upper-Middle Income Oman Upper-Middle Income
China, P.R.: Mainland Upper-Middle Income Palau Upper-Middle Income
Colombia Upper-Middle Income Panama Upper-Middle Income
Costa Rica Upper-Middle Income Paraguay Upper-Middle Income
Croatia Upper-Middle Income Peru Upper-Middle Income
Cyprus High Income Poland Upper-Middle Income
Czech Republic Upper-Middle Income Portugal High Income
Denmark High Income Romania Upper-Middle Income
Dominica Upper-Middle Income Russian Federation Upper-Middle Income
Dominican Republic Upper-Middle Income Saudi Arabia Upper-Middle Income
Ecuador Upper-Middle Income Serbia, Republic of Upper-Middle Income
Equatorial Guinea Upper-Middle Income Seychelles Upper-Middle Income
Estonia Upper-Middle Income Singapore High Income
Fiji Upper-Middle Income Slovak Republic Upper-Middle Income
Finland High Income Slovenia Upper-Middle Income
France High Income South Africa Upper-Middle Income
Gabon Upper-Middle Income Spain High Income
Georgia Upper-Middle Income St. Kitts and Nevis Upper-Middle Income
Germany High Income St. Lucia Upper-Middle Income
Greece Upper-Middle Income St. Vincent and the Grenadines Upper-Middle Income
Grenada Upper-Middle Income Suriname Upper-Middle Income
Guyana Upper-Middle Income Sweden High Income
China, P.R.: Hong Kong High Income Switzerland High Income
Hungary Upper-Middle Income Thailand Upper-Middle Income
Iceland High Income Trinidad and Tobago Upper-Middle Income
Iran, Islamic Republic of Upper-Middle Income Turkey Upper-Middle Income
Iraq Upper-Middle Income Tuvalu Upper-Middle Income
Ireland High Income United Kingdom High Income
Israel High Income United States High Income
Italy High Income Uruguay Upper-Middle Income
Jamaica Upper-Middle Income Venezuela, Rep. Bolivariana de Upper-Middle Income
Japan High Income
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Table 2.5: List of Sudden Stops
Albania 1995 Israel 2001
Angola 2010 Italy 2012
Antigua and Barbuda 2014 Jamaica 2009
Argentina 2002 Jamaica 2015
Argentina 1990 Kazakhstan 2010
Austria 2006 Korea, Republic of 1998
Bahamas, The 2015 Latvia 2009
Bahrain, Kingdom of 1995 Lebanon 2010
Belgium 2010 Lithuania 2009
Belize 2006 Macedonia, FYR 2009
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Malaysia 1998
Botswana 2005 Mauritius 2013
Brunei Darussalam 2010 Mexico 1995
Bulgaria 2009 Montenegro 2009
China, P.R.: Hong Kong 1999 Namibia 2006
Colombia 1999 Norway 2008
Costa Rica 2009 Oman 2010
Cyprus 2009 Palau 2015
Denmark 2011 Panama 2000
Dominica 2016 Paraguay 1996
Dominican Republic 1991 Poland 1994
Ecuador 1999 Portugal 2011
Estonia 2009 Romania 2009
Fiji 2007 Serbia, Republic of 2009
Georgia 2009 Slovenia 2009
Greece 2012 Spain 2009
Grenada 2004 St. Kitts and Nevis 2012
Grenada 2014 St. Lucia 2009
Guyana 1996 Switzerland 2010
Hungary 2009 Thailand 1998
Hungary 1995 Turkey 1994
Iceland 2009 United States 2009
Ireland 2009 Uruguay 2003
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Chapter 3
FiPIt : A Simple, Fast Global
Method for Solving Models with
Two Endogenous States &
Occasionally Binding Constraints
by Enrique G. Mendoza and Sergio Villalvazo Mart́ın
3.1 Introduction
Important branches of the recent macroeconomics literature study quantitative solu-
tions of models in which constraints are triggered endogenously (i.e. they are “occa-
sionally binding”), as in studies of the zero-lower-bound on interest rates or financial
crises triggered by credit constraints. Because these models typically feature non-
linear decision rules that lack analytic solutions and capture precautionary savings,
University of Pennsylvania, NBER and PIER.
University of Pennsylvania.
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global solution methods (e.g. time iteration or endogenous grids methods) are the
preferable tool for solving them. Global methods are, however, less practical than
perturbation methods, because of limitations that make them slow and difficult to
implement with widely used software (e.g. Matlab). On the other hand, perturbation
methods for solving models with occasionally binding constraints, such as OccBin
developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) and DynareOBC proposed by Holden
(2016), have caveats that limit the scope of the findings that can be derived from
using them (see Aruoba et al., 2021, Durdu, Groot, and Mendoza, 2019)
This paper proposes a simple and fast algorithm to obtain the global solution of
models with two endogenous states and occasionally binding constraints. This algo-
rithm is denoted as FiPIt because it is based on the well-known fixed-point iteration
approach to solve systems of transcendental equations. It is easy to implement in
a Matlab platform and is significantly faster than the standard time iteration algo-
rithm and several hybrid alternatives. FiPIt ’s solution strategy builds on the class
of time iteration methods that originated in the work of Coleman (1990), who first
proposed a global solution method based on policy function iterations of the Eu-
ler equation. Since then, various enrichments and modifications of this approach
have been developed, in particular the endogenous grids method proposed by Carroll
(2006) (see Rendahl, 2015 for a general discussion of these methods and an analysis
of their convergence properties). FiPIt differs from these methods in that it applies
the fixed-point iteration method to solve a model’s Euler equations. For instance, in
the Sudden Stops model solutions provided as example in this paper, the bonds (cap-
ital) Euler equation is used to solve directly for a “new” bonds decision rule (capital
pricing function) without the need of a non-linear solver. The capital decision rule is
solved for in “exact” form using the models’ optimality conditions.
The endogenous grids method also avoids using a non-linear solver, but it does
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so by defining alternative state variables so that obtaining analytic solutions of Eu-
ler equations for control variables (e.g. consumption, investment) requires irregular
interpolation of functions defined over endogenous grids of the original state space.
This is innocuous in one-dimensional problems, but in two- and higher-dimensional
problems it requires elaborate interpolation methods to tackle the non-rectangular
nature of the endogenous grids. In particular, Ludwig and Schön (2018) developed a
method using Delaunay interpolation, and showed that it is significantly faster that
standard time iteration.1 Alternatively, Brumm and Grill (2014) proposed a a variant
of the time iteration method that still uses a non-linear solver but gains speed and
accuracy by updating grid nodes to track decision rule kinks using also Delaunay
interpolation. In contrast, FiPIt retains the original state variables so that standard
multi-linear interpolation on regular grids can be used.
We apply the algorithm to solve the model proposed by Mendoza (2010), which is a
model of Sudden Stops (financial crises) in a small open economy. This model includes
an occasionally binding credit constraint limiting intertemporal debt and working
capital not to exceed a fraction of the market value of physical capital (i.e. pledgeable
collateral). The results show that, relative to the time iteration method, FiPIt reduces
execution time by a factor of 2.5 (or 18.1 when solving an RBC variant of the model).2
We also found that FiPIt continues to perform well for several parameter variations,
despite the well-known drawback of fixed-point iteration methods indicating that their
convergence is not guaranteed. Execution times for seven parameter variations of the
1Adjacent points in the endogenous grids do not generally match adjacent nodes in the matrix
formed by the original grids. Ludwig and Schon tackled this problem using Delaunay interpolation.
They also proposed a hybrid method that uses an exogenous grid for one of the endogenous states
and an endogenous grid for the second.
2We used Matlab version R2017a on a Windows 10 laptop with an Intel Core i7-6700HQ 2.60GHz
chip, 4 physical cores and 16 GB of RAM. The state space for the Sudden Stops (RBC) model has
72 (80) nodes on foreign assets and 30 on domestic capital. The Sudden Stops (RBC) model solved
in 810 (100) seconds, compared with 1,986 (1,808) using the time iteration method.
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model were smaller than using time iteration by factors of 2.0 to 18.1. Ludwig and
Schön (2018) report reductions by factors of 2.7 to 4.1 using endogenous grids with
Delaunay interpolation v. standard time iteration, or 1.8 to 2.5 using their hybrid
method v. standard time iteration, when solving a perfect-foresight model of human
capital accumulation in a small open economy.3
In addition to the Delaunay interpolation, a second drawback of the endogenous
grids method relative to the FiPIt method is that it still requires a root-finder in order
to determine equilibrium solutions in points of the state space in which occasionally
binding constraints bind (see Ludwig and Schön, 2018). FiPIt requires a non-linear
solver only if the solution of the allocations when the constraint binds cannot be
separated from the solution of the multiplier of the constraint. The two are separable
in models that feature several widely-used occasionally binding constraints, including
standard no-borrowing constraints, maximum debt limits, and constraints on debt-
to-income and loan-to-value ratios that depend on endogenous variables. Solving
variations of the SS model using these constraints, FiPIt reduced execution time
relative to the time iteration method by a factor of 13.0 for a loan-to-value-ratio
constraint and 17.9 for a maximum debt limit.
There are applications in the literature that solve models using fixed-point iter-
ation algorithms with some features similar to the one we proposed here. Carroll
(2011) described and implemented a fixed-point iteration algorithm for solving the
workhorse complete-markets RBC model of a closed economy. Boz and Mendoza
(2014), Bianchi and Mendoza (2018) and Bianchi, Liu, and Mendoza (2016) solved
3They report faster solution times for each individual scenario than with our algorithm but these
are not comparable due to differences in models and hardware. We solve a stochastic model with
three shocks, capital accumulation and adjustment costs, and a credit constraint that depends on
the model’s two endogenous states and a market price. They solve a deterministic model in which
human capital is an accumulable factor produced with an exponential technology and a no-borrowing
constraint. We do not have details about the software and hardware they used.
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open-economy models with occasionally binding collateral constraints iterating on
bond decision rules and/or pricing functions. All these applications considered only
one endogenous state variable. Perri and Quadrini (2018) solved a two-country model
with two endogenous state variables and a credit constraint resulting from an enforce-
ment friction using Fortran and a state space with 121 points (11 nodes for each state
variable). This paper differs from these studies in that we develop an algorithm that
solves models with two endogenous states easily and fast in a standard Matlab plat-
form and with a sizable state space including 2,160 points. FiPIt can be used in
a variety of models with two endogenous states. The choice of functions that are
iterated on using the Euler equations can vary across models, and there can be more
that one arrangement for the same model.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the prin-
ciples of the algorithm in the simple case of a model of savings with endowment
income, and uses this example also to explain how FiPIt differs from the time iter-
ation and endogenous grids methods. Section 3.3 describes the Sudden Stops model
and provides a step-by-step description of the complete algorithm. Section 3.4 pro-
vides quantitative results, evaluates the robustness of the algorithm, and conducts
performance comparisons with alternative algorithms, including the standard time
iteration method. Section 3.5 presents conclusions. In addition, the Matlab codes
and an Appendix that provides a user’s guide to the codes are available online.
3.2 A Fixed-Point Iteration Algorithm for a Sim-
ple Savings Model
We describe the principles of the FiPIt method using a savings model with stochastic
endowment income and an exogenous interest rate. This model is a workhorse of
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various branches of the macro literature, including consumption and savings in partial
equilibrium, heterogeneous agents models with incomplete markets, and international
macro models of the small open economy.
A representative agent chooses consumption and savings plans so as to maximize








subject to the budget or resource constraint:
ct = e
zt ȳ + bt − qbt+1. (3.2)
and a debt limit:
bt+1 ≥ −ϕ. (3.3)
In the utility function, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and u(·) is the
period utility function, which can be any standard twice, continuously differentiable






where σ is the relative risk aversion coefficient. In the resource constraint, ezt ȳ is
stochastic income with mean ȳ and shocks zt of exponential support e
zt , bt are hold-
ings of one-period, non-state-contingent discount bonds traded in a frictionless credit
market. In a partial equilibrium model of savings or a model of a small open econ-
omy, the real interest rate r is exogenous, so the price of bonds is also exogenous and
given by q ≡ 1
1+r
. In a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous agents, the above
optimization problem is solved by each individual agent facing idiosyncratic income
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uncertainty, and the interest rate is endogenously determined so as to clear the bond
market. The FiPIt method can be used in all of these models, except that in the
heterogeneous agents model we would also need to iterate on the interest rate until
the bond market clears. We focus on the small open economy case to simplify the
exposition.
If the utility function satisfies the Inada condition and income shocks follow a
discrete Markov process or a truncated continuous distribution, the debt limit follows
from Aiyagari’s Natural Debt Limit: agent’s never choose optimal plans that leave
them exposed to the risk of non-positive consumption, and hence never borrow more
than the annuity value of the lowest income realization. Alternatively, agents may
face an ad-hoc debt limit tighter than the natural debt limit. Thus, the model includes
an occasionally binding constraint, albeit of a simple form: bt+1 ≥ −ϕ.
The Euler equation for bond holdings is
uc (ct) = (1 + r)βEt [uc(ct+1)] + µt, (3.4)
where uc(ct) is the marginal utility of ct and µt is the multiplier on the debt limit. Note
that using the resource constraint to substitute for consumption, the Euler equation
can be expressed as:
uc (e
zt ȳ + bt − qbt+1) = (1 + r)βEt [uc (ezt+1 ȳ + bt+1 − qbt+2)] + µt. (3.5)
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is defined by stochastic sequences
[ct, bt+1]
∞
t=0 that satisfy equations (3.3) and (3.4) for all t. The economy has a well-
defined limiting distribution of (b, y) (i.e. a stochastic steady state) only if β(1+ r) <
1 (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012, Ch. 18). This condition is also a general
equilibrium outcome in heterogeneous agents models, because otherwise all agents
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would want an infinite amount of bonds, which is inconsistent with market clearing
in the market of risk-free bonds.
Since there are no inefficiencies affecting the small open economy (other than the
incompleteness of asset markets), the competitive equilibrium can be represented as
the solution to the following dynamic programming problem:












c = ezȳ + b− qb′
b′ ≥ −ϕ
The solution to the above Bellman equation is characterized by a decision rule b′(b, z)
and the associated value function V (b, z), and the decision rule together with the
Markov process of the shocks induce a joint ergodic (unconditional) distribution of
bonds and income λ(b, z).
“Euler equation” methods typically solve for b′(b, z) over a discrete state space of
(b, z) pairs using the recursive equilibrium conditions that follow from the first-order-
conditions of the above Bellman equation:
c(b, z)−σ ≥ βR
∑
z′
π(z′, z) (c(b′(b, z), z′))
−σ
(3.7)
c(b, z) = ezȳ + b− qb′(b, z). (3.8)
The recursive equilibrium of the model is then defined as the pair of decision rules
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c(b, z), b′(b, z) that satisfy these two conditions.
The FiPIt method poses a conjecture of the decision rule b̂′j(b, z) in iteration j,
defined over the nodes of discrete grids for b and z. Intermediate values are then
found by interpolation. The function b̂′j(b, z) uses the resource constraint to generate
its associated consumption function as cj(b, z) = e
zȳ + b − qb̂′j(b, z). Using this con-
sumption function, the above first-order conditions can be combined into an equation














In the right-hand-side of this Euler equation, we need the value of ct+1, which is




′)). Since b̂′j(b, z) is defined only on the nodes of the grid
of bonds, this consumption function is interpolated over its first argument in or-
der to determine cj(b̂
′
j(b, z), z
′) (i.e. the value of ct+1 implied by the conjectured
consumption function). Once this is done, the Euler equation solves directly for
a new consumption function cj+1(b, z) without a non-linear solver. Using the re-
source constraint, this new consumption function yields a new decision rule for bonds
b′j+1(b, z), which is re-set to b
′
j+1(b, z) = −ϕ if b′j+1(b, z) ≤ −ϕ. Then the deci-
sion rule conjecture is updated to b̂
′





j+1(b, z) = (1 − ρ)b̂′j(b, z) + ρb′j+1(b, z). The process is repeated until
b′j+1(b, z) = b̂
′
j(b, z) for all (b, z) in the grids, up to a convergence criterion.
Three points raised by Judd (1998) about fixed-point iteration algorithms like
this one are worth recalling. First, using collocation methods instead of solving for
a finite state space, the fixed-point iteration method can be represented in a form
analogous to the Parameterized Expectations method, because the latter is a fixed-
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point iteration method that uses simulation and regression to construct conditional
expectations. Second, using 0 < ρ < 1 (ρ > 1) to set the decision rule of the next
iteration is useful to address possible instability (slow convergence) of the algorithm.
Third, a finite state space may be preferable to collocation methods to define the
decision rules depending on whether we expect decision rules to be smooth or to
have strong curvature. The latter can be particularly important in models with
occasionally binding constraints that depend on endogenous variables, such as credit
constraints that depend on collateral prices and yield U-shaped decision rules because
of the Fisherian debt-deflation mechanism (see Bianchi and Mendoza, 2018). This
will be the case in the model solved in the next section.
Fixed-point iteration differs from the time iteration method because the latter
applies the conjectured decision rule b̂′j(b, z) only to substitute for the term bt+2 in
the right-hand-side of the Euler equation (3.5), and then uses a non-linear solver to
solve the resulting non-linear equation for the optimal choice of bt+1 as a function
of (zt, bt). Hence, we can think of the fixed-point iteration method as a “proxy time
iteration method” that substitutes for the bt+1 in the right-hand-side of the Euler
equation with a proxy that is defined to be the conjectured decision rule, instead of
treating that bt+1 term as endogenous.
4 Fixed-point iteration is also different from the
endogenous grids method, because it does not redefine the endogenous state variable
and instead solves the problem over the original rectilinear grids (b, z). Still, fixed-
point iteration retains the main computational advantage of the endogenous grids
method, which is that the Euler equation is reduced to an equation with an analytic
solution for the decision rule, avoiding the need to use non-linear solvers.
4From this perspective, it may seem as if the FiPIt method solves the “incorrect” Euler equation.
Yet, as the paper shows, the solutions satisfy the same equilibrium conditions and are negligibly
different from those obtained using standard time iteration. This is because FiPIt is essentially an
application of the standard fixed-point iteration approach to solve transcendental equations.
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3.3 The FiPIt Method for Two-Dimensional Mod-
els
This section provides a detailed description of the steps that the FiPIt method follows
to solve a model with two endogenous states and an occasionally binding constraint.
The model pertains to a small open economy with two endogenous states, capital (k)
and net foreign assets (b), and a credit constraint. If the constraint never binds, the
algorithm solves a standard RBC model of a small open economy, and if it binds it
solves a model with endogenous financial crises or Sudden Stops.
3.3.1 Model structure and equilibrium conditions
The model is the same as in Mendoza (2010), except that the preferences with en-
dogenous discounting are replaced with standard time-separable expected utility with
exogenous discounting at rate β. The economy is inhabited by a representative firm-
household with preferences defined over stochastic sequences of consumption ct and














The agent chooses sequences of consumption, labor, investment, and holdings of
real, one-period international bonds, bt+1 (the agent borrows when bt+1 < 0), so as
to maximize the above utility function subject to the following budget and collateral
constraints:






AtF (kt, Lt, vt)− ptvt − φ(Rt − 1)(wtLt + ptvt)− qbtbt+1 + bt, (3.11)
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qbtbt+1 − φRt(wtLt + ptvt) ≥ −κqtkt+1. (3.12)
The right-hand-side of the budget constraint is the sum of net profits from pro-
duction and the resources generated by trading assets abroad. Net profits are equal
to gross production minus the cost of imported inputs minus the servicing of foreign
working capital loans for labor and imported inputs. Gross output is represented by a








t , that requires
capital, kt, labor and imported inputs, vt, to produce a tradable good sold at a world-
determined price (normalized to unity without loss of generality). TFP is subject to
a random shock εAt with exponential support around a mean of A. Working capital
loans pay for a fraction φ of the cost of imported inputs and labor in advance of sales.
These loans are obtained from foreign lenders at the beginning of each period and
repaid at the end. Lenders charge the world gross real interest rate Rt = R exp(ε
R
t )
on these loans, where εRt is an interest rate shock around a mean value R. Imported
inputs are purchased at an exogenous relative price in terms of the world’s numeraire
pt = p exp(ε
P
t ), where p is the mean price and ε
P
t is a shock to the world price of
imported inputs (i.e., a terms-of-trade shock). The shocks εAt , ε
R
t , and ε
P
t follow a
joint first-order Markov process. The resources generated by trading assets abroad
are given by −qbtbt+1 + bt, where qt is the price of the international bonds, which
satisfies qbt = R
−1
t .
The left-hand-side of the budget constraint is the sum of consumption expendi-
tures, investment and capital adjustment costs. Gross investment is it = kt+1 − (1−





. Since government expenditures are not included in the model, we include
a time-invariant consumption tax τ that is used to calibrate the model to match the
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average share of government expenditures in GDP in the data. This is done so that
consumption and investment shares in the model can match their data counterparts.
Since the tax is constant, it does not distort the savings-consumption margin. The
tax does distort labor supply but this distortion is constant over time, since the tax
itself is constant.
The credit constraint limits the total debt, which is equal to intertemporal debt
plus working capital financing, not to exceed the fraction κ of the market value of
the end-of-period capital stock. This is a more complex constraint than borrowing
constraints of the class bt+1 ≥ −ϕ, widely used in heterogeneous agents models and
also in the algorithm proposed by Ludwig and Schön (2018). Notice that the prices
qt and wt that appear in this constraint (and the wage in the budget constraint), are
endogenous market prices taken as given by the agent when solving its optimization
problem. As in Mendoza (2010), the wage rate must be on the labor supply curve
(i.e. it must equal the tax-adjusted marginal disutility of labor), which requires wt =




. With these simplifications noted, the competitive equilibrium of the
economy can be represented with the optimization problem of the firm-household,
instead of defining separate problems for households and firms. This equilibrium,
however, cannot be represented as the solution to a planner’s problem formulated
as a single Bellman equation, because the planner would internalize the responses of
wages and asset prices to its optimal plans, while the representative firm-household
does not.
Defining λt and µt as the future-value multipliers of the budget and collateral






= λt(1 + τ) (3.13)
120
AtFLt(kt, Lt, vt) = wt
(






AtFvt(kt, Lt, vt) = pt
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t (1 + τ) (3.19)






AtF (kt, Lt, vt)− ptvt − φ(Rt − 1)(Lωt (1 + τ) + ptvt)− qbtbt+1 + bt (3.20)
Solving this model with the time iteration method requires solving the Euler equa-
tions (3.16) and (3.17) as part of a system of non-linear equations. Given conjectures
of the decision rules for capital and bonds, and simplifying using the other equilib-
rium conditions, the two Euler equations form a two-equation system that yields the
“new” decision rules. When the collateral constraint does not bind, these two Euler
equations have their standard forms. When the constraint binds, the multiplier µt is
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an additional endogenous variable and there is an additional equation, which is the
constraint holding with equality. The solution can still be reduced to a two-equation
system, by using the constraint to substitute for qbtbt+1 together with the conjectured
decision rules so as to obtain a two-equation system in kt+1 and µt.
5
Solving with the endogenous grid method requires defining grids for two alterna-
tive state variables (s1, s2) such that s1t ≡ qbtbt+1 and s2t ≡ kt+1/(1 − δ), and then
proceeding as in Ludwig and Schön (2018) to first determine the values of (bt+1, kt+1)
associated with each (s1t , s
2
t ) pair, then use the optimality conditions (including the
Euler equations) to solve for the contemporaneous controls, particularly (ct, it), and
then use the resource constraint and the definition of gross investment to extract
the implied values of the original endogenous states (bt, kt), namely the endogenous
grids. When solving for the contemporaneous controls, the optimality conditions form
a system of equations that has an analytic solution, thus avoiding the need to use
a non-linear solver, but the endogenous grids of (bt+1, kt+1) are irregular, so inter-
polation of the relevant functions required to obtain the solution of the system is
implemented using Delaunay interpolation.6 As noted earlier, FiPIt does not need
either non-linear solvers or interpolation methods for irregular grids.7 Standard bi-
linear interpolation over rectangular grids still applies.
5If the solution implies a value of bt+1 lower than the lower bound of the grid of bonds, we set
bt+1 to that lower bound and solve again the two-equation system for the values of kt+1 and µt+1
consistent with that value of bt+1. Hence, the lower bound of the bonds grid is still treated as a
constraint of the form bt+1 ≥ −ϕ.
6The Ludwig-Schon algorithm still needs to solve a non-linear equation in order to solve for the
contemporaneous controls in states in which their no-borrowing constraint binds.
7A non-linear equation may need to be solved for in states in which the credit constraint binds,
depending on the structure of the constraint (as we explain in Section 3.3.2), but this is separate
from the need to solve a two-Euler-equation non-linear system when time iteration is used to solve
models with two endogenous states.
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3.3.2 Description of the FiPIt algorithm
The FiPIt method solves the model’s equilibrium conditions in recursive form. The
model has two endogenous states, b and k, and three exogenous states, using s to de-
note the triple of exogenous shocks s ≡ (A,R, p), which includes shocks to TFP (A),
the world interest rate (R) and the price of imported inputs (p). The recursive equi-
librium is defined by a set of recursive functions for allocations [b′(b, k, s), k′(b, k, s),
c(b, k, s), L(b, k, s), v(b, k, s)], prices [w(b, k, s), q(b, k, s)] and multipliers [λ(b, k, s),
µ(b, k, s)] that satisfy the recursive representation of Equations (3.13)-(3.20), which
is provided in the Appendix.
The recursive equilibrium is solved for over a discrete state space, which requires
defining discrete grids for (b, k, s). The grid for the shock triples s ∈ S comes from
the discretization of the stochastic processes of the model’s three shocks. This is typ-
ically done using Tauchen’s quadrature method. Here we take S and the associated
Markov transition probability matrix from Mendoza (2010), where S has eight triples
(i.e. each shock has two realizations). For the endogenous states, we define grids with
M nodes for bonds and N nodes for capital, respectively: B = {b1 < b2 < ... < bM},
K = {k1 < k2 < ... < kN}. The state space has M ×N × 8 elements and is defined
by all (b, k, s) ∈ B⊗K⊗ S. Once parameter values and the discrete state space are
defined, the FiPIt algorithm is implemented following the steps described below.
Step 1. Start iteration j with conjectured functions for the price of capital q̂j(b, k, s),
the decision rule for bonds b̂′j(b, k, s), and the multiplier ratio
ˆ̃µj(b, k, s) ≡ µj(b, k, s)/λj(b, k, s). The first iteration can start with ˆ̃µ0(b, k, s) = 0 so
that the first pass runs as if it were an RBC model and only cases where the constraint
binds pass positive multipliers to the next iteration. The initial functions can be set
to q̂0(b, k, s) = 1 and b̂
′
0(b, k, s) = b, which imply stationary decision rules for capital
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and bonds. Note also that this same algorithm can be used to solve a standard RBC
model without the occasionally binding constraint, by simply setting κ high enough
so that the constraint never binds.
Step 2. Using the recursive equilibrium conditions, compute the iteration-j implied
decision rules for capital k′j(b, k, s), consumption, investment (inclusive of adjustment
costs), labor, inputs and output as shown below. Note that, given q̂j(b, k, s), the capi-
tal decision rule has an analytic solution that follows from optimality condition (3.54)
(i.e. the capital decision rule has a closed-form solution as a function of the price of
capital). The factor allocation rules follow from the conditions equating marginal
products with marginal costs, which include factor prices and financing costs. The
wages bill wL is replaced with (1+τ)Lω because of the optimality condition for labor
supply. With these arguments in mind, the iteration-j implied decision rules are:
k′j(b, k, s) =
k
a
[q̂j(b, k, s)− 1 + a] (3.21)
ĩj(b, k, s) =(k
′






































Consumption then follows from the resource constraint:
(1 + τ)cj(b, k, s) = yj(b, k, s)− pvj(b, k, s)− φ(R− 1)[(1 + τ)Lj(b, k, s)ω+




Note that for points where ˆ̃µj(b, k, s) = 0, factor allocations and output are the same
as for an RBC model without credit frictions, which because of the GHH structure of
period utility (i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between c and L is independent
of c) depend only on (k, s). We keep them as functions of all three states because
when ˆ̃µj(b, k, s) > 0 factor allocations and output do depend on the three states.
Step 3. Assume the collateral constraint does not bind. This implies that the
new decision rule for the modified multiplier is ˆ̃µj+1(b, k, s) = 0, and the new de-
cision rules for the rest of the endogenous variables are solved using the recursive
equilibrium conditions as follows:
3.1 Factor allocations and output again match the expressions corresponding to an
RBC model with perfect credit markets:



























3.2 Solve for cj+1 by applying the fixed-point iteration method to the Euler equation
for bonds. The iteration-j conjectures for capital and bonds are used everywhere
in the right-hand-side of this Euler equation, so that we obtain an analytic
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solution for cj+1. Keep track of the subscripts denoting which function is used
in each term:
cj+1(b, k, s) =βRE









In the above expression, the functions cj(b, k, s) and Lj(b, k, s) are defined only
at the nodes of B⊗K⊗S, but since the values of b̂′j(b, k, s) and k′j(b, k, s) gener-
ally do not match node grids in B and K, respectively, cj(·) and Lj(·) are inter-
polated over their first two arguments to determine cj(b̂
′
j(b, k, s), k
′




j(b, k, s), k
′
j(b, k, s), s
′). Standard bi-linear interpolation is applied. Use
extrapolation if k′j(b, k, s) is below (above) k
1 (kN) and also if b̂′j(b, k, s) is above
bM , but for b̂′j(b, k, s) < b
1 evaluate the functions at b1, because the lower bound
on bonds represents an ad-hoc debt limit commonly used for calibration of the
model to the data (see Durdu, Groot, and Mendoza, 2019). Note also that,
because of the fractional exponent (since typically σ > 1) the above equation
solves only if cj(·) − Lj(·)
ω
ω
> 0, but if this is true for the consumption and
labor decision rules implied by the initial conjectures set for the first iteration
(c0(·), L0(·)), it will also be true at any iteration j > 0.
3.3 Solve for b′j+1(b, k, s) using the resource constraint:
b′j+1(b, k, s) =
R{yj+1(b, k, s)− pvj+1(b, k, s)− φ(R− 1) [(1 + τ)Lj+1(b, k, s)ω + pvj+1(b, k, s)]−
ĩj(b, k, s)− (1 + τ)cj+1(b, k, s) + b} (3.31)
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3.4 Evaluate if the collateral constraint binds. If:
b′j+1(b, k, s)
R
− φR [(1 + τ)Lj+1(b, k, s)ω + pvj+1(b, k, s)] + κq̂j(b, k, s)k′j(b, k, s) ≥ 0,
(3.32)
the constraint does not bind at the point (b, k, s), the functions with j + 1
subscripts are saved, and skip to Step 5. Otherwise, the constraint binds at
this point, the functions with j + 1 subscripts are discarded and move to Step
4.
Step 4. Solve for new decision rules when the collateral constraint binds. Since
q̂j(b, k, s) has not changed, we use the same iteration-j implied decision rule for capi-
tal k′j(b, k, s) =
k
a
[q̂j(b, k, s)− 1 + a] and the same function ĩj(b, k, s) as before. This
is the most computationally intensive step, because it solves a non-linear simultane-
ous equations system to determine Lj+1(b, k, s), vj+1(b, k, s), cj+1(b, k, s), b
′
j+1(b, k, s),
µ̃j+1(b, k, s). The five equations in the system are the two optimality conditions for
factor allocations, the Euler equation for bonds (with the µ̃ terms), the credit con-
straint holding with equality, and the resource constraint. To make the solution more
tractable, we express Lj+1(b, k, s), vj+1(b, k, s), cj+1(b, k, s), b
′
j+1(b, k, s) as functions of
µ̃(b, k, s), and use the results to reduce the system to a single non-linear equation
in µ̃(b, k, s). In the simplified system, factor allocations, consumption and bonds are
functions denoted Lj+1(b, k, s, µ̃), vj+1(b, k, s, µ̃), cj+1(b, k, s, µ̃), b
′
j+1(b, k, s, µ̃), but to
make the notation simpler we write them as depending on µ̃ only (still, keep in mind
the set of equations needs to be solved for each (b, k, s) for which the constraint was
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The equations for labor and inputs follow from combining the borrowing constraint
with the optimality conditions equating marginal products with marginal costs, in-
cluding the µ̃ terms. They are the same equations used in Step 2, but now we need
to find the value of µ̃j+1 that solves them, instead of taking as given µ̃j.
In addition to Equations (3.33)-(3.36), the solution for µ̃j+1(b, k, s) must also
satisfy the Euler equation for bonds, which can be written as:





j(b, k, s), k
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Notice the numerator in the second term in the right-hand-side still applies fixed-
point iteration by computing expected marginal utility using j-dated functions only.
The values of cj(b̂
′
j(b, k, s), k
′
j(b, k, s), s
′) and Lj(b̂
′
j(b, k, s), k
′
j(b, k, s), s
′) are again de-
termined by bi-linear interpolation.






















































Note again that, because of the fractional exponent in the right-hand-side of (3.38),
the equation solves only if cj(·)−Lj(·)
ω
ω
> 0. Since the first iteration starts with µ̃0(·) =
0, any state that yields a binding credit constraint in the first iteration will solve for
µ̃1(·) as long as the same condition required for the unconstrained consumption func-




for the decision rules implied by the initial conjectures set for the first iteration.
Moreover, since when the constraint binds it must be true that 0 < µ̃ < 1, it follows
from Equation 3.37 that cj(·) − Lj(·)
ω
ω
> 0 will hold for any iteration j > 0. Once
µ̃j+1(b, k, s) is solved, the functions vj+1(b, k, s), Lj+1(b, k, s), b
′
j+1(b, k, s), cj+1(b, k, s)
are determined using Equations (3.33)-(3.36), but replacing µ̃ with µ̃j+1(b, k, s). The
functions with j + 1 subscripts are saved, and we move to Step 5.
It is important to note that, depending on the structure of the occasionally bind-
ing constraint, if µ̃ can be solved for separately after solving for the allocations,
Step 4 is much easier because FiPIt does not require a non-linear solver any-
where. For example, if working capital is not in the credit constraint, we can set
b′j+1(b, k, s)/R = −κq̂j(b, k, s)k′j(b, k, s), and this can be used to determine cj+1(b, k, s)
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directly from the resource constraint. The implied value of µ̃j+1(b, k, s) can then be
solved for from the bonds Euler equation. The same applies for a credit constraint
set to a constant value, as in Ludwig and Schön (2018), where they used bt+1 ≥ 0.
Hence, FiPIt can solve models with a large class of occasionally binding constraints
without using a non-linear solver at any point, whereas the Ludwig-Schön algorithm
needs both the Delaunay interpolation and a non-linear solver when the constraint
binds.
Step 5. Return to Step 3 and repeat ∀(b, k, s) ∈ B ⊗ K ⊗ S. This is necessary
before proceeding to compute a new asset pricing function, because the complete set
of j+1-dated functions is required.
Step 6. Compute the new pricing function qj+1(b, k, s). We describe two ways
of doing this:
6.1 The FiPIt algorithm proceeds in a manner analogous to fixed-point iteration
on the Euler equation for bonds, by applying the new decision rules for cj+1(·),
Lj+1(·), b′j+1(·), µ̃j+1(·) to the Euler equation for capital and solving it so as to
obtain the following analytic solution for qj+1(b, k, s):













































j+1(·), k′j(·), s′)− k′j(·))2
k′j(·)2
The asset price used in the right-hand-side of (3.41) is the conjecture set in
Step 1. Since all the functions in the right-hand-side are known, the equation













are determined by bi-linear inter-
polation. The value of the dividends function d′(·) is obtained by applying bi-








in the marginal product of capital and k′j(b
′
j+1(·), k′j(·), s′) in the adjustment cost
term. Notice that the decision rule for bonds that sets the value of bt+1 at which
all these functions are interpolated is a j+1-indexed function, not the j-indexed
function used in Steps 3 and 4, but over the capital dimension we are still using
the j-indexed decision rule.
6.2 A variant of the algorithm labeled Fixed-Point Iteration with Forward Solution
(FPIFS) solves for the new price conjecture by iterating to convergence on the
capital Euler equation (i.e. it uses the forward solution of the asset price).
Index the iterations on this equation with superscript z, the iterations solve
this functional equation problem, always using the j + 1-dated functions and
the multiplier µ̃j+1(·) obtained in Steps 3 to 5:




























Iterate until ||qz+1(b, k, s) − qz(b, k, s)|| ≤ εq for small εq, and if the result













are determined using bi-
linear interpolation as in step 6.1.
Step 7. Check the convergence of the conjectured functions. Convergence requires
that for small εf the following conditions are satisfied ∀(b, k, s) ∈ B⊗K⊗ S:
|qj+1(b, k, s)− q̂j(b, k, s)| ≤ εf (3.43)
|b′j+1(b, k, s)− b̂′j(b, k, s)| ≤ εf (3.44)
|µ̃j+1(b, k, s)− ˆ̃µj(b, k, s)| ≤ εf (3.45)
If these conditions hold, the recursive competitive equilibrium has been solved. The
level of the multiplier on the credit constraint can then be solved for as follows:








The accuracy of the solution can then be evaluated by verifying that the equilibrium
conditions hold, including computations of the maximum and average absolute values
of the errors in the Euler equations of k and b.
If any of the three convergence conditions fails, update the conjectured functions
using a convex combination of the last conjectures and the new functions to dampen
possible overshooting or speed up convergence. This is conventional practice because
there is no guarantee that fixed-point iteration algorithms converge, but when they
diverge it is generally because they overshoot the true solution. Hence, the new
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conjectures are set as:
x̂j+1(b, k, s) = (1− ρx)x̂j(b, k, s) + ρxxj+1(b, k, s) (3.47)
for x = [q, b′, µ̃] and some 0 ≤ ρx. Notice that x̂j(b, k, s) in the right-hand-side
of this expression represents the initial conjectures that were used in the current
iteration, while x̂+1j(b, k, s) in the left-hand-side denotes the new conjectures for the
next iteration. Use 0 < ρx < 1 (ρx > 1) for the particular function x(·) that is not
converging (converging too slowly). Return to Step 2, setting x̂j(b, k, s)=x̂j+1(b, k, s),
and repeat until convergence is attained.
3.4 Application to Sudden Stops Model
This section examines solutions of the Sudden Stops model obtained with a set of
Matlab programs we developed to implement the FiPIt algorithm. The Matlab codes
and an Appendix that explains how the codes execute each of the algorithm steps
are available online. All the computations were made using Matlab R2017a on a
Windows 10 laptop with an Intel Core i7-6700HQ 2.60GHz four-core chip and 16GB
of RAM.
The model’s parameter values are taken from Mendoza (2010) and listed in Table
3.9, including the same baseline value for the collateral coefficient (κ = 0.2). We also
use the same Markov process for the model’s three shocks. The only difference, as
mentioned earlier, is that instead of using preferences with an endogenous rate of time
preference we use standard time-separable expected utility with constant discounting,
setting the subjective discount factor at β = 0.92.
The state space consists of evenly-spaced grids with 72 nodes for bonds and 30
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nodes for capital. K spans the [654.5, 885.5] interval and B spans the [-188.6, 800]
interval. Solving with larger grids increases sharply execution time and produces
negligibly different results, while solving with smaller grids is faster but yields inac-
curate results. The Markov process of the shocks has two realizations for each shock
and their values together with the associated 8×8 transition probability matrix ap-
proximate the variability, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation of TFP,
interest rates and the price of imported inputs in the data (see Mendoza, 2010 for
details).
To assess the performance of the FiPIt algorithm, we computed solutions using
FiPIt and the FPIFS variant, as well as solutions from three other algorithms: TIFS
replaces the fixed-point iteration solution of the bonds decision rule with a standard
time iteration solution that uses a non-linear solver, and solves for the price of capital
using the forward solution of the capital Euler equation; TIFPI uses again standard
time iteration for the bonds decision rule, but solves for the price of capital using the
fixed-point iteration approach; and FTI is the full time iteration solution in which the
Euler equations for capital and bonds are solved as a non-linear equation system. In
all these solutions except FTI, we found faster convergence by setting the dampening
parameters for updating the conjectured functions to 0.3 for the price of capital (0.25
for a scenario with 60 capital nodes) and 1 for bonds and µ̃. For FTI solutions, we
kept ρx = 1 for all three functions, and confirmed that these produces convergence in
the smallest number of iterations.
3.4.1 Comparison of Results & Performance Metrics
Table 3.2 reports long-run moments of the main macro aggregates and performance
statistics of the algorithm for the following seven solution scenarios: Columns (1) and
(2) are FiPIt solutions with capital grids of 60 and 30 nodes respectively, (3) is the
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Value
σ risk aversion coefficient 2.0
ω labor elasticity coefficient 1.8461
β discount factor 0.92
a capital adjustment cost 2.75
φ working capital parameter 0.2579
δ depreciation rate 0.088
α labor share 0.59
η imported inputs share 0.10
γ capital share of income 0.31
τ tax on consumption 0.17
A average TFP 6.982
κ collateral coefficient 0.20
TFIS solution, (4) is the FPIFS solution, (5) is the TIFPI solution, (6) is the FTI
solution and Column (7) shows the results from Mendoza (2010) for reference.
The comparison of Cols. (1) and (2) shows that solving using FiPIt with the
smaller capital grid has nearly no effect on the results but reduces execution time by
a factor of 2.5. The moments reported in Columns (2) to (6) are very similar, and in
fact identical up to one or two decimals. Hence, all of the four solution algorithms we
tried yield effectively the same results. The results from Mendoza (2010) in Column
(7) are qualitatively similar in terms of ranking of volatilities and signs and ranking
of correlations and autocorrelations, but quantitatively show more differences. These
are due to the different discount factors (Mendoza used endogenous discounting) and
the different solution methods (Mendoza solved forcing decision rules to be on the
nodes of the grids of bonds and capital, instead of using interpolation, and used value
function iteration on a quasi planner’s problem with w and q restricted to satisfy the
labor supply and investment optimality conditions). The one item that differs sharply
is the probability of Sudden Stops, which is about 2.0 percent in Cols. (1)-(6) v. 3.3
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percent in Mendoza’s paper.8 This is due to the approximately-continuous decision
rules obtained using interpolation in our solutions v. decision rules forced to be on
grid nodes in Mendoza’s solution. This makes our estimates of the frequency with
which µ(b, k, s) > 0, and of the trade balance adjustment implied by the associated
b′(b, k, s) in those states, more accurate. In all of our results, the long-run probability
of states with µ > 0 is about 2.6 percent, but 23 percent of these states do not yield
a sufficiently large increase in the trade balance to classify as a Sudden Stop.
The performance metrics for Columns (1)-(6) reported in panel (b) of Table 3.2
show that all the solutions have similar accuracy, with small maximum and average
absolute-value errors in the Euler equations for bonds and capital. The FTI solution
yields larger errors, but still this makes little difference in the statistical moments it
produces relative to those produced by the other solutions.
In terms of execution time, the FiPIt method in Col. (2) dominates the other
solution methods by large margins.9 The absolute speeds will vary widely with hard-
ware and software configurations, but the relative speeds are likely to vary less and
the ranking across methods based on this criterion is unlikely to change. Comparing
speeds relative to FiPIt, which took 810 seconds to run, the second fastest method is
FPIFS in Col. (4), which took 20 percent longer solve. This algorithm only differs
from FiPIt in that it solves for the price of capital by solving forward the capital
Euler equation. The slowest methods are the three that use time iteration (i.e. a
non-linear solver) for at least one Euler equation. In Cols. (3) and (5) the bonds
decision rule is solved with the time iteration method, but the price of capital is
solved using the forward solution in Col. (3) v. fixed-point iteration in Col. (5). This
8We applied the same definition of Sudden Stops: coordinates (b, k, s) in which the collateral
constraint binds and the trade balance-GDP ratio is at least 2 percentage points above what the
RBC model yields.
9FiPIt has even lower relative execution times than the other methods when solving the RBC
model, because it avoids using the non-linear solver completely (see Section 3.4.2 for details).
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makes little difference in execution time, as they take 4.6 and 5.1 times longer than
the FiPIt solution in Col. (2), respectively. Interestingly, the standard FTI method
in Col. (6), which solves the simultaneous non-linear Euler equations for bonds and
capital, is significantly faster than the methods used in Cols. (3) and (5), indicating
that solving only one non-linear Euler equation instead of two does not guarantee a
faster algorithm. Still, the FTI execution time exceeds that of the FiPIt solution by
a factor of 2.5!
The FTI solution is faster than the ones in Cols. (3) and (5) because time it-
eration takes advantage of the contraction mapping properties of the two non-linear
Euler equations by solving them simultaneously while fixed-point iteration methods
do not. Intuitively, every iteration with FTI tends to generate relatively more ac-
curate outcomes, and hence attains convergence in 94 iterations. The algorithms in
Cols. (3) and (5) take more than twice as many iterations (190 iterations for TIFS
and 207 for TIFPI ), and still in each they have to use a root finder because they
solve for the bonds decision rule using time iteration. The FiPIt method converges
in a similar number of iterations (196) as these two methods, but goes through each
iteration much faster because it avoids using non-linear solvers when the constraint
does not bind, overcoming the drawback of not taking advantage of the contraction
mapping properties of the Euler equations, and this makes it the fastest method.10
FPIFS in Col. (4) is the second fastest for a similar reason, and it is slower than
FiPIt because solving the price of capital with the forward solution is slower than
with fixed-point iteration.
In addition to comparing Euler equation errors, we also compared the recursive
10This suggests that FiPIt can be again much faster than FTI in applications in which, as ex-
plained in Section 3.3, the structure of the occasionally binding constraint is such that FiPIt does
not need a root-finder in states in which the constraint binds (e.g. qbt bt+1 ≥ −κqtkt+1, qbt bt+1 ≥ −ϕ).
We show results for a case like this in Section 3.4.2.
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Table 3.2: Long-run Moments & Performance Metrics: Sudden Stops Model (κ = 0.2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FiPIt-large grid FiPIt TIFS FPIFS TIFPI FTI Mendoza (2010)
(a) Long-run moments
Mean
gdp 393.629 393.619 393.626 393.618 393.626 393.549 388.339
c 273.910 274.123 274.074 274.124 274.073 274.011 267.857
i 67.482 67.481 67.484 67.481 67.484 67.459 65.802
nx/gdp 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.024
k 765.191 765.171 765.202 765.170 765.202 764.922 747.709
b/gdp 0.007 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.012 -0.104
q 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
leverage ratio -0.106 -0.102 -0.103 -0.102 -0.103 -0.103 -0.159
v 42.618 42.617 42.618 42.617 42.618 42.609 41.949
working capital 76.660 76.658 76.659 76.658 76.659 76.644 75.455
Standard deviation (in percent)
gdp 3.91 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.85
c 3.95 4.03 4.02 4.03 4.02 4.03 3.69
i 13.33 13.33 13.33 13.33 13.33 13.32 13.45
nx/gdp 2.90 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.58
k 4.40 4.49 4.49 4.49 4.49 4.50 4.31
b/gdp 18.72 19.62 19.47 19.62 19.47 19.45 8.90
q 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.23
leverage ratio 8.79 9.22 9.15 9.22 9.15 9.14 4.07
v 5.87 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.84
working capital 4.33 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.36 4.26
Correlation with GDP
gdp 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
c 0.849 0.842 0.844 0.842 0.844 0.844 0.931
i 0.646 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.641
nx/gdp -0.122 -0.117 -0.118 -0.117 -0.118 -0.120 -0.184
k 0.757 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.744
b/gdp -0.133 -0.120 -0.119 -0.120 -0.119 -0.117 -0.298
q 0.400 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.406
leverage ratio -0.125 -0.111 -0.111 -0.111 -0.111 -0.108 0.258
v 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.823
working capital 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.987
First-order autocorrelation
gdp 0.823 0.825 0.824 0.825 0.824 0.825 0.815
c 0.823 0.830 0.829 0.830 0.829 0.829 0.766
i 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.500 0.483
nx/gdp 0.589 0.601 0.598 0.601 0.598 0.598 0.447
k 0.964 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.963
b/gdp 0.989 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.087
q 0.444 0.447 0.446 0.447 0.446 0.446 0.428
leverage ratio 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.040
v 0.776 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.764
working capital 0.800 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.777
Prob. of Sudden Stops 1.98% 1.99% 2.03% 1.99% 2.04% 2.05% 3.32%
(b) Performance metrics
Bonds Euler Equation
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error -3.58 -3.58 -3.58 -3.58 -3.58 -3.52 -
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (1, 11, 3) (1, 6, 3) (1, 6, 3) (1, 6, 3) (1, 6, 3) (2, 1, 7) -
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -14.45 -14.45 -12.41 -14.27 -12.39 -12.35 -
Capital Euler Equation
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error -15.38 -15.37 -15.42 -15.37 -15.42 -4.06 -
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (72, 1, 7) (72, 1, 7) (32, 1, 7) (72, 1, 7) (32, 1, 7) (1, 1, 7) -
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -16.22 -16.22 -16.07 -16.04 -16.21 -12.45 -
Grid size (#b,#k) (72, 60) (72, 30) (72, 30) (72, 30) (72, 30) (72, 30) (80, 60)
Seconds elapsed 1985 810 3735 956 4136 1986 -
Relative to FiPIt 2.5 1.0 4.6 1.2 5.1 2.5 -
Number of iterations 196 196 190 178 207 94 -
Notes: Column (1) and Column (2) are for the FiPIt algorithm, fixed-point iteration is used for both the bonds decision rule and
the price of capital. Column (3) is for the TIFS method, which uses the time iteration method for the bonds decision rule and
the forward solution of the capital Euler equation for the price of capital. Column (4) is for the FPIFS method, which uses fixed-
point iteration for the bonds decision rule and the forward solution of the capital Euler equation for the price of capital. Column
(5) is for the TIFPI method, which uses time iteration for the decision rule for bonds and fixed-point iteration for the price of
capital. Column (6) is for the FTI method, which solves the bonds decision rule and the price of capital by solving the Euler
equations for bonds and capital as two simultaneous non-linear equations. Sudden Stop states are defined as in Mendoza (2010):
states (b, k, s) such that µ(b, k, s) > 0 and the trade balance-GDP ratio is at least 2 percentage points above its value in the RBC
model.
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equilibrium functions produced by each solution method relative to the FiPIt solu-
tion. Table 3.3 shows the maximum and mean of the absolute value of the point-wise
differences of the functions as a ratio of the corresponding FiPIt solution. The dif-
ferences are generally negligible, except for the maximum differences for b′ and i in
the FTI solution, which reach 9.94 and 2.25 respectively in states in which the cor-
responding denominator is very close to zero. Still, as shown in Table 3.2 this makes
little difference in first moments and is nearly irrelevant for second- and higher-order
moments.
Table 3.3: Absolute Values of Differences in Equilibrium Functions Relative to FiPIt
Solution
Differences Relative to FiPIt Method
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TIFS FPIFS TIFPI FTI
Max Difference
b′ 3.17e+00 5.71e-02 3.21e+00 9.94e+00
k′ 2.23e-04 7.17e-07 2.23e-04 1.10e-02
q 6.04e-04 1.99e-06 6.04e-04 1.30e-01
c 9.72e-05 7.08e-07 9.72e-05 1.09e-02
i 8.75e-02 5.79e-05 8.74e-02 2.25e+00
L 4.92e-05 3.94e-07 4.92e-05 2.57e-03
v 9.08e-05 7.27e-07 9.08e-05 4.76e-03
gdp 3.27e-05 2.61e-07 3.27e-05 1.77e-03
Mean Difference
b′ 6.29e-04 1.10e-05 6.37e-04 4.35e-03
k′ 1.13e-05 2.76e-07 1.15e-05 9.81e-05
q 3.16e-05 7.61e-07 3.22e-05 5.64e-04
c 2.00e-05 3.22e-07 2.03e-05 7.10e-05
i 1.74e-04 3.27e-06 1.76e-04 1.51e-03
L 1.22e-06 3.27e-09 1.22e-06 2.38e-05
v 2.24e-06 6.03e-09 2.25e-06 4.40e-05
gdp 8.16e-07 2.19e-09 8.18e-07 1.62e-05
Figure 3.1 shows the ergodic marginal distributions of bonds and capital, and the
ergodic joint marginal distribution of both variables produced by the FiPIt solution.
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These plots are generated using the full ergodic distribution of (b, k, s), which FiPit
computes using a procedure that iterates to convergence on the law of motion of
the conditional distribution of (b, k, s) (starting from an arbitrary initial condition)
taking into account the fact the the decision rules of capital and bonds are generally
off the nodes of the corresponding grids. Full details are provided in the Appendix.
The long-run moments listed in Table 3.2 were produced using this distribution. The
distributions produced by all the other solution methods are visually identical, and
hence we only show the ones for the FiPIt case. Relative to the distributions that the
RBC model would produce, the distribution of bonds shifts to the right because of the
credit constraint and the stronger precautionary saving incentives. The distribution
of capital shows higher dispersion and a fatter left tail because of the fire-sales of
capital in states in which the constraint binds.
We also examined the recursive equilibrium functions to evaluate the relevance
of the global solution to capture non-linearities. Figure 3.2 shows the decision rules
of bonds and capital, the pricing function of capital and the multiplier of the credit
constraint across the full state space of endogenous states, B ⊗K, with s evaluated
for a state with low TFP, high interest rate, and high input prices. We show results
for the Sudden Stops model and for the RBC variant, and provide only the FiPIt
results because the other methods yield visually identical graphs. The equilibrium
functions of the Sudden Stops model show significant non-linearities, whereas the
RBC outcomes are approximately linear. The non-linearities result from the fire-sales
of capital when the constraint binds, the resulting collapse in the price of capital, and
the associated sharp reversal in the bond position as borrowing capacity collapses.
The sharp curvature of these non-linear solutions highlights the advantages of us-
ing a finite-state-space solution method, instead of a colocation method, as well as
the importance of solving using first-order conditions and approximately-continuous
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Figure 3.1: Long-run Distributions of the Sudden Stops Model Solved with FiPIt
(a) Ergodic Bond Distribution








(b) Ergodic Capital Distribution



































decision rules. Decision rules that capture accurately the non-linearities implied by
occasionally binding constraints are critical for quantifying the positive and norma-
tive implications of this class of models, including Sudden Stops models. For their
positive implications, the magnitude, dynamics and frequency of financial crises de-
pends critically on the behavior of decision rules near and at the constraint. For
the normative implications, quantifying the size of distortions induced by the credit
constraint and the properties of optimal policies to tackle them hinges critically on
how likely and how severely is the credit constraint expected to bind at t+1 in a state
in which it does not bind at t (see Bianchi and Mendoza, 2018).
The plots of equilibrium functions do not control for whether particular (b, k, s)
triples have positive probability in the stochastic steady state. States with zero-
probability are irrelevant in the long run, and if this is the case in the region where
equilibrium functions are non-linear, the non-linearities would be of less relevance than
what the equilibrium functions suggest. To assess this issue, we follow Mendoza (2010)
to calculate impact amplification coefficients and report the results in Table 3.4. These
coefficients measure the excess response of macro variables across the Sudden Stops
and RBC solutions for each triple (b, k, s), separating the state space into Sudden
Stop (SS) and non-Sudden Stop (NSS) regions.11 The averages shown in the SS and
NSS columns of the table are computed using the limiting distribution of (b, k, s) of
the Sudden Stops model. The results in the SS column measure amplification on
impact when a crisis occurs. Differences across the SS and NSS columns illustrate
asymmetry, namely the amount by which shocks of identical magnitudes generate
11A triple (b, k, s) belongs in the SS set if the trade balance-GDP ratio in the Sudden Stops
model is 2 percentage points or more above its value in the RBC model, otherwise it belongs in
the NSS region. The amplification coefficients for each variable at a given (b, k, s) are calculated as
differences relative to their values in the RBC model in the same state and expressed in percent of
the unconditional mean of the variable also in the RBC model. For variables defined in ratios, the
coefficient is the difference in the Sudden Stops model relative to the RBC model.
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Recursive Functions of the Sudden Stops & RBC Models



























































































Notes: All plots show solutions obtained with the FiPIt method. Surface plots in red (blue) are for
the SS (RBC) model.
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different effects when the collateral constraint is present and active v. when is not.
Table 3.4 compares amplification coefficients produced by the FiPIt and FTI
solutions (the other methods yield nearly identical results). The coefficients differ
very marginally and in most instances they are the same up to the second decimal.
The table shows that the Sudden Stops model yields significant amplification and
asymmetry. Amplification coefficients on factor allocations and output are relatively
smaller, because on impact at date-t when the credit constraint binds it can only
affect them via its effect on working capital financing and hence on labor and imported
inputs. In turn, this is due to the absence of the wealth effect on labor supply implied
by the utility function specification and to the fact that the date-t capital stock is
pre-determined.
The FiPIt method yields more accurate results than those produced by the so-
lution method used in Mendoza (2010). The results in Table 3.4 are qualitatively
similar to those reported in Table 4 of Mendoza’s paper, but quantitatively there are
significant differences. Differences in model structure (i.e. endogenous v. exogenous
discounting) play some role, but the bulk of the differences is due to differences in the
solution methods. Mendoza solved for decision rules forced to be on grid nodes using
value function iteration, while FiPIt solves for interpolated decision rules and iter-
ates on the model’s optimality conditions. FiPIt yields coefficients for “supply side”
variables (i.e. GDP, labor, imported inputs and working capital) that are smaller,
while those for the rest of the variables (particularly investment and the price of cap-
ital) are larger. Moreover, for supply-side variables in the NSS region FiPIt yields
near-zero amplification while Mendoza reports figures in the -0.29 to -0.11 range.
The FiPIt results are the correct ones because the amplification coefficients for these
variables should indeed differ from zero only due to numerical approximation error.
Since k is pre-determined at each date t and there is no wealth effect on labor supply,
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when µ(b, k, s) = 0 the set of optimality conditions is the same in the RBC and Sud-
den Stops models and in both cases all supply-side variables depend only on (k, s).
The coefficients around -0.11 to -0.29 that Mendoza obtained result from non-trivial
numerical approximation errors due to inaccuracies of the solution algorithm when
averaging outcomes for states in which the NSS and SS regions are adjacent and in
determining the value of µ(b, k, s) when assigning (b, k, s) triples to the SS and NSS
sets.
Table 3.4: Amplification and Asymmetry of Sudden Stop events
(1) (2)
FiPIt FTI
SS NSS SS NSS
gdp -0.777 -0.001 -0.789 -0.001
c -3.849 -0.255 -3.882 -0.260
i -24.965 -1.036 -25.384 -1.089
q -6.090 -0.253 -6.194 -0.266
nx/gdp 4.033 0.233 4.047 0.238
b′/gdp 4.215 0.251 4.229 0.257
k′/gdp -1.667 -0.105 -1.680 -0.110
lev. ratio 1.166 0.081 1.167 0.082
L -1.178 -0.001 -1.196 -0.002
v -2.146 -0.003 -2.180 -0.003
w. cap -2.160 -0.003 -2.193 -0.003
Notes: Sudden Stop (SS) states are defined as states in
which the collateral constraint binds and the trade balance-
GDP ratio in the Sudden Stop model is more than 2 per-
centage points above the trade balance-GDP ratio of the
RBC model. The coefficients are computed as mean dif-
ferences relative to the RBC model in percent of the RBC
unconditional averages.
3.4.2 Robustness Analysis & Credit Constraint Variations
The last set of experiments evaluates the robustness and stability of the FiPIt algo-
rithm by examining its performance relative to the time iteration method for various
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parameter changes. This is important in light of the potential instability of fixed-point
iteration methods. As documented below, the FiPIt method remains stable and con-
tinues to outperform the FTI method in all the experiments. We also provide results
for the RBC variant of the model and for variations of the credit constraint for which
FiPIt does not require using a non-linear solver in states in which the constraint binds
and found even larger gains in execution time in both instances.
Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 show long-run moments and performance metrics obtained
by solving the model using the FiPIt and FTI methods for these parameter changes:
(a) removing working capital (φ = 0); (b) lowering the discount factor (β = 0.91); (c)
reducing the collateral coefficient (κ = 0.15); (d) increasing the collateral coefficient
(κ = 0.25); (e) setting the collateral coefficient so that the constraint never binds
(κ ≥ 1.0), which yields the RBC solution; (f) increasing the labor disutility coefficient
(ω = 2.5); and (g) increasing the relative risk aversion coefficient (σ = 3.0). For each
parameter variation, the grids of capital and bonds were re-sized to obtain the fastest
solution that does not distort the quantitative results, using identical grids for the
FiPIt and FTI solutions. Still, this resulted in grids of about the same dimensions
as before: 71 or 72 nodes in B and 30 nodes in K, except for case (e) with the RBC
model, for which 80 nodes in B were needed, and case (f) that needed only 62 nodes
in B.12
The dominance of the FiPIt method is robust to all these parameter changes,
and in all cases the algorithm is stable and yields solutions nearly identical to the
FTI results. Comparing across the cases in which the root-finder is needed to solve
allocations when the credit constraint binds (i.e. excluding case (a)), FTI is 2.0 to
12When solving the RBC variant of the model, the bonds grid is extended to accommodate larger
debt positions that are part of the equilibrium solution. In this case, B consists of 80 nodes spanning
the [-300.0, 800] interval. The upper bound is the same as before, but the lower bound of -300 is
significantly smaller (relative to -188.6 used in the solutions reported earlier).
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6.0 times slower than FiPIt depending on which scenario is considered. Comparing v.
the scenario in which FiPIt does not need the root-finder when the constraint binds
(Col. (2) of Table 3.5), FTI is 13.0 times slower, and for solving the RBC model,
which also does not need a root-finder (Col. (6) of Table 3.6), FTI is 18.1 times
slower. In both of these instances, FiPIt solves in about 2 minutes. Moreover, in
most cases FiPIt did not require changing the values of the dampening parameters
for the updates of the decision rule for bonds (ρb = 1), the credit constraint multiplier
(ρµ = 1) and the pricing function (ρq = 0.3).
It is worth noting that the time iteration solutions required about the same number
of iterations (between 87 and 100) and execution time in all the experiments except
case (f), which has the smaller B grid and used about the same number of iterations
but solved faster than the other time iteration solutions. There is more variation in
both number of iterations and execution times in the FiPIt solutions, but the two
tend to move together: The slowest solution was for case (b) which took 1,130 seconds
and 244 iterations.
For the case without working capital (case (a)), Column (2) shows the results that
FiPIt yields when the code is modified to take into account that a root-finder is not
needed to solve when the credit constraint binds, as explained in Section 3.3 (since
the constraint is now of the form b′j+1(b, k, s)/R ≥ −κq̂j(b, k, s)k′j(b, k, s)). We also
solved an additional experiment with an alternative credit constraint in the same
class that does not require a non-linear solver: b′j+1(b, k, s)/R ≥ ϕ with ϕ set one
standard deviation below the average of b′ in the limiting distribution of the RBC
model. These experiments illustrate the large additional gain in speed that FiPIt
yields when used to solve models with constraints like these. In Case (a), the FiPIt
solution is obtained in almost one-third of the time taken by the FiPIt algorithm that
uses the non-linear solver, which implies that FiPIt is faster than the time iteration
147
solution by a factor of 13.0 (v. 5.6 with the FiPIt algorithm that uses the non-linear
solver). In the case with the constraint given by ϕ, the FiPIt solution is faster than
the time iteration method by a factor of 17.9.
3.5 Conclusions
FiPIt is a simple and fast algorithm designed to solve macroeconomic models with
two endogenous state variables and occasionally binding constraints using widely
used software. The algorithm applies fixed-point iteration on the Euler equations
and by doing so it avoids solving the Euler equations as a non-linear system, as with
the standard time iteration method, and does not require interpolation of decision
rules over irregular grids, as with the endogenous grids method. Analytic solutions
are obtained for recursive equilibrium functions in each iteration of the algorithm,
and standard bi-linear interpolation for obtaining these analytic solutions remains
applicable.
The FiPIt algorithm can handle a large class of occasionally binding constraints,
including constraints set to fixed values as well as constraints that depend on endoge-
nous variables. If the constraints are such that equilibrium allocations and prices
when the constraints bind must be solved jointly with their associated multipliers,
FiPIt does need a root-finder in states in which the constraint bind, but for a large
class of constraints the two can be solved separately and FiPIt does not require a
non-linear solver anywhere. In contrast, the endogenous grid method requires a root
finder whenever the constraint binds.
We documented the performance gains and accuracy of FiPIt by comparing the
solutions it produces for a Sudden Stops model of a small open economy vis-a-vis
solutions obtained with the time iteration method, and hybrid methods that combine
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Table 3.5: Sudden Stops Model Variations: Working Capital & Discounting
(a) Working Capital φ = 0 (b) Discount factor β = 0.91
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FiPIt FiPIt FTI FiPIt FTI
(no root-finder when µ > 0)
(a) Long-run moments
Mean
gdp 406.361 406.361 406.291 368.772 368.159
c 282.681 282.681 282.564 255.219 254.877
i 69.847 69.847 69.824 59.863 59.678
nx/gdp 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.029 0.029
k 792.035 792.035 791.780 678.870 676.802
b/gdp -0.202 -0.202 -0.205 -0.161 -0.160
q 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
leverage ratio -0.095 -0.095 -0.097 -0.195 -0.195
v 45.079 45.079 45.072 39.798 39.729
working capital 0.000 0.000 0.000 71.585 71.460
Standard deviation (in percent)
gdp 3.71 3.71 3.71 3.93 3.93
c 3.82 3.82 3.82 3.91 3.92
i 13.16 13.16 13.16 12.17 12.16
nx/gdp 2.94 2.94 2.93 2.12 2.11
k 4.44 4.44 4.45 4.53 4.54
b/gdp 20.06 20.06 19.88 2.28 2.26
q 3.16 3.16 3.16 2.88 2.88
leverage ratio 9.47 9.47 9.39 0.69 0.68
v 5.42 5.42 5.43 5.97 5.97
working capital - - - 4.38 4.39
Correlation with GDP
gdp 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
c 0.820 0.820 0.823 0.969 0.969
i 0.593 0.593 0.594 0.713 0.713
nx/gdp -0.083 -0.083 -0.085 -0.310 -0.311
k 0.775 0.775 0.776 0.754 0.754
b/gdp -0.070 -0.070 -0.067 -0.093 -0.096
q 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.442 0.441
leverage ratio -0.076 -0.076 -0.073 -0.024 -0.030
v 0.795 0.795 0.795 0.833 0.833
working capital - - - 0.988 0.988
First-order autocorrelation
gdp 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.818 0.818
c 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.759 0.759
i 0.501 0.501 0.500 0.330 0.330
nx/gdp 0.608 0.608 0.606 0.068 0.068
k 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.970 0.970
b/gdp 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.423 0.415
q 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.234 0.235
leverage ratio 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.686 0.679
v 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.756 0.757
working capital - - - 0.755 0.756
P(S.S) 1.43% 1.43% 1.49% 39.98% 40.44%
(b) Performance metrics
Bonds Euler Equation
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error -4.17 -4.17 -4.13 -3.56 -3.51
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (3, 1, 3) (3, 1, 3)
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -15.53 -15.53 -13.25 -18.96 -12.07
Capital Euler Equation
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error 15.43 15.43 -6.36 15.40 -4.18
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (72, 1, 7) (72, 1, 7) (1, 1, 7) (72, 1, 7) (2, 1, 7)
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -16.17 -16.17 -12.77 -22.43 -12.23
Grid size (#b,#k) (72, 30) (72, 30) (72, 30) (72, 30) (72, 30)
Seconds elapsed 297 123 1593 1220 2405
Relative to FiPIt 2.4 1.0 13.0 1.0 2.0
Number of iterations 200 200 95 244 87
Notes: Columns (1) are FiPIt solutions and Columns (3) are time iteration (FTI ) solutions. Column (2) shows results for
the model with φ = 0 obtained with the FiPIt algorithm without using a non-linear solver when µ > 0, since it is not
needed.
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Table 3.6: Sudden Stops Model Variations: Collateral Coefficient
(c) Lower Coll. Coeff. (d) Higher Coll. Coeff. (e) RBC Non-Binding Coll. Coeff.
κ = 0.15 κ = 0.25 κ ≥ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FiPIt FTI FiPIt FTI FiPIt FTI
(a) Long-run moments
Mean
gdp 393.503 393.433 393.728 393.659 393.847 393.813
c 276.545 276.436 271.926 271.807 264.021 263.871
i 67.442 67.420 67.517 67.495 67.530 67.518
nx/gdp 0.007 0.008 0.022 0.022 0.045 0.046
k 764.752 764.503 765.564 765.316 765.885 765.759
b/gdp 0.109 0.106 -0.070 -0.073 -0.372 -0.377
q 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
leverage ratio -0.057 -0.059 -0.142 -0.144 -0.286 -0.288
v 42.604 42.596 42.630 42.622 42.649 42.646
working capital 76.634 76.620 76.681 76.667 76.716 76.710
Standard deviation (in percent)
gdp 3.91 3.91 3.96 3.96 3.99 3.99
c 3.87 3.87 4.20 4.20 5.15 5.14
i 13.23 13.22 13.43 13.43 13.51 13.51
nx/gdp 2.90 2.89 3.02 3.01 3.53 3.52
k 4.43 4.44 4.54 4.55 4.65 4.65
b/gdp 19.10 18.92 20.73 20.55 30.28 30.04
q 3.18 3.18 3.23 3.23 3.24 3.23
leverage ratio 8.96 8.88 9.76 9.68 14.42 14.31
v 5.87 5.87 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91
working capital 4.33 4.33 4.38 4.38 4.40 4.40
Correlation with GDP
gdp 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
c 0.842 0.844 0.836 0.839 0.773 0.776
i 0.641 0.642 0.640 0.640 0.640 0.640
nx/gdp -0.085 -0.088 -0.145 -0.148 -0.227 -0.230
k 0.758 0.758 0.763 0.763 0.767 0.767
b/gdp -0.169 -0.167 -0.072 -0.069 0.090 0.093
q 0.390 0.390 0.385 0.385 0.381 0.381
leverage ratio -0.165 -0.164 -0.060 -0.057 0.112 0.115
v 0.831 0.831 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834
working capital 0.995 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.995 0.995
First-order autocorrelation
gdp 0.823 0.823 0.826 0.826 0.830 0.830
c 0.823 0.822 0.837 0.837 0.885 0.885
i 0.500 0.499 0.501 0.501 0.516 0.516
nx/gdp 0.602 0.600 0.607 0.604 0.711 0.709
k 0.961 0.961 0.962 0.962 0.964 0.964
b/gdp 0.989 0.988 0.991 0.991 0.997 0.997
q 0.447 0.447 0.446 0.446 0.460 0.460
leverage ratio 0.990 0.990 0.993 0.993 0.997 0.997
v 0.776 0.776 0.777 0.777 0.780 0.780
working capital 0.800 0.800 0.802 0.802 0.807 0.808
P(S.S) 2.90% 2.98% 1.34% 1.45% - -
(b) Performance metrics
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error -3.59 -3.53 -3.57 -3.52 -6.93 -6.93
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3)
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -14.11 -12.09 -14.96 -12.71 -15.96 -13.33
Capital Euler Equation
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error 15.37 -4.22 15.37 -4.14 15.42 -9.91
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (71, 1, 7) (1, 1, 7) (72, 1, 7) (1, 1, 7) (2, 1, 7) (2, 1, 3)
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -16.28 -12.38 -16.24 -12.56 -16.36 -12.74
Grid size (#b,#k) (71, 30) (71, 30) (72, 30) (72, 30) (80, 30) (80, 30)
Seconds elapsed 1066 2668 657 1604 100 1808
Relative to FiPIt 1.0 2.5 1.0 2.4 1.0 18.1
Number of iterations 196 94 196 94 201 94
Notes: Columns (1) are for the FiPIt algorithm. Columns (2) are for the full time iteration method (FTI ).
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Table 3.7: Sudden Stops Model Variations: Labor Elasticity & Risk Aversion
(f) Higer Labor Coeff. ω = 2.5 (g) Higher Risk Aversion σ = 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FiPIt FTI FiPIt FTI
(a) Long-run moments
Mean
gdp 110.477 110.441 393.797 393.722
c 78.995 78.897 277.504 277.357
i 18.937 18.924 67.534 67.509
nx/gdp -0.007 -0.006 0.005 0.005
k 214.735 214.586 765.801 765.531
b/gdp 0.289 0.278 0.138 0.134
q 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
leverage ratio 0.027 0.023 -0.044 -0.045
v 11.960 11.956 42.639 42.630
working capital 21.514 21.507 76.697 76.682
Standard deviation (in percent)
gdp 3.33 3.33 3.97 3.98
c 6.31 6.24 4.35 4.35
i 13.11 13.11 13.46 13.46
nx/gdp 5.39 5.31 3.25 3.24
k 4.32 4.34 4.59 4.61
b/gdp 56.17 55.03 28.69 28.55
q 3.17 3.17 3.23 3.23
leverage ratio 26.48 25.94 13.55 13.49
v 5.40 5.41 5.91 5.92
working capital 3.76 3.77 4.39 4.40
Correlation with GDP
gdp 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
c 0.451 0.463 0.744 0.747
i 0.614 0.614 0.638 0.639
nx/gdp -0.077 -0.084 -0.059 -0.062
k 0.755 0.756 0.765 0.765
b/gdp -0.039 -0.034 -0.058 -0.054
q 0.366 0.365 0.381 0.381
leverage ratio -0.043 -0.037 -0.048 -0.044
v 0.797 0.797 0.834 0.834
working capital 0.992 0.992 0.995 0.995
First-order autocorrelation
gdp 0.820 0.821 0.828 0.828
c 0.941 0.939 0.894 0.894
i 0.489 0.489 0.506 0.506
nx/gdp 0.857 0.852 0.733 0.731
k 0.960 0.960 0.963 0.963
b/gdp 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
q 0.435 0.435 0.450 0.450
leverage ratio 0.995 0.995 0.996 0.996
v 0.768 0.769 0.779 0.779
working capital 0.793 0.794 0.804 0.805
P(S.S) 3.38% 3.66% 1.29% 1.35%
(b) Performance metrics
Bonds Euler Equation
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error -3.43 -3.37 -3.82 -3.75
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (1, 1, 7) (1, 1, 7) (2, 1, 7) (2, 1, 7)
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -14.27 -13.16 -15.11 -12.41
Capital Euler Equation
Max Log10 Abs. Euler Error 14.09 -4.46 16.30 -3.90
At Grid Points (b, k, s) (62, 1, 7) (1, 1, 7) (71, 1, 7) (1, 1, 7)
Mean Log10 Abs. Euler Error -14.76 -12.52 -17.13 -12.56
Grid size (#b,#k) (62, 30) (62, 30) (71, 30) (71, 30)
Seconds elapsed 283 1700 1108 3533
Relative to FiPIt 1.0 6.0 1.0 3.2
Number of iterations 163 98 246 100
Notes: Columns (1) are for the FiPIt algorithm. Columns (2) are for the full time iteration method
(FTI ).
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fixed-point and time iteration techniques. In addition, we explored the robustness of
our algorithm by documenting solutions for seven parameter variations, including an
RBC model in which the constraint never binds. The algorithm was coded in Matlab
and executed in a standard Windows laptop. In all cases, FiPIt produced results
nearly identical to time iteration results with large gains in speed and comparable
accuracy as measured by Euler equation errors. Time iteration solutions exceeded the
execution time of the FiPIt solutions by factors of 2.0 to 18.1. The largest gains were
obtained in cases in which FiPIt does not use root-finders anywhere, which include
the RBC solution and a variation of the Sudden Stops model without working capital.
In these cases, solving for allocations when the constraint binds does not require a
non-linear solver. Time iteration took 18.1 and 13 times longer than FiPIt to solve the
RBC model and the Sudden Stops model without working capital, respectively. For
the baseline Sudden Stops model, which does need the solver to determine allocations
when the constraint binds, time iteration took 2.5 times longer than FiPIt.
The FiPIt algorithm can be extended to other models with two endogenous states,
since applying it requires mainly a fixed-point strategy to iterate on recursive func-
tions using Euler equations. In this paper, FiPIt was applied to the Euler equation
for bonds to solve for the bonds decision rule and to the Euler equation for capital
to solve for the price of capital. The Tobin’s Q investment optimality condition was
then used to determine the decision rule for capital. It is possible to re-arrange the
solution in other ways that FiPIt may still accommodate, for example conjecturing
the bonds and capital decision rules and using the two Euler equations to solve for
their updates. Applying these principles to other models with two endogenous state
variables so that they can be solved using FiPIt seems relatively straightforward. We
provide a brief sketch of four examples in the online Appendix.
Performance gains using FiPIt are likely to be even larger if the algorithm is
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coded in languages that are more efficient than Matlab at handling high-dimensional,
sequential loops and parallel optimization, such as Julia, Fortran or Python. The
large gains in speed and simplicity of the algorithm also open up the possibility of
exploring research topics such as Bayesian estimation of models of financial crisis
driven by occasionally binding collateral constraints.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Introduction
This Appendix provides a user’s guide for the Matlab codes that implement the FiPIt
algorithm. It describes how the various steps of the algorithm presented in Section 3.3
of the paper are undertaken in the computer programs. The programs are available at
sergiovillalvazo.com in a zip file labeled MendozaVillalvazoFiPItCode available online.
The main directory of this file has the same name, and it contains two folders named
FiPIt and Mfiles. The main Matlab script is named mainFiPIt.m and is located in
the FiPIt folder. This folder also includes the output files as well as script files used
to generate various output components (moments, graphs, etc.). The mainFiPIt.m
program calls several function scripts that are stored in the MFiles folder. Table 3.8
provides a list of all the files, their location and contents.
The output of mainFiPIt.m is stored in a .mat file. To solve the variant of the
model in which the credit constraint never binds (denoted the RBC model), set the
valuef of κ high enough so as to ensure that this is the case. Under our calibration,
κ > 1 is sufficient. The .mat file with the RBC solution is named solFiPIt RBC.mat.
To solve the Sudden Stops (SS) model, set κ < 1. The .mat file with this solution is
named solFiPIt SS.mat. The long-run moments of these two models reported in Table
3.2 and 3.6.e of the paper are computed using script1 Moments.m, choosing to com-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SS solution. Similarly, to produce the policy function plots run script2 PolicyPlot.m
and to produce the probability of Sudden Stops run script4 TableDiffAmpl.m.
3.A.2 Recursive Equilibrium Conditions
To implement the FiPIt method, we first re-write the equilibrium conditions of the
model in recursive form. The model has two endogenous states, b and k, and three
exogenous states, using s to denote the triple of exogenous shocks s ≡ (A,R, p),
which includes the shocks to TFP (A), the world interest rate (R) and the price
of imported inputs (p). The recursive equilibrium is defined by a set of recur-
sive functions for allocations [b′(b, k, s), k′(b, k, s), c(b, k, s), L(b, k, s), v(b, k, s)], prices
[w(b, k, s), q(b, k, s), d(b, k, s)] and multipliers [λ(b, k, s), µ(b, k, s)] that satisfy the fol-
lowing recursive equilibrium conditions:
(




= λ(b, k, s)(1 + τ) (3.48)
αAkγL(b, k, s)α−1v(b, k, s)η = w(b, k, s)
(





ηAkγL(b, k, s)αv(b, k, s)η−1 = p
(





λ(b, k, s) = RβE[λ(b′(b, k, s), k′(b, k, s), s′)] + µ(b, k, s) (3.51)
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λ(b′(b, k, s), k′(b, k, s), s′)(d(b′(b, k, s), k′(b, k, s), s′) + q′(b′(b, k, s), k′(b, k, s), s′))
]
+ µ(b, k, s)κ (3.52)
d(b, k, s) = γAkγ−1L(b, k, s)αv(b, k, s)η − δ + a
2
(k′(b, k, s)− k)2
k2
(3.53)
q(b, k, s) = 1 + a
(




w(b, k, s) = L(b, k, s)ω−1(1 + τ) (3.55)
c(b, k, s)(1 + τ) + k′(b, k, s)− (1− δ)k + a
2
(k′(b, k, s)− k)2
k
= AkγL(b, k, s)αv(b, k, s)η
− pv(b, k, s)− φ(R− 1)(L(b, k, s)ω(1 + τ) + pv(b, k, s))−R−1b′(b, k, s) + b (3.56)
3.A.3 Contents of the mainFiPIt.m program
The mainFiPIt.m file is divided into 5 cells, each one including comments describing
how the contents of each cell relate to each of the seven algorithm steps described in
Section 3.3.2 of the dissertation. The itemized step numbers labeled in bold typeface
below match the step numbers in the paper description, with the line in the Matlab
code in which the step is executed indicated in parenthesis.
Cell 1. Parameterization & State Space: Sets the model’s parameter values,
creates the discrete grids of bonds and capital, defines the Markov processes
of shocks, and sets the values of program parameters that define the method
to solve for capital price, the convergence criteria, the maximum number of
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iterations and the updating coefficients for decision rule conjectures between
one iteration and the next. The endogenous states are foreign bonds b and
domestic capital k. The exogenous states are included in s, which denotes a
triple of shocks s ≡ (A,R, p) that includes TFP (A), the world interest rate
(R) and the price of imported inputs (p). The realization set for shock triples
s ∈ S comes from the discretization of the stochastic processes of the shocks,
which is typically done using Tauchen’s quadrature method. Here, we take S
and the associated Markov transition probability matrix from Mendoza (2010),
where each shock has two realizations and hence S has eight triples. For the
endogenous states, the algorithm defines grids with a total of nBondGrid nodes
for bonds and nCapitalGrid nodes for capital. The state space has nBondGrid×
nCapitalGrid × 8 elements and is defined by all (b, k, s) ∈ B ⊗ K ⊗ S. The
conditional statement starting in Line 82 adjusts the bonds grid when the SS
model is being solved to make sure the collateral constraint binds before the
lower bound of the grid. The recursive equilibrium is defined by a set of recursive
functions for allocations [b′(b, k, s), k′(b, k, s), c(b, k, s), L(b, k, s), v(b, k, s)], prices
[w(b, k, s), q(b, k, s), d(b, k, s)] and the multipliers [λ(b, k, s), µ(b, k, s)]. The model
and program parameters are listed in Table 3.9.
Cell 2. Initial Conjectures, Array Definitions & Non-linear Solver Options:
This cell defines the initial conjectures for the equilibrium recursive functions.
Following the notation in the paper, at any iteration j the initial conjectured
functions are denoted q̂j(b, k, s) for the price of capital, b̂
′
j(b, k, s) for the deci-
sion rule for bonds, and ˆ̃µj(b, k, s) ≡ µj(b, k, s)/λj(b, k, s) for the multiplier ratio.
This cell also initializes the arrays for other variables and constructs a function
that sets the optimization options for the non-linear solver used later in the pro-
gram to solve for allocations when the credit constraint binds.
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Table 3.9: Parameter Values
Calibrated parameters
σ coefficient of relative risk aversion 2.0
ω labor elasticity coefficient 1.8461
β discount factor 0.92
a capital adjustment costs coefficient 2.75
φ fraction of input costs requiring working capital 0.2579
δ depreciation rate 0.088
α labor share in gross output 0.59
η imported inputs share in gross output 0.10
γ capital share in gross output 0.31
τ tax on consumption 0.17
A average TFP 6.982
Algorithm parameters
ρb Updating weight for bonds decision rule 1.00
ρµ Updating weight for multiplier ratio 1.00
ρq Updating weight for price of capital 0.30
εf Function convergence criterion 10e-4
Step 1. (Line 106) Sets the first-iteration recursive function conjectures to
b̂′0(b, k, s) = b, q̂0(b, k, s) = 1 and ˆ̃µ0(b, k, s)) = 0 for all (b, k, s) ∈ B ⊗K ⊗ S.
The instructions after those initialize the arrays for other variables, the first-
iteration value of the convergence metric for the recursive functions (nMaxDif )
and the iterations counter (nIter), and they also define the function pSolverOpt
to set the options for Matlab’s fsolve non-linear solver used later in the code
when solving for allocations in states in which µ̃ > 0.
Cell 3. Main Loop Executing Iterations on Equilibrium Recursive Func-
tions: The While loop starting in line 143 executes the successive iterations
on the equilibrium recursive functions for bonds, price of capital and multiplier
ratio. The current iteration number (j) is stored in the integer nIter, and the
value of the convergence metric attained in iteration nIter is stored in nMaxDif.
160
Step 2. (Line 146) Generates decision rules for capital, investment, factor allo-
cations, gross output and consumption in iteration j implied by the conjectures
q̂j(b, k, s), b̂
′
j(b, k, s), ˆ̃µj(b, k, s):
k′j(b, k, s) =
k
a
[q̂j(b, k, s)− 1 + a]
ĩj(b, k, s) =(k
′





















ω [1 + φ(R− 1) + ˆ̃µj(b, k, s)φR]
} ω
ω(1−η)−α











(1 + τ)cj(b, k, s) =yj(b, k, s)− pvj(b, k, s)− φ(R− 1)[(1 + τ)Lj(b, k, s)ω




The code uses here the same set of expressions for the RBC and SS solutions. For
the latter, the values of factor allocations, gross output and consumption vary
with µ̃(·), whereas in the RBC solution they do not because µ̃(·) = 0 always.
Note also that since µ̃(·) is always set to zero in the first iteration, the first-
iteration results of this step are identical when solving either the RBC or SS
models. When solving the RBC model, µ̃(·) remains zero in all iterations, but
when solving the SS model, µ̃(·) > 0 in states in which the credit constraint
binds.
Step 3.1 (Line 166) Assume the collateral constraint does not bind. Solve for
new decision rules (indexed j + 1) for labor, intermediate goods and output.
Since the constraint is assumed to be non-binding, these decision rules are the
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same in RBC and SS solutions:











ω [1 + φ(R− 1)]
} ω
ω(1−η)−α











Steps 3.2 & 3.3. (Line 181) Solve for the j+1 consumption and bonds decision
rules using the bonds’ Euler Equation and the resource constraint. For each
(b, k, s) in the state space, consumption is solved for using the fFiPIt Cons.m
function located in the Mfiles folder. This function finds the new consumption
rule by solving “directly” from the Euler equation, as explained in Step 3.2 of
the algorithm description in the paper:
cj+1(b, k, s) =βRE









fFiPIt Cons.m calls the function fBiLinearInterpolation.m, also in the Mfiles
folder, in order to find the values of cj(b̂
′
j(b, k, s), k
′




j(b, k, s), k
′
j(b, k, s), s
′), which are determined using bi-linear interpolation
because b̂′j(b, k, s) and k
′
j(b, k, s) are not on the nodes of the bonds and capital
grids in general. Once cj+1(b, k, s) is determined, the new bonds policy function
b′j+1(b, k, s) is solved for using the resource constraint, and the implied leverage









−φR [(1 + τ)Lj+1(b, k, s)ω + pvj+1(b, k, s)]+κq̂j(b, k, s)k′j(b, k, s) ≥ 0
Line 202 evaluates if there are (b, k, s) states for which the new bonds decision
rule is below the lower bound of the bonds grid. In these cases, the lower bound
is a binding ad-hoc debt limit. The bonds decision rule is re-set equal to this
debt limit, the consumption decision rule is re-set to the value implied by the
resource constraint, and we also compute the associated Lagrange multiplier for
the binding ad-hoc debt limit.
Step 4. (Line 217) This step is only executed when solving the SS model and
only for states (b, k, s) in which the constraint was found to be binding in Step
3.4, because these are the only states in which the decision rules depend on µ̃.
This step solves for µ̃j+1(b, k, s) by applying Matlab’s fsolve root finder to a
function formed using the fFiPIt MuHat.m script located in the Mfiles folder.
fFiPIt MuHat.m forms Equation 3.38 in the paper. It uses the j-indexed func-
tions for consumption and labor to form the expected value in the right-hand-side
of eq. (38), which requires the same bi-linear interpolation method used to solve
for cj+1 in step 3.2. The solver uses the optimization options set in pSolverOpt
as defined in Cell 1 and returns the value of µ̃j+1(b, k, s). The solver uses these
options: optimoptions(‘fsolve’,‘Display’,‘off’,‘TolFun’,1e-18). A small tolerance
convergence criterion is needed in order to attain convergence of the recursive
functions and small Euler errors. We use as initial condition (vInitX ) the cur-
rent iteration’s initial conjecture µ̃j(b, k, s). After µ̃j+1(b, k, s) is solved for, we
compute the associated j+1 values of the decision rules using eqs. (33)-(36) in
the paper. Keep in mind that there are many variations of occasionally binding
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constraints for which the constrained allocations and the multiplier of the bind-
ing constraint can be solved separately, in which case there is no need to use a
non-linear solver in this step. Two cases explored in the paper are one in which
working capital is removed from the collateral constraint and one in which the
credit constraint is set to a constant value instead of the value of collateral (see
p. 15 and p. 24 of the paper). This makes the FiPIt algorithm significantly
faster.
Step 5. (Line 250) This step is just a comment noting that at this point in the
code we have solved the new (j+1-indexed) optimal decision rules for all (b, k, s)
in the state space conditional on the conjectured q̂j(b, k, s) function.
Step 6. (Line 252) Compute the new pricing function. This step is coded so as
to allow the user to choose one of the two alternatives to compute the pricing
function described in Steps 6.1 and 6.2 of the paper. The former uses fixed-point
iteration, the latter finds q as the forward solution of the capital Euler equation.
The fixed-point iteration (forward) solution is chosen by setting pFixPointPriceK
== 1 (pFixPointPriceK == 0) in the algorithm parameters of Cell 1. In both
cases, we solve for qj+1(b, k, s) using the fFiPIt PriceK.m script located in the
Mfiles folder. This script solves the following equation, which is Equation 3.41
in the paper (we use (·) to denote (b, k, s) so as to shorten the notation):
qj+1(b, k, s) =
βEt









































j+1(·), k′j(·), s′)− k′j(·))2
k′j(·)2
When solving by fixed-point iteration, the above Euler equation solves directly
for qj+1(·), since all the terms in the right-hand-side of the expression are known
at this point in the code. The equation is solved once and the solution passed on
as the new pricing function. Note that in forming the conditional expectation,
we use j-indexed conjectures of the price of capital and the capital decision rule
(since their j + 1 values are not known), but the rest of the relevant recursive
functions are indexed j + 1 (since they have been solved for in the previous
steps of the algorithm). As before, bi-linear interpolation is used to determine
the values of all the functions that have (b′j+1(·), k′j(·)) as arguments (the t +
1 variables in the conditional expectation of the Euler equation), since those
functions are only known at grid nodes.13 When solving by forward solution,
fFiPIt PriceK.m is used repeatedly to iterate on the above capital Euler equation
until qj+1(·) and q̂j (·) converge, but keeping all the other functions unchanged.
For these iterations, the iteration counter is the integer nIterInner, and the value
of the convergence metric at iteration nIterInner is denoted nMaxDifInner. The
convergence criterion is the value assigned to the parameter nTolInner in Cell 1.
Step 6.1. (Line 271) If pFixPointPriceK = 1, then the first solution for
qj+1(b, k, s) generated for each (b, k, s) using fFiPIt PriceK.m is retained as the
new pricing function.
Step 6.2. (Line 274) If pFixPointPriceK = 0 (which is executed by the else
13For evaluating dividends, we found that the algorithm performs better if we interpolate the func-
tions that enter in the definition of dividends individually and then generate the value of dividends,
instead of first defining dividends and then interpolating the dividends function.
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instruction when pFixPointPriceK = 1 is not valid), then fFiPIt PriceK.m is
used to generate the new values of qj+1(b, k, s) for each (b, k, s) as we iterate to
convergence on the capital pricing function.
Step 7. (Line 281) Check convergence and update conjectures. The conver-





|qj+1(b, k, s)− q̂j(b, k, s)|, |b′j+1(b, k, s)− b̂′j(b, k, s)|, |µ̃j+1(b, k, s)− ˆ̃µj(b, k, s)|
}
,
∀(b, k, s) ∈ B ⊗ K ⊗ S. The value of εf is defined by setting the program
parameter nTol in Cell 1. If convergence is attained, the recursive equilibrium
has been solved and the results are stored in either the solFiPIt SS.mat file for
the SS model or the solFiPIt RBC.mat file for the RBC model. If convergence
is not attained, then generate new conjectures as follows:
x̂j+1(b, k, s) = (1− ρx)x̂j(b, k, s) + ρxxj+1(b, k, s)
for x = [q, b, µ̃] and some 0 ≤ ρx. x̂j(b, k, s) in the right-hand-side of this ex-
pression represents the initial conjectures used in the current iteration, while
x̂+1j(b, k, s) in the left-hand-side denotes the new conjectures for the next it-
eration. Use 0 < ρx < 1 (ρx > 1) for the particular function x(·) that is not
converging (converging too slowly). The values of the ρx coefficients are set with
the parameters nUpdateGuessB and nUpdateGuessPK in Cell 1.14 Return to
Step 2 (Line 146) using the new conjectures for the next iteration.
14We set ρB = ρµ̃ = 1 and ρq = 0.3 because this produced the best convergence performance, but
this can change with other parameterizations or in other applications of the algorithm.
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Cell 4. Compute Euler Equation Errors.
The solution of the recursive equilibrium is completed when the program exits
Cell 3. The next two cells generate two important objects based on the model
solution. First, Cell 4 computes the errors of the Euler equations of bonds and
capital using the fFiPIt EulerError.m function located in the Mfiles folder. Then
Cell 5 computes the ergodic distribution of bonds, capital and shocks. To com-
pute the Euler errors, the Euler equations are evaluated at the equilibrium solu-
tions rather than used to solve for the equilibrium. Hence, fFiPIt EulerError.m
uses the equilibrium functions (the last solutions generated by the functions that
converged according to the tolerance criterion) in all the relevant terms of the
Euler equations.
Cell 5. Compute the Ergodic Distribution.
We compute the ergodic distribution of (b, k, s) by iterating to convergence on the
law of motion of the conditional transition probabilities from (b, k, s) (denoted
Mj(b, k, s)) to (b
′, k′, s′) (denoted Mj+1(b
′, k′, s′)) ∀(b, k, s), (b′, k′, s′) ∈ B⊗K⊗S.
The initial guess (called mErgDistGuess in line 404) is a uniform distribution.
The law of motion is formed using the decision rules for capital and bonds and
the exogenous Markov process of the shocks. Since we have solved for approxi-
mately continuous decision rules using bi-linear interpolation, we use a standard
modification of this law of motion adjusted for the fact that decision rules do
not yield values on the nodes of the bonds and capital grids in general. For
every (b, k, s) we find bL ≤ b′(b, k, s) ≤ bU and kL ≤ k′(b, k, s) ≤ kU , where
bL, bU , kL, kU are the grid points closest to b
′(·) and k′(·) . Then we iterate on








bU − b′(b, k, s)
bU − bL
)(
kU − k′(b, k, s)
kU − kL
)






bU − b′(b, k, s)
bU − bL
)(
k′(b, k, s)− kL
kU − kL
)






b′(b, k, s)− bL
bU − bL
)(
kU − k′(b, k, s)
kU − kL
)






b′(b, k, s)− bL
bU − bL
)(
k′(b, k, s)− kL
kU − kL
)
The convergence criterion is max |Mj+1(b, k, s)−Mj(b, k, s)| < εDist ∀(b, k, s) ∈
B⊗K⊗ S, with the value of εDist set by the parameter nTolDist in Cell 1.
3.A.4 Auxiliary Notes
 Interpolation: Bi-linear interpolation can be done using the “interp2” Matlab
function, but we found that programming the interpolation directly improved
the performance of the code. We determine first the interpolation nodes, and
then apply the standard bi-linear interpolation rule. The scripts that implement
the functions interpolations determine the relevant interpolation nodes and then
perform the bi-linear interpolation. To determine the interpolation nodes, for
each (b, k, s), create first vectors with the differences hb(b, k, s) = b̂′j(b, k, s)− b
and hk(b, k, s) = k′j(b, k, s) − k, then find the location of the smallest positive
difference and smallest negative difference (i.e. the difference closest to zero
from below) in these vectors. For example, for the interpolation nodes over the
b dimension (bn, bn+1), find the locations of argminh
b(b, k, s) for hb(b, k, s) ≥ 0
and argmaxhb(b, k, s) for hb(b, k, s) ≤ 0. bn is the location of the argmin and
bn+1 is the location of the argmax. Once the interpolation nodes are found,
the interpolation is executed by calling the fBiLinearInterpolation.m function
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located in the Mfiles folder. The scripts also make these adjustments when
the interpolated functions return decision rule values outside the state space:
Use extrapolation if k′j(b, k, s) returns a value below (above) the first node k
1
(last node kNCapitalGrid) and also if b̂′j(b, k, s) returns a value above the last node
bNBondGrid, but for b̂′j(b, k, s) < b
1 evaluate the functions at b1, because the lower
bound on bonds represents an ad-hoc debt limit used for calibration.
 Parallelization: There are several loops that run faster in parallel, using parfor
instead of for. This can be done with all loops that do not need to run sequen-
tially. The outmost loop controlling the iterations of the policy and pricing
functions needs to be executed sequentially, but several others can be paral-
lelized. Parfor can be used in Step 2, 3, 4, and 6. For the FiPIt variant of Step
6 a sequential sum is needed to attain convergence. We included comments in
the code indicating specific loops where parfor was used. Using parfor requires
Matlab’s Parallel Computing Toolbox. Note also that setting the number of
workers to the largest feasible (i.e. the number of processors) does not neces-
sarily minimize execution time, particularly in machines with several processors.
In various computers with more than 16 processors, we found that using 6 or 7
workers produced the fastest execution times.
 Invalid allocations: Rule out allocations with non-positive arguments in the
utility function. These are cases such that, at any iteration and for a given
triple (b, k, s) the conjectured functions (indexed by j) or the unconstrained or
constrained new decision rules (indexed by j + 1) yield c− Lω/ω ≤ 0. In these
cases, the solution of consumption when the constraint does not bind and/or
of the multiplier µ̃ when it binds cannot be obtained because they involve the
fractional exponent 1/σ (for σ > 1), which requires a positive base. Note
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that this requirement is stricter than feasibility, because it is not just that
the allocations are technologically feasible, they also need to avoid hitting the
Inada condition of the CRRA utility function. In the mainFiPIt.m program,
this causes an error that stops execution at the point in which the first attempt
to solve for a state of nature with c − Lω/ω ≤ 0 is encountered. As explained
in the paper (see p. 13 and p. 15), however, the FiPIt algorithm has the
advantage that starting from initial conjectures b̂′0(b, k, s), q̂0(b, k, s), ˆ̃µ0(b, k, s))




0, implies that cj(·) − Lj(·)
ω
ω
> 0 for any iteration j > 0 . For the baseline
calibration and all six variations we solved for, the initial conditions b̂′0(b, k, s) =
b, q̂0(b, k, s) = 1 and ˆ̃µ0(b, k, s)) = 0 satisfied this condition.
3.A.5 Sketch of Other FiPIt Applications
We provide here a brief sketch of four examples:
1. Mendoza (1995): This is an RBC small open economy with incomplete
markets and three sectors, quadratic capital adjustment costs given by
(φ/2)(kt+1 − kt)2, and a maximum debt limit as the only occasionally
binding constraint. The model has endogenous discounting, but consider
a variant with a standard constant discount factor. The adjustment costs
formulation does not satisfy the Hayashi conditions required for the average
and marginal Tobin’s Q to be the same, but for implementing FiPIt define
a quasi capital pricing function given by qt ≡ 1+φ(kt+1−kt), so that given a
conjecture of this pricing function we can obtain an implied capital decision
rule. Start with this pricing conjecture and a conjectured bonds decision
rule. The model’s equilibrium conditions, the implied capital decision rule,
170
and the bonds decision rule can be used so that the resource constraint for
tradable goods yields an implied decision rule for tradables consumption.
FiPIt can then be used on the Euler equation for bonds to solve for a new
tradables consumption decision rule, and the resource constraint yields a
new bonds decision rule. FiPIt can then be applied to the Euler equation
for capital to solve for a new q function.
2. Ludwig and Schön (2018): This is a model of optimal human capital ac-
cumulation h with a no-borrowing constraint on an asset a that pays an
exogenous interest rate R (i.e. a small open economy). Human capital de-
preciates at rate δ and is produced with a concave function of human cap-
ital investment f(i). Agents have CRRA period utility and an exogenous
probability of survival given by an increasing, concave function s(h). To
solve using FiPIt, start with a conjectured decision rule for assets Â(a, h)
and a conjecture for the shadow relative price of human capital investment
ˆ̃µ(a, h) where µ ≡ µ/λ and λ and µ are the multipliers on the resource
constraint and law of motion of human capital accumulation respectively.
Given these conjectures, the model’s equilibrium conditions yield implied
decision rules for human capital, consumption and investment in human
capital. Then FiPIt can be applied to the Euler equation on assets to solve
for a new consumption decision rule and using the result in the resource
constraint yields a new decision rule for assets A(a, h). If A(a, h) < 0, re-
define the decision rule as A(a, h) = 0, set the associated consumption to
the amount supported by the resource constraint, and compute the ratio
ψ/λ (where ψ is the multiplier on the no-borrowing constraint). Finally,
rewrite the Euler equation for human capital in terms of the ratio µ/λ and
apply FiPIt to solve for a new decision rule for µ̃. There is no need to use
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a root-finder in this case.
3. Mendoza and Smith (2006): This is a stochastic model of a small open
economy in which agents trade in world bond markets and in a market
where equity on the economy’s capital can be bought by foreign investors,
who face a quadratic cost of purchasing equity. A productivity shock af-
fects equity returns. There is a credit constraint imposing a limit on the
ratio of debt to the market value of the equity holdings of domestic agents,
and a short-selling limit on the equity position. Given conjectures of the
decision rule for bonds and the equity pricing function, the optimality con-
dition of foreign investors and market clearing conditions yield an implied
decision rule for equity holdings (the quadratic adjustment cost plays a role
similar to the capital adjustment cost in the SS model we solved earlier).
Given these, the resource constraint of the small open economy yields a de-
cision rule for consumption. Assuming the credit constraints do not bind,
FiPIt can then be applied to the bonds Euler equation to solve for a new
consumption decision rule, and the resource constraint yields a new bonds
decision rule. If the latter yields a value that violates the credit constraint,
the constraint is imposed with equality to obtain new values for the bonds
decision rule and consumption, and for the ratio of the multiplier of the
borrowing constraint. Finally, FiPIt is applied to the Euler equation for
equity holdings to obtain a new equity pricing function.
4. Huggett (1993): This is one of the canonical heterogeneous agents mod-
els in which a continuum of agents trade non-state-contingent debt facing
idiosyncratic Markov income shocks and a maximum debt limit. The opti-
mization problem solved by an individual agent, who takes an exogenously-
determined value of the interest rate as given, is identical to that of the
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small open endowment economy studied in Section 3.2, which has only
one endogenous state variable. Start with a conjectured decision rule for
bonds, use the resource constraint to obtain the implied decision rule for
consumption. Then apply FiPIt to solve for a new consumption decision
rule, and use the resource constraint to obtain a new bonds decision rule. If
the latter violates the maximum debt limit, redefine to bonds decision rule
to match the debt limit and set the associated consumption decision rule to
the amount supported by the resource constraint. Iterate to convergence
on the bonds decision rule and then use the decision rules and Markov
process of income shocks to compute the ergodic distribution of bonds and
income (i.e. the wealth and income distribution across agents). The differ-
ence with the small open economy is that now the interest rate is also part
of the solution. The ergodic distribution is used to compute the aggregate
demand for bonds (i.e. the mean of asset demand across agents), which
must be equal zero at equilibrium in order to clear the bond market. If
it yields exceeds demand (supply), the interest rate is reduced (increased)
until the market-clearing condition holds up to a convergence criterion.
Again FiPIt does not require a root finder.
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